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The Reign of Evil 
C. K. BARREIT 
Paul was not only the greatest but the first of all Christian theologians. We 
know fair ly exactly what he had to start with; he tells us in 1 Cor 15:3-5 what he 
had received--the tradition that was current when he became a Christian. It is 
quite short enough to quote: 
Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures 
was buried 
rose on the third day according to the Scriptures 
appeared--to a number of people (Paul was himself able to expand 
the primitive list, adding his own name at the end). 
That is, it was known and accepted that certain events had taken place; these 
had received incipient theological interpretation in terms of the Old Testament. 
With 1 Corinthians 15 we may put a second passage, 1 Cor 11:23, where 
Paul, calling the Corinthian Church to order, recalled in similar language ("I 
received .. .I handed on") what he had learnt about the church supper: 
The Lord J esus in the night in which he was betrayed took a loaf, gave 
thanks, broke it, and said, "This is my body which is for you. Do this in 
memory of me." Similarly he took the cup after they had had supper, 
saying, "This cup is the new covenant in my blood. Do this, whenever 
you drink, in memory of me." 
Here is an historical event, and a continuing event (a weekly supper) , the for-
mer controlling the latter. Here, also, is more interpretation: a sacrificial giving 
of body and blood, establishing a covenant--a new covenant, though Paul does 
not use, his predecessors had not used, the adjective that would have given a 
clear reference to the new covenant prophecy of J eremiah 31. Paul adds a 
verse, which points to what he took the tradition to mean: "As often as you eat 
the loaf and drink the cup you proclaim the Lord's death until he come." It was 
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a proclamation of the Lord's death, establishing a relation between God and 
man, and continuing until the Lord (evidently therefore no longer dead--an im-
plicit reference to the Resurrection) should come again. 
Paul thus entered into a tradition of events provided with an incipient 
interpretat ion. Historically and conceptually, this brings us to the point at which 
Paul started. From the simple historical point of view we have a sequence of 
events: 
Supper, in the night in which Jesus was betrayed, or handed over. 
Death and burial. 
Resurrection on the third day. 
Appcarances--last of all, Paul says, to me. 
We should add a further expected event: 
Until I-le come. 
Before Paul 's conversion, Christian thought focused on these events, adding 
two propositions that gave them meaning: 
For our sins; and, 
according to the Scriptures. 
In all these propositions, Jesus of Nazareth is the subject of the verb (except 
where, in other passages which I have not quoted, we read that God raised Him 
from the dead) . It is not hard to state these facts; if you had actually encoun-
tered Jesus following His death it was impossible not to accept, state and pon-
der them. But they were not easy. They called accepted conceptual frameworks 
into question. It was especially difficult to relate the recorded events to their 
experienced consequences. How did the death of Jesus of Nazareth deal with 
our sins and inaugurate a new covenant? 
It was left to Christians after the Resurrection to answer such questions to 
the best of their ability and to explain their position to their contemporaries. Of 
course, they had the assistance of the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit docs not 
work without reference to the human material available; and though there 
were, no doubt, many good Christians who were open to the Spirit's operation, 
there was only one who ha<l the necessary gifts to evolve out of these tradi-
tional--and indispcnsablc--propositions a powerful and coherent theology. His 
name was Paul. 
Not hing more self-evident , and nothing more profound, can be said about 
Paul's theology than that it was a theology of salvation. Those who arc Chris-
tians may be delined as the saved (1 Cor 1: 18), or perhaps as those who are in 
process of being saved (the participle is in the present tense), for salvation in its 
fullness and linalit y still lies in the future. "Now is salvation nearer to us, as we 
march through time, nearer than when we lirst believed" (Rom 13:11). The 
verb to sal'e regularly appears in the future tense or the subjective mood, with 
an element of contingency, or at least futurity. Finality is sure, yet it is uncer-
tain; for Paul himself, having preached to others, may in the end turn out lo be 
rejected (1 Cor 9:27). Bur salvation is what theology is about. 
A theology of salvation presupposes a world that is somehow wrong, a situ-
ation from which men need to be delivered. This is an impression of the world 
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that is familiar enough in our time, and it was by no means unfamiliar in Paul's, 
though then the wrongness of the world was expressed in somewhat different 
terms. In what sense is the world wrong? From what do we need to be deliv-
ered? Some of Paul's contemporaries thought of a world that had been wrong 
from the start, that was wrong in itself and could only cease to be wrong by 
ceasing to be itself. Creation was an unfortunate error that had to be undone; 
salvation was de-creation. The empirical universe was an unhappy mixture of 
spirit (which was good and immortal) with matter (which was bad and subject 
to death). Salvation consisted in the resolution of this radical dualism. The mix-
ture had to be sorted out and spirit freed from matter. This was the basic 
proposition which the various gnostic myths expressed in an endless series of 
mythological fantasies--fantasies indeed, but not fantasies that we may regard 
as objects of scorn, for they were the products of sensitive minds burdened by 
the evil of the world, which they took as seriously as it deserved to be taken. 
But this was a view that no orthodox Jew, adhering to the Old Testament, could 
hold; Paul did not hold it. Yet his view of the world was, in some respects, akin 
to this astrological, gnostic view that he was bound to reject. The fund amental 
difference, indeed, was absolute. The world was not made wrong, it had gone 
wrong. It had gone wrong because, though made good by the good God, it had 
escaped from His dominion and come under that of evil powers; al this point 
the resemblance between Paul and his gnostic contemporaries is absolute. This 
was the world's misfortune; it was also, as we shall see, its fault. (One might say 
with a little exaggeration, a collective misfortune and an individual fault.) 
Gilbert Murray wrote that "astrology fell upon the Hellenistic mind as a 
new disease falls upon some remote island peoplc ... .In all the religious systems 
of antiquity, if I mistake not, the Seven Planets play some lordly or terrifying 
part."1 These seven heavenly bodies, whose regular and predictable movements 
created a strong impression of destiny and determinism, had each of them its 
own sphere (or hemisphere) in which it moved. These seven sphe res formed an 
impenetrable barrier between this material world of bondage to destiny and to 
the heavenly powers and the upper world of spirit, freedom, life and God. 
These astrologers might, for a suitable fee, inform you about your destiny. For 
escape from it, you needed the mysteries for sacramental agencies, or gnosis, 
which was in essence (though capable of great refinement) the secret of how to 
get out. 
At present we are not concerned with getting out; we are dealing with the 
reign of evil, and we are to note that Paul has reached a position strikingly simi-
lar to that of contemporaries, though he began in a different place and must 
think of salvation not as de-creation, an unmixing of creation, but as a restora-
tion of creation to what it originally was and was always intended to be in that 
mind of God. There are other differences too, which we shall encounter 
shortly; at the present, we may explore the similarity further. 
We may look with confidence for the similarity in the time "before faith 
came" (Gal 3:23), a situation in which there was no gospel to set men free. 
Man is in prison, kept under lock and key. In the immediate context, Paul is 
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thinking of bondage under the law of Moses, a bondage which is ended when 
men become sons of Goel in Christ. All this is expressed in language which is 
suitable for Jews who have become Christians; moreover, in classic form, it 
contains truths which, mutatis mutandis, arc applicable to all Ch ristians. But 
Paul knows that his readers arc not converted Jews; they arc Gentiles (though 
their faith is being threatened by Judaizers), and accordingly he begins (in 
chapter 4) to express himself in a new way. Even an heir, while an infant and 
underage by law, is kept under the rule of stewards and governors--and is any-
thing but free. Similarly, until the appointed moment when God sent forth His 
Son (4:4), we were enslaved under the elemental spirits (stoicheia) of the uni-
verse. 
What are these stoicheia? We must pick up what hints we can (for Paul 
nat urally assumes that his readers know all about them and need no definiti ons 
or explanations). The hints arc to be found chicOy in vv 8-1 2. The Galatians arc 
in danger of falling back into bondage from which they have been liberated by 
Christ. They arc going back to the stoicheia; Paul (who docs not think much of 
them) calls them the feeble and poverty-stricken stoicheia. What then wa the 
previous state to which the Galatians were th reatening to return? They had 
been enslaved to beings which in the nature of things arc not gods. These are 
the stoicheia, beings regarded by some as divine though in the proper sense 
they arc not god. Paul docs not say that they <lo not exist; only that they are 
"no-gods"; not exactly "anti-gods," but not to be described by the word god as 
a Jew understood it. They arc the heavenly powers; planets, perhaps, or powers 
represented by the planets, or inhabiting the planets. 
There arc two things to note here. One is that Paul is talking like a gnostic, 
or at least a modified gnostic. The change that had happened to the Galatians 
(which they seemed about to reverse) is described in terms of knowledge. In 
the old days they had not known God; their release is described as "now that 
you have come Lo know God"--cxactly what a gnostic would have said. But as 
soon as Paul has said it, he corrects it: "or rather have come to be known by 
God." The important thing is not that you know God but that God knows you. 
So the language of gnosis can (with proper caution and correction) be applied. 
The second thing to note is that Paul has not forgotten about the Law, but in-
corporates it with what he is saying about the stoicheia. For the Galatians arc 
not turning back lo their old heathenism; they are turning to the Law, which (as 
Paul said in 3:19) was given by angels. 
Law we shall come back to, bricOy, at a later point. For the present, note 
that the stoicheia reappear in Colossians; and whatever we make of the author-
ship of Colossians, the point is the same. In 2:8 the stoicheia arc connected with 
phi/osophia, which is much nearer to gnosis than to what we mean by philoso-
phy. Verse 2:20 indicates we have been removed from the reach of the ele-
ment s by dying with Christ. The whole conte>.1 is important, but I can only 
name the relevant themes: 
l. Again the heavenly powers are associated with the Law (2:14, 16). 
2. Other words are used, too: principalities, powers, angels (2:10, 15, 18). 
3. In this context, Christolot,ry develops (2:9, 10, 17). 
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The reference to other words will remind us of other passages in other 
epistles where stoicheia are not mentioned but a variety of other terminology 
appears. In addition to those I have already listed, there are powers and rulers, 
and Paul knows the astrological terms height and depth (Rom 8:38f.). He evi-
dently distrusts all these powers, even angels. 
The powers are in conflict with Christ; it is a conflict that takes place in 
three acts. 
Act 1--The powers have been defeated by Christ: Col 2:15, 1:13; cf. Eph 
1:21; see also 1 Cor 2:8 (which indicates something less than defeat); cf. Eph 
2:2. It is worth noting that these references (apart from that in 1 Corinthians) 
come from epistles which, if not deuteropauline, are certainly late). 
Act 2--The demons continue the fight; so very clearly in Eph 6:12, cf. 3:10; 
also Rom 8:38f. and the references to stoicheia that we have already consid-
ered; but especially the references to Satan, who is very active: 1 Cor 5:5, 7:4; 2 
Cor 2:11, 11:14, 12:7; 1Thess2:28 (cf. Eph 4:27, 6:11). 
Act 3--This continued conflict will be brought to an end by Christ's final 
victory: 2 Thess 2:8-12; 1Cor15:24-28. This restores the order willed by God in 
creation: Col 1:16, 18; 2:10. Note again what is said of Satan: 2 Thess 2:8; Rom 
16:20. 
The position is thus neither static nor simple. Paul and his readers live be-
tween crucifixion and resurrection on the one hand, and the parousia on the 
other, each a decisive divine victory. It corresponds to this that Christians have 
been rescued from the power of darkness and translated into the kingdom of 
God's Son (Col 1:13), yet remain and groan within the world of sin and death 
(Rom 8:23; 2 Cor 5:4). They are saved in hope (Rom 8:24). It is worth noting 
that in this scheme Paul reproduces the pattern, though not the terminology, of 
the eschatology of the Gospels, in which the kingdom is mysteriously present 
but is still to come in power, and the Son of Man is exposed to suffering and 
death and will come in glory at some point in the future. 
It would be possible to stop here and present a neat and comforting, if not 
in all respects comfortable, picture. Evil powers have usurped authority over 
God's universe and are, of course, running it wrongly. God, however, has no 
intention of allowing them to get away with their wickedness, and in due course 
will drive them out. For the present, things are bound to be unpleasant for 
those caught in the crossfire, but before long the powers of evil will be put to 
flight. It is unfortunate that we should have to suffer because things have gone 
wrong, but it was not our fault and we shall be compensated. It would be pos-
sible to stop here; and wrong. 
The tyranny under which the human race suffers is not only external; it is 
also internal. Man is not simply an unfortunate sufferer under the malign influ-
ence of the planets. We cannot adequately deal with the reign of evil without 
introducing a new word: sin. 
This is not an easy term to define. One might do much worse that to use 
our starting point and say that sin is the inward correlative of the external tyr-
anny, the subjection to astrological and demonic forces, under which man lives. 
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He is not simply, as some J ews tended to think of him, the unfortunate victim 
of oppression, the deprived heir of an Adam who had lost his wisdom, beauty, 
strength and freedom; nor is he the unlucky product of a gnostic mythical "acci-
dent" (as in Poimandres, where heavenly man, leaning out of heaven to enjoy 
his own reflection in the watery deep, leaned loo far, fell out of heaven and 
found himself in the embrace of [female] nature, a union out of which a mix-
ture of spirit and matter, good and evil, was produced) . H e is himself a guilty 
rebel against his Creator, condemned to perish by his fault, his own fau lt , his 
own most grievous fault. How far the individual member of the race generated 
this fault himself, how far he inherited it, how far he acquired it from his envi-
ronment, are questions we must for the present, and perhaps altogether, defer. 
I shall, however, take this opportunity to point out that we see here for the 
first time one of the most important hermencutical and theological problems, a 
problem that will go with us in one form or another th roughout our work. How 
far is this inward bondage of man to sin simply a demythologized way of ex-
pressing the outward bondage of man to the clements? It might be better to put 
the question the other way round. How far is the outward bondage of man to 
the elements simply a mythologized, pictorial way of expressing the inward 
bondage of man to sin? Arc the two capable of being equated without remain-
der? That they are related is, or will become, clear; arc they, though cast in 
d ifferent terms, identical? If they are, then we may, if we wish, dismiss the stoi-
cheia at once; and most of us, I suspect, would be glad to sec them go. They are 
an embarrassment, for we do not, today, speak naturally in these terms. T he 
consequence of this would be that Pauline theology could virtually be rewritt en 
in terms of existentialism; theology would become anthropology. There is truth 
in this view; some measure of equivalence as welJ as parallelism exists between 
the two kinds of bondage. Man's rebellion is man's way to his own loss of privi-
lege and of life itself: by man came death. There will be (if we may anticipate 
work we have not yet done) a corresponding parallelism and equivalence in the 
sphere of redemption, for salvation will consist in existential renewal or reori-
entation of man's life as he discovers authentic existence: by man came also the 
resurrection of the dead. There is truth in all this, some truth; but is this the 
whole truth? Or does there remain an objective, external clement in man's 
bondage, and hence in his liberat ion also? Christus pro 11obis, Cl11ist11s extra nos, 
as well as Christzts in 11obis?2 
These are not questions that I may even attempt to answer in this art icle. If 
we stick to our present theme the answers may emerge in due course. I have 
allowed myself to digress for a moment in order to make clear how fundamen-
tal are the issues with which we are concerned. It is easy to get lost, o r at least 
to feel lost, in a maze of detail, and a good thing from time to time to look at a 
large map. But that does not mean that we can afford to scamp the detail. We 
had better get back to it. 
We are speaking of sin; what has Paul to say about it? We will jump in at 
the deep end with a sentence that has caused much difficulty, and indeed of-
fense. In Rom 14:23, Paul declares that everything that is not of faith is sin. So, 
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if you are not actively engaged in being religious, and feeling religious, are you 
a sinner? Is every activity you engage in outside an ecclesiastical framework 
wicked? To believe so mistakes Paul's antithesis. If faith is (and for the moment 
at least we may allow ourselves to assume it) the true relation of man to God, 
anything that is outside this true relation, anything, that is, that is wrongly re-
lated lo God, is, by definition, sin. That is, sin is primarily a relational rather 
than an ethical word, and is nothing if no t (in the strictest sense) theological. Of 
course, to be wrongly related to God will have ethical consequences; this fol-
lows from the nature of God. But these are consequences, and in the first in-
stance sin is defined in relation not to an ethical system but to God. 
Let us track down this relational, pre-ethical, understanding of sin in more 
detail. There is plenty of material in the opening chapters of Romans. The es-
sence of the matter is set out at once in 1:18-32, where the sin of the Gentile 
world is traced back to its idolatry, so that sin immediately appears as a false, 
negative relation with God. The very existence of creation exterior to himself, 
the existence of objects for which he was in no sense responsible--sun, moon, 
earth and so on--should have convinced man of an eternal power and divinity 
(1:20), a power, not his own, not human, conceivably demonic but, in fact (as a 
reader of the Old Testament did not need to be told), divine. This is what can 
be known about God (1:19)--not the whole truth about God, but the basic fact 
that there is a " not-I," something other than self, with which I am confronted. 
What does man do in the presence of this divinity? What he ought to do may be 
inferred from 1:21: he ought to glorify God and give thanks to Him. But verse 
21 has a negative in it; this is precisely what man will not do. Instead of believ-
ing gratitude, he gives God a rebuff. Why? Because to recognize an eternal 
power and divinity--such a " not-I" --would mean recognizing a master; and this 
is what man is unwilling to do. 
ll is worthwhile here to pause in order to note the allusions that show that 
Paul has in the back of his mind the story of creation and the Fall in Genesis 1-
3. What has happened is the perversion of an element in God's good creation. 
The human creatures were intended to have dominion over the rest of creation 
(Gen 1:28; cf. Ps 8:6); but their lust for dominion was unbridled. Having tasted 
the sweets of authority, man sought more and more to make himself free even 
of God by depressing God to his own level. He changed the truth of God into a 
lie, and rejected all the intimations of God that came to him from a world still 
unfallen. H e preferred to worship human and animal images which could never 
be his lord (1:22f.). So far, all is a matter of relation; ethics is not yet involved, 
but it follows as an immediate consequence. Man's rejection of a right relation 
with God is the o rigin of man's disorder. His wisdom becomes folly (1:21f.). He 
plunges into moral wickedness, and that by God's own decree (1:24, 26, 28). 
Immediately we meet the words desire and uncleanness; for Paul, sexual, and 
especially homosexual, sin is the most blatant of all sins because it is the clear-
est example of man's self-assertion, the ultimate case of arrogating lo oneself a 
right one does not possess. It is bad enough when I make an illicit claim on 
another person's property; worse when I make such a claim on another per-
son's person. 
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So much for idolatrous Gentiles; no J ew was in doubt that they were sin-
ners (sinners of the Gentiles [Gal 2:15]). All that we have time and need to pick 
oul of chapter 2 is the devastating counlerblasl, "You who judge practice the 
same things" (2:1) --a theme that runs, positively and negatively, th rough the 
whole chapter. It cannot mean that all are equally guilty of the vices listed al 
the end of chapter 1, any more than "observing the righteous o rdinance of the 
law" (2:26) can mean that Gentiles observe the Sabbath and abstain from pork. 
Jn simple terms, it means that the self-appointed judge, whether Jew or Gen-
tile, dispossesses God, putting himself in God's place; instead of giving glory to 
God, he takes it for himself. The pre-ethical origins of sin are very clear. 
Chapter 3 contains the jo int indictment of J ew and G reek (3:9), with a de-
tailed demonst ration of the point out of the Old Testament (3:10-18). T his is 
important because it shows that, for P aul, the charge of universal sin fulness is 
no t a matter of observation but of the Word of God. The assertion of the 
Psalm, "There is none righteous, not even one," matches the quasi-philosophi-
cal (but really exegetical) argument of chapter 1. 
Thal exegetical argument was based on Genesis 1-3 and made use of the 
figure of Adam, though without naming him. The reference becomes explicit in 
chapter 5, and before laying down Romans we must look brieny al what Paul 
has to say there. The rela tional, non-ethical, meaning of sin becomes unmistak-
able as Paul , introducing new words, speaks of trespass and transgression (5:15, 
16, 17, 18, 20). Sin cannot be measured, can hardly be properly observed, unless 
a further facto r, law, is int roduced into the situation (5:13). It is law lhal turns 
sin into concrete acts of transgression. So it was with Adam; so it is with the 
rest o f mankind; for all sinned (5:12). Only law was needed to turn universal sin 
into universal transgression (and so far as law was not universal, or might have 
seemed not to be universal, some might seem to have escaped, so that Paul has 
to make a special point in 5:14) . 
What Adam's sin was is given fundamental definition by its cont rast with 
the act of grace (5:16) and the obedience (5:19) of Christ, who humbled himself 
in obedient faith before God. Grace is condescending, outgoing, non-acquisitive 
love. This is contrasted with the acquisitiveness of Genesis 1-3, and of all hu-
man life since, and helps to clarify what sin is. It is not simply greed, but man's 
desire to secure himself--cvcn vis-a-vis God. The contrast is expressed in the 
tille of Nygrcn's classic book, Agape and Eros (giving love and acquisitive love). 
Paul docs not use the word eros; his word (both noun and verb) is desire, which 
he draws from the lasl of the Ten Commandments (Exod 20:17; Dcul 5:21; 
quoted in Rom 7:7). 
A t this point we may pause for a moment to survey the ground that we 
have covered regarding sin; 
1. Sin is connected with Adam; the word adam is Hebrew for man, hu-
manity. That is, sin is coextensive with the human race and proper to the being 
of man as such, not an accident, which any given man may or may not incur, but 
a definition of human nature--al least a partial and provisional definit ion. The 
ultimate definition of human nature, for Paul, is Christ, der rechte Mann ; but 
th is is man as intended by God, not man as he is. 
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2. Sin is connected with idolatry, the most primitive of all sins. It is thus 
essentially a theological rather than a moral concept, a relation (or lack of rela-
tion) with God. It exists wherever God is dispossessed of His place and His 
right. In this sense, Jews as well as Gentiles may be idolaters. The root of idola-
try (to press further back still) is pride, for the only way in which man can put 
himself on a level with God, the being whom he worships, is to deny the true 
God and put a no-god in his place. The connection between the external tyr-
anny of the stoicheia and the internal disorder of human nature is already ap-
parent. 
3. The consequence of sin is death. The more man seeks life in and for 
himself the more he turns his back on God, who is life. Again the story of 
Adam (Man) is in mind. By rebelling, seeking life by illicit means, Adam con-
demned himself to death: " In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely 
die" (Gen 2:17). This, collectively, man continues to do, and death reigned 
from Adam to Moses even over those who, having no law, did not trespass as 
Adam did (Rom 5:14); much more from Moses onward. 
4. It follows that sin, like death, is something that concerns the whole 
man, not part of him. It is a definition of the totality of human existence in this 
age. 
These summary observations are worth making, but they leave open a 
number of questions of various kinds. If the human race is now to be thought of 
as universally sinful, at least in the sense of being imperfectly related to its 
Creator, a nd if this was not the original intention of the Creator (if, that is, 
something originally good has been corrupted into evil), what was the source of 
the corruption? It is easy to paint a picture, as I have done, of the usurpation of 
God's cosmos by unruly and ill-intentioned cosmic elements; but where did 
these elements come from? Did God make them, and, through inadvertence or 
negligence or weakness, make them evil? Is there a corresponding corrupting 
force within the microcosm, the life of man? Alongside this question, almost 
paraphrasing it, is the strictly exegetical question: What docs Paul mean by the 
word flesh? Does this point to an initial dualism in hum an nature in such a way 
as to contradict the conclusion that sin is a phenomenon of the whole man and 
the belief that God's original creation was wholly good? 
This will prompt the next stage in our inquiry into the reign of evil; it can 
be brief, for no t long ago I wrotc3 about the great passage in Galatians 5 in 
which Paul gives the basic principles of his understanding of flesh. The key to 
this is the observation that flesh has two counterparts, two opposites. One is 
love; if flesh is what love is not (or is love with a minus sign outside the bracket) 
then it denotes self-centered existence, life directed to my own ends. This, of 
course, need have no thing to <lo with gross, vulgar, carnal sins but may be exer-
cised within a religious framework (and has indeed all too often been exercised 
within an ecclesiastical framework in which men have pushed for the best jobs 
and used their positions to manipulate others) . The constituents of the human 
person arc what they should be, but they are set in a false configuration; there 
is still no better phrase than Luther's cor i11cmvat11111 in se, the heart turned in 
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upon itself. The other counterpart of flesh is Spirit, for the only way not lo be 
self-centered is to be God-centered, and that, for Paul, is what the Spirit 
means: God in his readiness to fill and control a human life. 
Another passage of primary importance if we are to understand what Paul 
means by flesh is Rom 7:17-8:13, of which we can glance at only a verse or two. 
The argument begins back in 7:7, not as an account of human nature, or of con-
version, but as an answer to the question, " Is the Law sin?" If it is not to be 
identified with sin (and how could it be, since it is the word of God?), how is it 
related to sin? In fact, Paul says (7:17) it is sin itself as a living force that is re-
sponsible for sinful actions. He goes on to say (7:18), "There is no good thing in 
me, that is in my flesh." The parallelism shows that here flesh means " me-de-
voted-to-sin," which is not very different from the " me-devoted-to-myself' of 
Galatians. This is evidently not the whole truth about "me," because I want to 
do what is good, but that it is true is proved by my practical inability to achieve 
the good I want to do. 
Paul turns the corner into chapter 8, but he has not forgotten that he is 
writing about law, or that he has defended law as good. He cannot, however, 
deny (8:3) that it is ineffective, and it is ineffective on account of the flesh (cf. 
7:12, 14). Flesh is thus a force that operates in a direction contrary to the true 
intention of the law, which is to secure ma11 's obedience to God. Clearly this 
does not mean flesh as material, or even flesh as man's "unspiritual nature." 
This is fu rther emphasized by the expression "sin's flesh" and especially by the 
statement that the Son of God came in the likeness of sin's flesh. If we may 
paraphrase Paul's st raightforward language in our polysyllables, the incarnation 
meant that Christ shared fully in existence that was normally anthropocentric. 
That H e (or God) condemned sin in the flesh (the only place where there was 
any point in condemning it) means that H e lived a theocentric existence in an-
thropocentric circumstances. 
The result of Christ's living a God-centered life while in the likeness of 
sin's flesh (real material flesh which, however, He did not permit lo be under 
the dominion of sin) is that the requirement that the law rightly makes, namely 
God-centered existence, may be fulfilled in us--in that we live not "according to 
flesh" but "according to Spirit" (verse 4). The righteous requirement of the law 
is fulfilled only where this new existence is lived. 
Verse 5 is a fundamental definition of what is meant by this. The alterna-
t ive to " minding the th ings of the flesh" is not " minding the things of the 
higher, or spiritual, life" but " minding the things of the Spirit (of God)." Once 
more, flesh is anthropocentric life, Spirit is God-centered li fe. 
It is important once more to recall that Paul 's view of the perversion of the 
world in its alienation from God is twofold. Independently of man, and objec-
tively, the universe is perverted because it has come to be under the wrong di-
rection, under the wrong rulers. The stoiclzeia and other powers (or possibly the 
same powers under other names) have seized control. The resul t is that the uni-
verse itself is in bondage to corruption (Rom 8:21) . U nless something is done 
about this, it will inevitably be destroyed. Man will share in this destruction; he 
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is already on the way to death, and he lives under the authority of darkness. 
Christians, though they have the assurance of the divine love, continue under 
the threat of the demonic forces (Rom 8:38f.). One of these forces bears the 
title "sin," often described by Paul in almost personal terms. This means that 
we are already moving over to the second aspect of alienation. 
Inwardly, and subjectively, the individual man is perverted. The disorder is 
anthropological as well as cosmological, and the essence of it is that man lives 
within the closed circle of his own existence, seeking to control his own affairs 
in his own interest. Turning away from God and manufacturing deities to suit 
his own desire, he falls into foolishness and moral corruption, abusing even 
such good gifts of God as the law. He is under the primeval sentence of death. 
Where did all this evil come from? How did the snake get into the garden? 
Paul does not tell us; and anyone who has pursued Calvin's tormented thought 
as he tried to deal with the problem will have little stomach for investigation. 
"The first man fell because the Lord deemed it meet that he should: why he 
deemed it meet, we know not...Man therefore falls, divine providence so or-
daining, but he falls by his own fault (suo vitio )."4 Certainly we may say that 
God gave His creature freedom, which must from the beginning have left the 
door open--for temptation, for the snake to come in, for man to go out. This, 
however, is not an explanation. There is perhaps an inevitability given in the gift 
of creativity. Precisely because man is the center of new, creative, independent 
existence, he will wish to push his creativity and independence as far as they will 
go. If he pushes them too far, encounters God, and in the end discovers the 
truth of the God who loved enough to give him birth, shall we not say with 
Augustine, Felix culpa?5 Here we may rejoin Paul, who knows that only through 
their disobedience do men apprehend the mercy of God (Rom 11:32). 
We are still using mythological language if we say that evil must reign in 
order that God may be seen to get the better of it; and, so far as the myth 
speaks (as we have seen) of an objective perversion and points to an objective 
restoration of God's universe, we must not attempt to get rid of it. But Paul 
himself has a demythologized version of the truth in question, and this also we 
must not miss. Our greatest danger lies not in our obviously wicked actions, 
which no one would ever think of defending, but in the perversion of our reli-
gious aspiration and discipline. Paul did not write letters complaining of the 
treatment he received at the hands of the heathen, though (if we may trust 
Acts) they sometimes treated him pretty roughly. He filled page after page with 
complaints against the religious. Com1ptio optimi pessima6 is as true in the 
realm of theology as elsewhere; it is what the reign of evil means. In other 
words, as Paul says (Rom 7:13), "Did that good thing come to mean death for 
me? No; on the contrary it was sin, that sin might appear in its true colors, pro-
ducing death for me through that good thing, that sin might through the com-
mandment become overwhelmingly sinful." 
16 Barrett 
NOTES 
1. G ilbert Murray, Five Stages of Greek Religion (London: Walls, 1935), pp. 144-146. 
2. Christ for us, Christ apart from (outside of, beyond) us as well as Christ in us. 
3. C. K. Barrell, Freedom and Obligation (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1985). 
4. Calvin, Institutes, 3:23:8. 
5. 0 blessed guilt. 
6. The (absolute) worst corruption of the good (person). 
Early Jewish Christianity--A 
Lost Chapter? 
WILLIAM RICHARD STEGNER 
What do we mean by early J ewish Christianity? Who were these early .Jew-
ish Christians? Early Jewish Christianity describes the membership and man-
ner of thinking of the first church--thc kind of church that existed before A.D. 70 
in Judea, Galilee and other places like Damascus. St. Paul was referring to the 
leadership of early Jewish Christians in Ga l 2:9 when he spoke of James and 
Cephas (Peter) and John as " pillars." Paul goes on to say that he and Barna-
bas would go "to the Gentiles and they to the circumcised." Do we really know 
anything about these early J ewish Christians? Can we? 
True, there are the sketchy accounts in Acts. However, these stories tell us 
mostly about the spread of the church; they tell us only a litt le about what Jew-
ish Christians believed and how they unde rstood themselves. In addition, there 
are a few interpolated accounts from the Ebionites-- later descendants of early 
Jewish Christians. While a few scholars have tried lo reconstruct early J ewish 
Christianity from these later garbled "books," in actuality, we know precious 
little about the period from Pentecost un til the outbreak of the g reat Roman 
war in A.O. 66. Until recently, early J ewish Christianity has remained a lost 
chapter in church history. 
Within the last few years, however, New Testament scholars have become 
increasingly aware that several Gospel nar ratives arc best described as the liter-
ary deposits of early Jewish Christianity. Specifi cally, the narratives of J esus' 
baptism, temptation, transfiguration and feed ing of the live thousand were for-
mulated by early Jewish Christians. I prefer to use the awkward term "formu-
lated" rather than "written" in order not to prejudge the question of historicity. 
These well-known, but widely misinterpreted, narratives tell us much about the 
beliefs of early J ewish Christians as well as the way in which they understood 
themselves. 
Before turning to a detailed examinat ion of the first two of these narra-
tives, we would do well to investigate the elements that make up each of these 
stories about Jesus. Heretofore, New Testament interpreters have tended to 
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read a ll kinds of meanings into these stories because they have not understood 
their makeup or structure. These structural c lements mark them as somewhat 
different fro m o ther kinds of sto ries in the Gospels. 
Prim ary structural clements in these narratives are the references and allu-
sio ns they make to Old Testament stories and passages. These sto ries about 
Jesus canno t be understood witho ut first studying the Old Testament passages 
to which they refer. While it may be difficult for us as moderns to understand 
this re liance o n OT stories, it made perfect sense to Jewish Christians. After 
a ll , they " lived" out of their Bibles much more than we do. Moreover, by relat-
ing Jesus to the stories and heroes from their Bible, they sought to show His 
meaning in terms familia r to themselves and the la rger Jewish community. 
A second element lying in the background of each of these Jewish Chris-
tian narratives is .Jewish exegetical tradition. We naively think that they ap-
proached the OT sto ries directly, as we tend to do. They loved a Bible already 
in terpreted. For example, consider Jesus' words o f institution al the Last Sup-
per: "This is my body" (Mark 14:22) . Lutherans, Anglicans and others who 
believe in the " real" presence understand the word " is" litera lly. Baptists and 
others interpret the word " is" to mean "stands for." Similarly, Jewish Chris-
tians brought first-century Jewish understandings to the text of the OT. 
T he third clement in each story is the work o f Jewish Christians them-
selves. T hey sought to combine O T passages, plus first-century Jewish inter-
pre tive traditio ns, in such a way that these stories about Jesus reflected and 
even clarified their fa ith in Jesus. Accordingly, each of these stories seems to 
be composed of at least four clements: an incident in the ministry o f Jesus, OT 
references and allusions, first-century Jewish exegetical tradit ions, and a crea-
tive combination o f the previous three clements that pointed to the meaning o f 
J esus for their time. 
Before we turn to an in-depth analysis of the temptation narra tive, o ne 
critical issue must be discussed. The New Testament contains three accounts 
of the te mptat ion: Matt 4: 1-11, Mark 1:12-13 and Luke 4:1-13. In actuality, 
there are two narratives of the tcmpta tion--the brief Markan narrative and the 
p re-Gospel narrative lying behind the very similar accounts in Matthew and 
Luke. Since Matthew and Luke apparently d id not know each other's Gospels, 
they copied the narra tive of the tempta tion from an o lder, pre-Gospel source 
called Q . Since the brief Markan narrative simply slates that Jesus was 
tempted by the devil in the wilderness, scholarly a ttentio n has focused on the 
more de tailed account used in Matthew and Luke. This de ta iled account found 
in Q is usually dated between A.O. 50 and 60. A history o f this narrative would 
look like the following: an incident in the ministry of J esus, la te r formulated by 
.Jewish Christians, found its way into the source called Q . This Q narrative was 
copied with minor changes by the la ter write rs of Matthew and Luke . 
REFERE NCES TO SCRIPTU RE 
Now let us turn to the narrative in M atthew and Luke. The crucial e lement 
for interpre ting the meaning o f the temptation narra tive is found in the three 
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quotations from Deuteronomy by which J esus answered the three temptations 
set before him. The Dcutcronomic contexts of these three quotations point to 
three incidents in the wilderness wanderings of the children of Israel under 
Moses. The contexts of the quotations show that the situation of J esus in the 
wilderness of Judea was similar to that of Israel. So similar were the tempta-
tions of Jesus to those of his ancestors that one may say in some sense Jesus 
was reliving the experiences of his ancestors. 
Note the parallel situations. In the climactic temptation according to Mat-
thew (in Luke the order of Mallhew's second and third temptation are re-
versed), the devil invites J esus to "fall down and worship" him (Matl 4:9b). Jn 
Deut 6:13-14, Moses warned the people against going after "other gods." Ac-
cording to the later rabbinic tradition, the most celebrated incidence of such 
idolatry was the worship of the golden calf. 
In the second temptation, the devil invites Jesus to prove his sonship by 
putting God to the test: if Jesus throws himself down from the temple, God 
will send angels to save his life. Similarly, Israel of old asked Moses to give 
them water in the wilderness and thereby prove that God was with them (Exod 
17:1-7). In the first temptation, the hunger of Jesus recalls the hunger of Israel 
shortly after the deliverance in the Exodus (Exodus 16). 
The words from Deuteronomy which arc quoted in the introduction to the 
narrativc--" led," "wilderness," "tempted," "forty"--imply another parallel. In 
Deut 8:2 the Lord "led" Israel "forty" years in the "wilderness," " testing (the 
same Greek word as 'tempted'] you." The sentence continues, " to know what 
was in your heart, whether you would keep his commandments or not." The 
first half of the sentence implies the last half. Presumably Jesus was tested/ 
tempted for the same reason. The devil's business is to cause Jesus to sin as 
Israel had sinned. Jesus' business is to remain obedient to God. 
JEWISH TRADITION 
The Jewish tradition which the early Jewish Christians presumed in formu-
lating/telling this narrative is found in the Dead Sea Scrolls and in the exegeti-
cal tradition associated with Dcut 1:1. Let us turn to the Dead Sea Scrolls first. 
In the Dead Sea Scrolls the term "wilderness" conveys much more mean-
ing than its literal definit ion. Wilderness was associated with the coming time 
of deliverance and the end of this present evil age. The people of the Scrolls 
believed in typology (the parallelism of two ages) and felt that the Mosaic age 
foreshadowed the coming time of deliverance. As Israel was destined to inherit 
the promised land, so they were preparing the way in the wilderness for inherit-
ing the land in the new age. In their own life the sect imitated the institutions 
of the Mosaic age and believed that in their sectarian community they were al-
ready experiencing the coming salvation. 
In addition, the term "wilderness" designated the devil 's primary area of 
activity. Hence it meant a time and place of testing. Belia! (the devil) tried to 
prevent their obedience to God's law by tempting them to disobedience. 
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Since the early Jewish Christians were familiar with this kind of wilderness 
theology, they presupposed this thought-world in formulating their narrative of 
Jes us' temptations. 
The exegetical tradition associated with the book of Deuteronomy, and 
more narrowly with Deut 1:1, has never before been brought into discussions of 
the meaning of this narrative. The following sentences will explain this exegeti-
cal tradition and the following paragraph will show how it enhances our under-
standing of the narrative of the temptation. In Deut 1:1 we read: "These are 
the words that Moses spoke to all Israel beyond the Jordan in the wilder-
ness .... " Accordingly, the words of Moses are interpreted to be words of re-
buke to Israel for their failures in the wilderness.1 While this tradition is pre-
sented in de pth in later rabbinic works, the Dead Sea Scrolls and the earlier 
book of Jubilees show knowledge of it. 
The rebuke tradition enables us to find an emotional coloring and an inten-
sity in the narrative that was not apparent before. In the rebuke tradition 
God's anger is directed toward Israel for their apostasy, particularly their wor-
ship of the golden calf, in the wilderness. This underscores Jesus' achievement 
of obedience when faced with the same temptations. Also, the rebuke tradit ion 
answers questions that have puzzled scholars for a long time: Why does Jesus 
quote from Deuteronomy and not from the prim ary accounts of the incidents in 
Exodus, and why are Israel's transgressions summ arized by three incidents? 
Jesus quotes from Deuteronomy because only these words arc considered to be 
words of rebuke. In the rabbinic accounts the quotations from Exodus, among 
others, arc cited only by way of illustration to lend specificity to the words from 
Deuteronomy. Further, within the accounts of the rebuke tradition, there is a 
tendency to summarize Israel's sins into three incidents. For example, two of 
the four targums speak of only three rebukes. 
THE WORK OF EARLY JEWISH CHRISTIANS 
Standing within Judaism and using interpreted passages from Scripture, the 
Jewish Christian scribes forged a narrative of remarkable unity and balance. 
The unity is seen in the smooth now of the narrative. In Matthew's account 
(Matt 4:1-11) the setting (verses 1 and 2) prepares the hearer for that first 
temptation and nows naturally into it by quoting words from the context of the 
quotation that Jesus cites in verse 4. The temptations reach their climax in the 
third and great temptation to idolatry. Balance is achieved in two ways. Three 
temptations arc juxtaposed with three quotations from Scripture, which put the 
devil to night by exposing the sin into which he would entice Jesus. The three 
quotations also juxtapose the obedience of Jesus with the disobedience and 
consequent rebuke of Israel. 
Perhaps the most remarkable achievement of the J ewish Christian scribes 
is the clarity of the theological message. A number of scholars have shown that 
Jesus' sonship is the focus of the temptations: " If you are the Son of 
God ... " (Dcut 4:3 and 6). The parallelism between Jesus and the wilderness 
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generation emphasizes J esus' faithful obedience. Sonship means faithful obedi-
ence to God. Jesus' obedience demonstrates--rather than earns--that sonship. 
Moreover, that sonship was a remarkable achievement: the adversary was 
the prince of this world. Israel, God's first son, had fai led. Jesus binds the 
"strong man" (Mark 3:27) and begins to plunder his house. 
While sonship is defined by obedience, we must say more about the J ewish 
Christian understanding of sonship in this narrative. Is "Son of God" a Litle for 
the messiah or is it used in a non-messianic sense? Many interpreters believe 
that the word "son" is quo ted from Ps 2:7 and thereby designated the messiah 
who would liberate Israel from the Roman yoke. H owever, the narrative cites 
no traditional messianic conduct o r Lilies. The messiah was supposed to fight 
the Romans; Jesus fights the devil. His weapon is Scripture, not a sword. Such 
titles as "Christ" or " messiah" arc nowhere to be found here. 
From a scholarly point of view, the narrative does much to clarify the title 
"Son of God." T oday, most New T estament scholars still hold that the title 
"Son of God," except when it is used to designate messiah, originated in the 
H ellenistic Gentile world or the Hellenistic Jewish Christian church outside Is-
rael. Certainly, the above research shows that "Son of God" was used non-
messianically in an early Jewish Christian narrative. Moreover, defining "Son 
of God" by faithful obedience in the presence of demonic temptation is a very 
Jewish definition that has litllc or nothing Lo do with a Hellenistic/Gentile envi-
ronment. 
However, our definition of the term "Son of God" is not yet complete. 
Scholars have long recognized that the narrative of the temptation and the nar-
rative of the baptism are intim ately related, and, consequently, that the use of 
the term "son" in the baptism sheds light on the title "Son of God" in this nar-
rative. A more complete definition must await our discussion of that narrative 
in the following pages. 
In the preceding paragraphs we have found that the early Jewish Christians 
were preoccupied with Christology and tried to define the significance of J esus 
out of their own traditions and past. This is an im portant insight for it defines 
the primary theological preoccupation of Jewish Christianity before AD. 70. 
Nevertheless, this insight docs not exhaust the theological significance of this 
narrative. The narrative also shows us how these people understood them-
selves. 
EARLY JEWISH CHRISTIAN SELF-UNDERSTANDING 
We have said that the communi ty of the Dead Sea Scrolls held a view of 
history in which the Mosaic age would foreshadow or parallel the coming time 
of deliverance. This view is based on the presupposition that God acts in his-
tory. His activity in one age will be similar Lo his activity in another age. But 
specifically, the Mosaic age--the great deliverance from Egyptian bondage--is a 
pattern for the coming final deliverance from sin and death at the end of this 
present evil age. Nol surprisingly, early Jewish Christians also held this view of 
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history. Jesus undoes the disobedience of the Mosaic generatio n. Thus, the 
narrative suggests that J esus is bringing the history of Israel to a fulfillment. 
He had defeated the prince of this world. The narrative of the temptat io n her-
alds the time of del iverance. Consequently, the early Jewish Christians under-
stood the mselves in a certain way. In Jesus' victory the time of deliverance had 
begun. They were an eschatological community-in-waiting. The new age, the 
Kingdom of God, had al ready begun. They were living between the times. Yet 
the e nd was in sight , as the narrative of the transfiguration makes clear. 
Let us turn now to the narrative of the baptism. 
THE BAPTISM OF J ESUS 
Like the narrative of the temptation, the narrative of the baptism was also 
formulated by early J ewish Christians. Note what one scholar writes after his 
investigation of just one motif in the narrative: "Specifically, we have ... anchorcd 
the story in the earliest milieu in which trad itions of Jesus eme rged - Palest in-
ian, Aramaic-using Christianity."2 
H owever, the histo ry of this narrative is somewhat different from that o f 
the temptation because this narrative found its way into Mark's Gospel. Its his-
to ry begins with an incident in the life of Jesus. Early Jewish Christians formu-
lated a pre-gospel narrative about the baptism. Mark used the narrative as the 
first o f his sto ries about Jesus. Then, the later Gospels of Matthew and Luke 
introduced some changes into the narrative and incorporated it into their 
books. Since Mark's G ospel is the earliest written account of it, we will confine 
our analysis la rgely to Mark's account. 
By way o f introduction to this short narra tive--it contains only !ifty- three 
words in the o riginal G reek--wc must point out that it is lo!lg o n cont roversy. 
There is little scho larly agreement about any aspect of the narra tive. In te rms 
of the clements co mposing a .Jewish Christian narrative, scho lars d isagree 
about the OT passages to which it refers, about the Jewish traditio ns lying be-
hind it, about the work o f the formulato rs, and, especially, about the meaning 
o r main thrust of the narrative. 
O f course, there is disagreement about the literary form of the narrative, 
too. Rather than rehearse all the possibilities, we !ind the form is best de-
scribed as a cert ain kind of "vision." In the OT, visio ns are described in a cer-
tain way: visions arc characterized by such formal clements as the opening of 
heaven and the voice from heaven. After the OT period the form was modified 
by the introduction o f another c lement. Especially in the ta rgums, stress was 
placed o n the contents of the words spoken by the heavenly voice. Thus the at-
tentio n of the reader is drawn to the message o f the heavenly voice.3 The Mar-
kan narrative exemplifies the formal clements of this ta rgumic version o f the 
vision. 
REFER ENCES FROM SCRIPTURE 
Let us now turn to the cont roversy concerning the words from Scripture in 
this narra tive. T oday, most int erpre ters say that the sentence spoken by the 
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voice from heaven quotes words from Ps 2:7 and Isa 42:1. Others believe the 
words " beloved Son" in Mark 1:11 are quoted from the Septuagint translation 
of Gen 22: 2, 12 and 16. In Genesis 22, God refers to Abraham's son Isaac as 
"your beloved son." The word "beloved" plays a crucial role in the argument. 
Note the arguments for the minority report. First, the combination "beloved 
son" is found three limes in the G reek text of Genesis 22. Second, the word 
"beloved" is not f ou11d in Ps 2:7. Third, the date of the Aramaic translation of 
Ps 2:7 which might supply the word is late and uncertain. Finally, Ps 2 : 7: 
"You are my son ... " (spoken lo the king) is usually considered a messianic 
psalm and the word "beloved" is 11ot an appropriate designation for the mes-
siah, a military hero! 
In addition, significant indirect evidence, never considered before, points to 
Genesis 22. We are speaking of the Jewish Christian habit of quoting words 
from the context of a quotation, as we saw in the previous narrative. A signifi-
cant number of important words in the narrative of the baptism seems to be 
quoted from Genesis 22. At least, the two narratives share the following words: 
(9) (and it happe11ed) In those days Jesus cam e from Nazareth of 
Galilee and was baptized by John in the Jordan. (10) And when he 
came up out of the water, immediately he saw the heave11s opened 
(split) and the Spirit descending upon him like a dove; (1 l) and a voice 
came from heaven, "Thou art my beloved Son .... "4 
Could this be coincidence? 
Comments about two of the above shared words are needed. The RSV 
translators of the passage did not choose to translate the introductory phrase 
"and it happened." Secondly, the word "split," which the RSV translators 
chose to paraphrase as "opened," is perhaps the key word in the narrative be-
cause it connects the story of the baptism with the crucifixion. In Mark 15:38 
the "curtain of the temple was torn (split) in two .... " In Jewish exegetical prac-
tice a significant common word between two passages allows the one passage to 
shed light on the other. 
There are similar diflicullies in associating the second half of the sentence 
spoken by the voice from heaven, "with thee I am well pleased," with Isa 42 :1, 
a servant passage. The key word "well pleased" does not appear in the Greek 
version of 42 :1! Again, the Jewish tradition associated with the sacrifice of 
Isaac can account for this word. 
Perhaps the clearest evidence that both halves of the sentence come from 
exegetical traditions based on Genesis 22 is the following sentence from a Pal-
estinian book that retells the story of Abraham and Isaac. The book of Jubilees 
was written about one hundred years before Christ.5 This evidence has never 
before been considered by scholars. 
Behold, Abraham loves Isaac, his son. And he is more pleased with 
him than everything. 
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Certainly, the cumulative effect o f the above arguments is impressive. Let us 
now turn lo the J ewish tradition lying behind this narrative. 
JEWISH TRADITION 
Again, there is controversy. If the majority of interpreters are correct, the 
heavenly voice spoke a combinat ion of words from Ps 2:7 and Isa 42:1. These 
words then designate the messiah and the servant of Isaiah. We have seen the 
weakness of this view. 
Others hold that Genesis 22 is the source of the first half of the sentence. 
We are now prepared to state our thesis. We ho ld that Genesis 22 supplied the 
words " beloved son." However, Genesis 22 was not a static story within the 
Jewish community. In its many rclellings, the story grew and picked up addi-
tional elements as it continued to address the needs of that community. The 
clearest example of this is the change in the role o f Isaac. In Ge nesis 22 he is a 
mere lad, a passive figure. Yet, in a first-century retelling, he becomes a grown 
man of twenty-five who willingly allows himself lo be sacrificed. In even late r 
retcllings, the knife actually grazes his throat and he sheds blood. We ho ld that 
the Jewish Christian narrative of the baptism quoted Genesis 22 and was mod-
eled on the exegetical traditions current in the first century. These exegetical 
traditions were later written in the Aramaic targums and greatly expanded 
Genesis 22 in their re telling the story. 
For our purposes we single out three aspects of the Jewish tradition found 
in the largumic accounts of the binding of Isaac on Mt. Moriah by Abraham, 
his father. First, Isaac, now a grown man, willingly seeks a sacrificial death in 
obedience to God's will and his father's request. (Jesus could not be compared 
with a child.) Second, in the targumic accounts, Isaac, as he is lying upon the 
altar, looks up to heaven and secs a vision (as Jesus did after his baptism). The 
formal elements of the vision arc the same--heaven is opened, there is a voice, 
the main focus of the vision is the message of the heavenly voice. Even within 
these formal elements there arc amazing similarities. Whereas Jesus sees the 
Holy Spirit descending, Isaac secs the Shekinah. The Shckinah is a Jewish con-
cept which describes the nearness of God Lo humans, particulary in the Jerusa-
lem temple. Recall that Isaac is bound on an altar on Mt. Moriah, on which 
the J erusalem temple will be built. The heavenly voice describes Abraham in 
the act of sacrificing Isaac and speaks of them both as " unique (only)" individu-
als. The Aramaic word translates the Hebrew word for "only" which is found 
in Gen 22:2, 12 and 16. 
The third aspect o f the Jewish tradition is the theological significa nce of 
the Isaac story. The Fragmentary Targum to Gen 22:14 simply sta tes the sacri-
ficial meaning of the story: God is called upon lo remember the bind ing of 
Isaac and thereby to " loose and forgive them their sins and deliver them from 
all distrcss .... "6 
In the J ewish exegetical tradition in the targums, Genesis 22, Isaac, sacri-
fice, temple mount and forgiveness of sins belong togethcr.7 Apparently, the 
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binding of Isaac was regarded as an anticipatory, original sacrifice which vali-
dated all subsequent sacrifices for sin on the temple mount. 
THE WORK OF EARLY JEWISH CHRISTIANS 
How does one describe the work of early Jewish Christians in formulating 
this narrative? If we knew where history left off and the modeling work of Jew-
ish Christians began, our task would be simple. What do we know? No one 
has ever doubled that Jesus was baptized by John in the Jordan. That Jesus 
saw a vision at the baptism is probable. Did he not see "Satan fall like lightning 
from heaven" (Luke 10:18)? Paul also saw visions. We must rid our minds of 
the twentieth-century bias that visions arc subjective experiences existing only 
in the minds of disturbed individuals. Did the heavenly voice first suggest the 
typology (parallelism) between Jesus and Isaac? 
How do we account for the amazing similarities between the targumic de-
velopment of Genesis 22 and the baptismal narrative? The simple answer is 
that Jewish Christians modeled one story upon another by using the words and 
details of one story to tell another. Two images, so to speak, have been super-
imposed one on the other so that in seeing one, the hearer thinks of the other. 
However, what caused Jewish Christians to see the relationship between the 
OT type and the baptism, particularly since the baptism and the deliverance of 
Israel in the Reed Sea are already parallels? In going behind the narrative we 
enter the realm of speculation. Again, was the parallelism first suggested by 
the heavenly voice? Were there other factors? Possibly the formulators were 
amazed at the similarities in the two stories. Jn both scenes God was very 
near. Jesus' coming up out of the waters of baptism and Isaac's looking up to 
heaven from the altar act out similar postures physically, and perhaps in rela-
tionship to God's will. Possibly the greatest similarity was the ancient Jewish 
Christian confession "that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the scrip-
tures" (1 Cor 15:3) and the Jewish view of the sacrificial efficacy of Isaac's 
binding. Or, was the binding of Isaac one of the ingredients that entered into 
the ancient Jewish Christian confession? Clearly, such speculation does not 
help us understand the meaning of the story or help us arrive at any kind of 
certainty. 
Since we have sketched in the elements that constitute the narrative, we 
should now turn our attention to the theological significance of the story. 
Again, we find that the primary thrust of the story is Christological and that the 
formulators of the story were seeking to understand the significance of Jesus in 
terms of their own background and Scripture. 
The key theological phrase in the narrative is "my beloved Son," since the 
targumic form focuses on the words spoken by the heavenly voice. Whereas 
the previous narrative stressed the obedience of the Son of God, this narrative 
probes the intimate relationship between Jesus and God. From their own 
Scripture they used a type (parallel) that spoke in categories with which they 
were familiar. As Isaac was the unique/beloved son of Abraham, so Jesus is 
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the unique/beloved Son of God. Perhaps, as they formulated this narrative, 
early Jewish Christians remembered the prayer life of Jesus: the word "Abba" 
carried with it the intimacy of a family relationship. 
This typology showed the relationship of Jesus to God without reference to 
a messianic role. Perhaps the sole support for a messianic interpretation of the 
narrative is the supposition that the word "son" is a citation from Ps 2:7. Noth-
ing else in the narrative points to the inauguration of a messianic role. Neither 
the vision, nor the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus, nor a possible reference to 
the servant of God can be associated with the office of messiah. Indeed, messi-
ahship was an office, a role in Judaism, not a description of a fam ilial relation-
ship. 
The Isaac/J esus typology also enabled Jewish Christians to explain the sig-
nificance of Jesus' death as a sacrifice for sin, since the binding of Isaac on the 
temple mount carried that message. 
E arlier we said that the narratives of the baptism and the temptation were 
so closely related that the meaning of sonship in the one could throw additional 
light on the meaning of sonship in the other. Typology explains that relation-
ship: the baptism/temptation recalls the Exodus through the sea and the wil-
derness temptations of the Mosaic age. Could this narrative refer to more than 
one OT type? In later rabbinic exegesis the second referent would be called a 
davar achcr (another interpretation): Scripture carried within itself more than 
one layer or level of meaning. Indeed, the New Testament itself juxtaposes the 
Exodus and the death of Jesus. In the Lucan narrative of the transfiguration, 
Moses and Elijah speak with Jesus about "his departure [the Greek word also 
means Exodus] which he was to accomplish at Jerusalem" (Luke 9:31). 
Like the previous narrative, this narrative reveals much about the approach 
of Jewish Christians lo theology. They thought in terms of typology: they drew 
parallels between Jesus and persons, events and situations from their past. 
Whereas the previous narrative drew heavily on the temptations of the wilder-
ness generation, this narrative sees Jesus' relationship to God and the signifi-
cance of his death foreshadowed in the patriarch Isaac. Nevertheless, this nar-
rative reveals that the theology of history presupposed by both narratives is the 
same: God acts in history and His activity in one age foreshadows His activity 
in the coming age of deliverance. However, this narrative shows that their 
types were not drawn from just one generation in the past: the time of the pa-
triarchs as well as the Mosaic age pointed lo the coming of Jesus. Given this 
background, Jewish Christians communicated their theology in story form. Ab-
stract theological propositions, such as we find in the later creeds, were not 
their medium of communication. 
THE NARRATIVE OF THE BAPTISM AND THE GOSPEL OF MARK 
The narrative of the baptism contains two theological thrusts: the relation-
ship of J esus to God and the saving significance of his death. Mark must have 
found this narrative to be compatible wi th his thinking, for both thrusts are key 
theological motifs in his Gospel. The title "Son of God," spoken by the voice in 
the baptism and by the Gentile centurion near the end, is one key to Mark's 
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Christological thinking. Secondly, it is commonplace to say that Mark pro-
claims a theology of the cross or that the shadow of the cross falls across this 
Gospel. Indeed, if our thesis is correct, that shadow falls across this narrative 
that inaugurates Jesus' public ministry. 
Further, there is evidence that Mark himself tied the baptism to the cross. 
Two words indicate this: baptism and split ("tear" and "opened" are other 
translations) . Think of the significance of the word "split" in three narratives. 
In Gen 22:3 Abraham split the wood for the sacrifice on Mt. Moriah; in Mark 
1:10 Jesus saw the heavens "split" (by God) so the Spirit could descend; then, 
in Mark 15:38, as Jesus dies the curtain of the temple is split in two. This 
probably indicates that the temple has been replaced by the death of Jesus as 
the way to forgiveness. In the third prediction of the passion, Jesus asks, "Are 
you able lo drink the cup that I drink, or lo be baptized with the baptism with 
which I am baptized?" (Mark 10:38). By recording that statement, Mark may 
be tying the two scenes together. 
Perhaps Mark also liked modeling one story on another since the figures of 
Jesus and Isaac arc associated or merged together. In this Gospel, Elijah, John 
the Baptist and Jesus tend to merge as do Peter and Satan. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Is early J ewish Christianity a lost chapter in church history? The preceding 
pages represent a beginning effort to recover that lost chapter. By examining 
more than one narrative, as we have done, we begin to see the outline of their 
attempts to "do" theology. Nevertheless, in drawing conclusions we would em-
phasize the preliminary nature of this probe. We have analyzed only two narra-
tives. Most of this analysis is based on my recent book, Nal7'ative 171eology in 
Early Jewish C/11istia11ity. There I have discussed both the baptism and the 
temptation in more depth. In addition, the transfiguration and the feeding of 
the live thousand have been analyzed. Still, the book is a first attempt, confined 
to four narratives. Additional narratives like the walking on the water and the 
storm narratives need to be studied for a more thorough understanding of their 
theology. 
Early Jewish Christians arc also responsible for other writings in the New 
Testament. The Sermon on the Mount is apparently based on a Jewish Chris-
tian ethical source. They did hold J esus lo be the messiah (Christ) in some 
sense. They may be the authors of several Epistles. Much remains to be done. 
Scholars arc just beginning lo fill in the blanks. 
The research that has been done raises more questions than it gives an-
swers. Were early Jewish Christians a hom ogeneous group or are we talking 
about several groups? Arc we talking about a non-messianic Galilean group as 
opposed to a Jerusalem group which stressed the mcssiahship of Jesus? Early 
Jewish Christians practiced circumcision and observed dietary laws. How ob-
servant were they? All these questions and many more beg for answers. 
Having acknowledged the above limitations of the study, let us summarize 
our results. According to our study, early Jewish Christians were preoccupied 
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with Christology and one of the primary titles by which they expressed their be-
lief in Jesus was "Son of God/beloved Son." This title is the focus of the two 
narratives analyzed above and of three of the four narratives analyzed in my 
book. 
Equally significant is the meaning that this title conveyed in each of the 
narratives in which it occurred. In the narrative of the baptism, the words "be-
loved Son" describe the intimate relationship between Jesus and God. They 
recall Genesis 22 so that Isaac becomes a type of Jesus. As Isaac was the 
unique/ beloved son of Abraham, so Jesus is the unique/beloved Son of God. 
Since the narratives of the baptism and the temptation were paired (because 
they stood in a typological relationship to the Exodus/wilderness temptation of 
Israel), the meaning of the words "beloved Son" informs the meaning of the 
words "Son of God" on the lips of the devil. Jesus demonstrates this relation-
ship by his obedience to God in the face of demonic temptation. Also, the use 
of the title "Son of God" in the context of the demonic is important , too, as we 
shall see. The above research supports the insight of Joseph Fitzmyer in his 
discussion of the meaning of the title "Son of God" in the transfiguration and 
the baptism: "Here the Synoptic tradition has made use of a title that is pre-
Pauline and has connotations other than messiah."8 
If the above research is correct, it refutes the conventional wisdom of most 
New Testament scholars that the title "Son of God" on J ewish Christian lips 
designated the messiah, Ps 2:7 lying in the background. It further refutes the 
conventional wisdom that the title "Son of God" was imported into Christianity 
from the Hellenistic world. The Jewish Christian context of the title, the use of 
typology and the Jewish virtue of faithful obedience, all make that clear. More-
over, the use of the title "Son of God" by the devil, and in other parts of the 
Synoptic Gospels by the demons, and in the context of exorcisms, underscores 
the J ewish context of the title. 
The above analysis also gives us insight into the early Jewish Christian use 
of Scripture. They used quotations. They quoted individual words from the 
contexts of quotations and individual words from OT stories to which they were 
alluding. They employed the exegetical technique of typology in relating the ir 
Bible to Jesus and the happenings of their own day. Indeed, this use of typo-
logy and its related theology of history points to an apocalyptic world-view. 
They believed in the two ages: this present evil age under the dominion of the 
devil and the coming time of deliverance. The OT foreshadowed the coming 
time of deliverance: the OT types pointed to their greater fulfillm ent in the age 
of salvation. Both narratives must be understood in this context. The failures 
of Israel point to the faithful obedience of Jesus. His obedience defeats the 
devil. The binding of Isaac points to the new way of forgiveness through the 
sacrifice of the cross. 
Finally, these two narratives give insights into the self-understanding of 
Jewish Christians. They understood themselves as an eschatological commu-
nity-in-waiting. (The feeding of the five thousand and the transfiguration fur-
ther strengthen this insight.) Some Jewish Christians, or the whole group, 
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looked upon themselves as a "school" or learned community. They searched 
the Scriptures. They knew the Jewish exegetical traditions of the time. They 
wrote in Greek. They knew the rebuke tradition found in Hebrew sources. 
They employed the targumic "vision" form available in Aramaic. They wrote 
narratives of remarkable beauty and balance which conveyed profound theo-
logical truths. They exemplified a burst of creative intellectual energy we are 
only now beginning to appreciate. 
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Philosophers and Theologians 
at Odds 
THOMAS V. MORRIS 
In the past ten or fifteen years, the areas of philosophy of religion and 
philosophical theology have been among the fastest growing fields within the 
discipline of philosophy. Only a few decades ago, many of the leading philoso-
phers in the world were either openly hostile to religion or else completely in-
different to its concerns. This created a nearly pervasive atmosphere in the 
profession and renewed the long-rumored reputation of philosophers as ene-
mies of faith. But now a new breeze is blowing down the halls of the academy. 
A significant number of the most active and prominent contemporary philoso-
phers are these days devoting their energies to a careful examination, and even 
defense, of many of the traditional tenets of Christian theology. There has 
been a great amount of new and exciting work on the concept of God, on the 
various divine attributes such as omnipotence and omniscience, on the rational 
status of religious belief and on the nature of religious experience. There has 
also recently been a development which is even more fascinating and unex-
pected, given the philosophical climate of previous decades: philosophers have 
begun to show deep interest in the distinctive doctrines of the Christian faith, 
focusing their attention on such ideas as those of incarnation, trinity, atone-
ment, sanctification and the nature of sin. An immediate result of this is that 
we are quickly attaining a new level of conceptual clarity concerning the content 
and credibility of these doctrines. Philosophers, for a long time thought of as 
nothing more than critics of religious thought, arc now to be numbered among 
its champions. At least this is true for a surprising number of contemporary 
thinkers. 
There is no little irony in the fact that this comes at a time when a number 
of respected academic theologians have, purportedly on philosophical grounds, 
largely abandoned the traditional claims dist inctive of the Christian faith 
throughout most of its history. In the writings of some prominent contempo-
rary theologians, the doctrinal foundations of the Church arc labelled as myths, 
reinterpreted as symbols or reassessed as grammatical rules merely intended to 
govern a particular religious " language-game." As straightforward claims about 
the way things are, they seem to be thought of as something of an embarrass-
Thomas V. Morris, Ph.D., is associate professor of philosophy at the University 
of Notre Dame. 
THE ASBURY THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL VOL. 44 No. 2 1989 
32 Morris 
ment. This, to put il mildly, is a remarkable turn of affairs. Until fairly recently, 
the existential force of the Christian gospel was understood in the context of a 
Christian story about God, the world and human beings which, as a conjunction 
of claims about the way things are, was believed to be tnte, metaphysically and 
morally correct. Of course, the apostles and the authors of the New Testament 
documents were not viewed as metaphysicians or moral philosophers. But it 
was generally recognized that their message has presuppositions and implica-
tions as well as central components which fall within the province of metaphys-
ics and moral philosophy, and which can be very useful when elucidated in the 
technical terms appropriate to these important domains of human thought. 
This view of the Christian message is now often termed "proposilionalism" 
or "cognitivism" by its theological detractors, and is thought to be a pre-mod-
ern mistake which arose only out of a philosophical innocence now long lost. 
In fact, anyone who thinks otherwise is nowadays quite often said to be naive, 
unsophisticated, a-historical (a charge shortly to be explained) and--nearly eve-
ryone's favorite term of disapprobation now that 'heretic' is unfashionablc--a 
fundamentalist. How is this aversion to the tradition's self-understanding on 
the part of leading academic theologians to be explained? What motivates 
their large scale move away from what they call proposilionalism? What, if 
anything, grounds their charges? In light of the wide divergence between such 
theologians and a great many contemporary philosophers on this issue, it may 
be worthwhile to examine a bit, however briefly, why it is that some theologians 
are now criticizing philosophers for taking the straight forward cognitivism of 
the tradition seriously, as providing the framework for their own efforts. 
A dominant trend in modern theology is to reinterpret the traditional 
Christian doctrines as symbols whose function is merely lo express and evoke 
certain sorts of evaluative and religious attitudes and e>.peric11ces. Representing 
one variant of this trend quite candidly and succinctly, John H ick once re-
marked concerning the central Christian claim that Jesus was, and is, God In-
carnate (lhe claim captured in the classical doctrine of the incarnation), that 
"the real point and value of the incarnational doctrine is not indicative bul ex-
pressive, not to assert a metaphysical facl but to express a valuat ion and evoke 
an attitude."1 
This systematic focus on human altitudes and experiences has become so 
firmly entrenched in modern theology since the work of Schleiermacher as lo 
become a hoary tradition unto itself. In his recent and enormously influential 
book, 771e Nature of Doctrine, George Lindbeck makes some very revealing 
comments aboul lhis " long and very notable experiential tradition" in theology. 
Expressing at one point a very common assessment, he says: 
The origins of this tradition in one sense go back to Kant, for he 
helped clear the ground for its emergence by demolishing the 
metaphysical and epistemological foundations of the earlier regnant 
cognitive-propositional views. T hat ground-clearing was later 
completed for most educated people by scientific developments that 
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increased the difficult ies of accepting literalistic propositional 
interpretations of such biblical doctrines as creation, and by historical 
studies that im plied the time-conditioned relativity of all doctrincs.2 
These statements from Lindbeck are enlightening in a number of ways. 
First of all, there is a conviction expressed here which seems to be wide-
spread among contemporary theologians, the belief that Kant, or Hume, or 
both together , some two centuries ago dealt death blows to natural theology 
and to the sort of classical theistic metaphysics underlying traditional ap-
proaches to revelational theology. In a strange way, these philosophers have 
become the unlikely patron saints of current academic theology, as the popular 
appraisal of their work has shifted the whole theological enterprise into its now 
common non-metaphysical directions. What is particularly interesting about the 
references theologians make to Kant or Hume is that most often we find the 
philosopher merely mentioned, in a somewhat deferential and even slightly ap-
preciative tone, but we rarely, if ever, see an account of precisely which argu-
ments of his are supposed to have accomplished the alleged demolition of cog-
nit ivism, and exactly how they may be supposed to have had that effect. In fact, 
I must confess to never having seen in the writ ings of any contemporary theolo-
gian the exposit ion of a single argument from either Hume or Kant, or any 
other historical figure, for that matter, which comes anywhere near to demol-
ishing, or even irreparably damaging traditional theistic metaphysics, historical 
Christian doctrine or the epistemology of what we might call " theological real-
ism" (the construal of theology as a discipline whose intent is to represent rel i-
gious realities as they, in fact, are). A great number of the foremost contempo-
rary philosophers, who are quite well acquainted with the work of Hume and 
Kant, reject this conclusion common among theologians about what their writ-
ings show concerning traditional religious belicf.3 
T he developments of modern science that Lindbeck alludes to no more 
clearly proscribe a traditionalist understanding of Christian doctrines than do 
the writings of Hume and Kant. His reference, of course, is to scientific devel-
opments since the time of Kant, although he docs not specify the precise devel-
opments he finds to be troublesome. It is unlikely that he has in mind recent 
strides in molecular biology, quantum mechanics or cosmology, although the 
last of these fields has been thought by some to pose challenges to religious 
belief. (Of course, just as many have hailed its details as corroborat ing the an-
cient theistic claims of cosmic design.) But, in any case, Lindbcck's me ntion of 
the biblical doctrine of creation indicates that what he probably means to in-
voke here is modern evolutionary theory. If, however, one draws the simple 
distinction which must be drawn between the biblical doct1i11c of creation and 
the literary representations of creation to be found in, for exam pie, the book of 
Genesis, it is unclear how this development of scientific theorizing is supposed 
to increase the difficulty of construing a sentence like 
(C) Everything in the universe is created by God and depends on him 
for its existence moment to moment 
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as the expression of a proposition which is true. How other scientific develo p-
ments could increase the dif!icully of accepting the rest of Christian doctrine as 
cognitively avai lable propositional truth is even more dif!icult to sec. 
In addition to the spectres o f Hume and Kant and the apparently bullying 
im age of modern science, historical studies arc cited by Lindbeck as contribut-
ing to the downfall of cognitive-propositional views of Christian doctrine. Now, 
there arc many ways in which histo rical studies since the t ime o f Spinoza might 
be thought to have had a negative impact on traditio nal Christian tho ught. 
First, in reference to biblical studies, it might be argued that we have discov-
ered the classical Christian doctrines not to be clearly present within the bibli-
cal corpus. Further, it is sometimes added, they arc not even hinted at in " the 
earliest stra ta" of the core New Testament documents and their so urces. And 
so, the conclusion is drawn, if we are historically sensitive to the earliest roots 
o f the Christian faith, we will recognize the standard Church doct rines to be 
late r accretio ns inessential Lo, and even corrosive o f, the most authentic Chris-
t ian witness. 
I must admit that during my own training in biblical studies before I came 
to phi losophy, I often wondered whether it was the heavy hand o f phi losophical 
presuppositions which, usually unack nowledged, guided the work of biblical 
scholars, in everything from their exegetical and critical efforts Lo their appl ica-
tio n of procedures for dating documents. This is how I suspected it oft en went: 
o theologian o r biblical scholar idcnti!ied in any sense as a Christian wants lo 
recognize in the earliest and foundatio nal beliefs of his own faith community 
metaphysically implausible, cosmologically incongruous or logically absurd 
claims about reality. If, on the basis of some philosophical argument o r, more 
commonly, rumo rs o f such an argument, the b ib lical scholar comes to believe 
that one or anothe r traditional doctrine is deeply flawed in any o f these ways, 
he o r she may well be less inclined to acknowledge in timations o r an ticipatio ns 
of the problematic formulatio n in the authentic sayings o f Jesus or in the earli-
est witness o f the Church. Since there is no purely mechanical procedure for 
textual archeology on complex a ncient documents, there is ample room within 
the parameters o f accepted scholarly practice for such philosophically inspired 
subject ive disinclinations to have their effect. If this, o r anything like this, has 
been an o perative dynamic in the development o f biblical stud ies in the recent 
past, then we clearly have from this quarter no independent historical challenge 
to a classica l conception of Christian faith and doctrine--wc arc merely directed 
back Lo purely philosophical arguments as potential sources of tro uble. What-
ever the merit of th is speculat io n about the possible psychological dynam ics 
behind some recent work in biblical studies, the Christ ian faith has been tradi-
tionally understood lo be rooted in the entirety of its canonical Scriptures, as 
well as in the creeds, confessions and conciliar decrees of the believing commu-
nity. Any Marcio nitc picking and choosing of favorite sources is unacceptable. 
Whether the fi rst Christian to commit fai th to papyrus had a pro positio nally 
oriented, incipiently doctrinal mindset or not, this is a fundamental orienta tion 
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o f Lhe Christian Church Lhroughoul Lhe centuries, and one which cannol be 
abandoned lightly. 
W e may suppose, however, tha t it is not primarily to the do main of histo ri-
cal biblical studies Lhal Lindbeck alludes when he cites b roadly " historical stud-
ies" as implying " the time-conditioned relativit y of a ll doctrines." It is likely 
that he has in mind ra ther something like this: Quite simply, modern histo rical 
research has made us sensitive to the fact that thought forms vary from culture 
to culture, and from one historical period lo ano ther. Religious tho ught forms 
are no exception. They seem Lo be thoroughly conditioned by Lhe times a nd 
places within which they arise. As Lindbeck himself says later in his book: 
The first -order trulh claims o f a re lig ion change insofar as these arise 
fro m thc ... shifting wo rlds Lhat human beings inhabit. What is la kcn lo 
be real ity is in la rge part socially constructed and consequently alte rs 
in the course o f Lime. The universe o f the ancient Near East was very 
diffcrcnl from that of Greek philosophy, and both arc dissimilar from 
the modern cosmos. Inevitably, the Christianized versions of Lhcse 
vario us world pictures arc far from idcntical.4 
The argumcnl that Lindbeck, in effect, goes o n to give is thal since Christian 
claims aboul reality have been made in very diffcrc nl times and places, those 
claims the mselves must be viewed as deeply different; thus, if doct rines arc 
claims about God, the world and human existence, first-order claims about re-
ality, Lhen they have been importantly changing and d iffering over space and 
Lime--thcrc is no single doctrine o f creation, or incarnation or salvat io n, but a 
set of very different time-conditioned cultural expressions of the faiths of differ-
enl Christians. Surely we want a conception of Christian doctrine such that 
there is continuity in it. Thus, we cannot view doctrines as first-order truth 
claims aboul reality. They arc instead, in Lindbcck's view, grammatical mies. 
Or so he argues. But what of " the time-conditio ned relati1•ity of a ll doctrines" 
Lhal historical studies arc supposed to unveil for the cognitive-propositional 
view of doctrine? Whal is relative to whal? Pe rhaps Lindbeck means Lo suggest 
Lhat since re lig ious claims are, on his concept ion, functio ns of socia lly con-
structed wo rld-views, the truth o f such claims can be understood only as intra-
systcmic truth, or truth-rcla tivc-to-thc-opcrativc-worldview. But the mere exis-
tence of different conceptual schemes does no t a lone entai l tbe semantic re la-
tivity of claims made within those schemes, any more than the existence o f dif-
fering theories in some domain o f scientific inquiry alo ne entails scientific a nti-
rcalism. An argument is needed. And no argument is fort hcoming whose con-
tours arc easily discernible and which might have any chance al a ll of cont ribut-
ing in a forceful way to dispatching the cognitive-p ropositional conceptio n of 
Christian doctrine. What is a t work here is one particular, philosophically 
loaded, sociology o f knowledge, or perhaps bette r, of belief, which seems 
strangely attractive to many contempo rary theologians. But for such a view 
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there is no compelling argument or independent purchase on truth, aside from 
a stipulativc truth-within-its-own-conceptual-framework which we arc free to 
ignore. 
Of course, Platonistic and Aristotelian metaphysics and moral theory were 
presumably unavailable to the great majority, if not a ll, of the biblical authors. 
It does not follow at all from this that their own perspectives and claims cannot 
be captured and unfolded in such philosophically a ttuned thought forms. The 
development of doctrine which ensued from appropriating such thought forms 
is something quite different from, and much more deeply continuous than, a 
mere succession of distinct, time-conditioned linguistic artifacts. We can 
understand the medievals, the patristics and the biblical authors about as well 
as we can understand each other. And we can disagree with them. We arc not 
limited to just noting that what is true-in-our-framework sometim es differs 
from what is true-in-their-framework, and to admitting that the very existence 
of such a difference is itself a fact only in-our-framework. We can really en-
gage the past. Nothing within the purview of modern historical studies has 
shown otherwise. Thus, again, from this direction there is not, after a ll, any 
decisive obstacle to working within the traditional understanding of Christian 
faith and doctrine. 
The mere existence of ongoing doctrinal disputes through the history of the 
Church, and the existence of metaphysical disputes related to these doctrinal 
controversies, seems to be deeply troubling to many modern theologians. Or, 
more spccilically, the fact that there is no humanly ava ilable Archimidean point 
from which to resolve such disputes, no single, simple decision procedure for 
adjudicat ing r ival doctrinal positions, seems to have been a cause for dismay 
among recent theologians contemplating the history of Christian thought. I be-
lieve that it is concern over such matters which has served as a powerful mo ti-
vation in recent years for the move toward theological anti-realism, or at least 
toward the attempt lo develop a practically metaphysics-free form of theologi-
cal reflection. And yet, a ll too o ften, the resulting reflection has not been free 
of metaphysics at all, but rather has been constrained by a naturalistic or mate-
ria list metaphysics alien to the gospel and the whole body of traditional Chris-
tian thought. If Christian thinkers do not, as part of their theological work, 
seek to develop and reline suitable philosophical too ls for the expression of 
their faith, they inevitably just inherit their philosophical assumptions and dis-
positions from the culture around them. Herc is a modicum of truth behind 
one of Lindbeck's convictions no ted above. And, as I think Lindbeck, on reflec-
tion, would agree, not all such cultural legacies are equally suitable to the ex-
pression of Christian faith. 
The lack of a simple algorithm for resolving doctrinal, or metaphysical, dif-
ferences does not prevent rational adjudication of such differences. It just 
makes it much more diflicult. Nor, as most cpistcmologists agree, does the un-
availability of such a procedure in many other departments of human thought 
prevent the attainment of genuine propositional knowledge in these spheres. It 
has often been said that a little philosophy is a dangerous thing. I suspect that 
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one reason for the significant divergence of assum ptions between numerous 
contemporary academic theologians and the professional philosophers now 
doing Christian philosophical theology is that the theologians have had a dan-
gerous amount of philosophy in the course of their theological training. They 
have had enough lo sec problems in the t radition, but not enough to equip 
them to work carefully th rough those problems. 
It is not the conviction of the philosophers now working on these topics 
that t raditional lheologizing is without any serious naws. The contrary convic-
tion on the part of many will become clear in reading their recent publications.5 
The shared assumption is rather that the tradition has substantive commit-
ments well worth exploring and relining, resources which merit detailed philo-
sophical scrutiny and contemporary reappropriation. Whatever Oaws there arc 
should be brought to light as clearly and precisely as possible, so that we might 
seek lo eliminate them and do our part to capture anew the deep truths hereto-
fore imper fectly expressed. 
O ne would have thought that in the years since Lindbeck's book was writ-
ten, or at least in the five years since it was published, the proof of the pudding 
here would have been had in the tasting. A great deal of successful, illuminat-
ing work has been done during this time in precisely the direction deemed by 
Lindbeck to be a dead-end. But, unfortunately, it seems that many theologians 
have not been keen to follow these developm ents, to see where, in fact, they 
might lead. Thus we find in a quite recent essay by a prominent theologian, the 
repeated insistence that the whole framework of contemporary philosophy of 
religion is faulty. In "Evidcntialism: A Theologian's Response," Gordon 
Kaufman argues that current philosophical attention to religion errs from the 
start by adopting three basic presuppositions shared by t raditional Christian 
theological thought.6 These three basic assumpt ions o r presuppositions provide 
the focus, agenda and methods of current philosophical theology, as done by 
philosophers. And they are assumptions which Kaufman believes have been 
undermined altogethe r, rendered intellectually unacceptable, by three corre-
sponding modern developments. It is .remarkable to sec the degree to which 
Kaufman just repeats some of the same worries voiced by Lindbeck, but in a 
slightly different and interest ing packaging which is worth our attention. 
The first assumption or presupposition identified by Kaufman, we can call 
" Religious Proposit ionalism." This is simply the assumption that certain crucial 
propositions actually believed o r adhered to by religious people can be found 
beneath, or distilled out of, the complex of religious pract ice, as themselves 
proper objects, and the primary objects, of philosophical allention. A proposi-
tion is, by definition, a claim or assertion, the content of a declarative or indica-
tive sentence, a truth bearer o r, more cautiously, the sort of thing which can be 
said to be true or false, which can be believed, doubted or denied. The as-
sumption of Religious Propositionalism, when brought to an examination of 
Christ ianity, leads to an identification of certain crucial propositions as believed 
by Christians, and treats these propositions as such that belief that they arc true 
is partly constitutive of what it is to be a Christian. Familiar examples of such 
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propositions would of course be the traditional claims that there is a God, that 
Jesus is God incarnate, that God is a Divine Trinity and thnl hum an salvation 
consists in being properly related lo God through Christ. It has been the prac-
tice of contemporary philosophers, when turning their attention to the Chris-
tian religion, to focus their efforts of analysis and evaluation on these and other 
propositions commonly thought of as central lo Christianity. 
Kaufman believes that Religious Propositionalism ignores the complex dy-
namic function of religious conceptions, symbols and utterances. IL is his con-
tention that the modern understanding of human religious pluralism brings this 
to our attention. According to Kaufman, when we come to an intimate knowl-
edge of the various, disparate human religious tradit ions, we find that what ini-
tially seem to be very different symbols, concepts and propositions arc actually 
items which serve the same practical functions in each of the different religions. 
H indu utterances and Christian utterances, sentences spoken in a religious con-
text by the Hopi, or by a Buddhist, may appear lo serve lo convey very different 
claims about reality. But Kaufman urges us to view this appearance as decep-
tive. Or so, at least, it seems that this is his point. In the holistic approach 
meant to be taken to religion and religious utterances instead of Religious Pro-
posit ionalism, Kaufman urges that ph ilosophers join his new breed of theolo-
gian in focusing more on the simibritics among religions in their practical fun c-
tions rather than on the awkward dissimilarities among them in their apparent 
claims about reali ty. 
But it is not easy lo gel clear on exactly what Kaufman finds unaccept able 
in Religious Propositionalism. Is it that he thinks that Christian propositions 
about God and humankind have fared poorly in the realm of scientific confi r-
mation and so wants to take some approach other than a propositional one lo 
the Christian faith? Or docs he endorse a radical semant ic thesis that from 
first-order religious activities discn:le assessable propositions conceptually can-
not be extracted? Sometimes it seems that he is motivated by the former con-
sideration, sometimes the latte r. But it really doesn't matter since either rea-
son is equa lly controversial. Unless we do att ribute discernible, discrete reli-
gious beliefs to religious people, their religious behavior becomes totally 
opaque and unintelligible. Moreover, it isn't even a question, finally, of 
whether we as observers can abstract propositional attitudes, for example belief 
states, and thus propositions, as the objects of those attitudes--rcligious people 
repon having such beliefs. And those of us engaged in the study of religion who 
arc for t unatc enough lo be insiders with respect to our object of study, know 
fi rst hand that certain propositions arc crucial to Christian faith, as it was deliv-
ered lo us, and as we maintain it. Any semantic theory which is al odds with 
such a plain fact has little to be said for it. And as for the worry that purported 
theological propositions do not fa re well in our hard-headed day of empirical 
inqui ry and scientific confirmation, recent philosophy of religion engaged in 
doing wh:it Kaufman dislikes seems to be demonstrating qu ite the contrary 
Vl e W. 
Philosophers and Theologians at Odds 39 
The second presupposition of recent philosophical work on religion re-
jected by Kaufman is what we have already referred to as "Theological Real-
ism." This is the assumption, simply, that the propositions extracted from reli-
gious belief have as their intent objective truth. Or, lo pul it another way, it is 
the assumption that those religious people making declarative utterances about 
God (and so forth) intend by doing so to express objective 1ru1hs about the way 
things really are. H aving made this assumption, philosophers then go on to lest 
religions by evaluating the purported truths or systems of purported truths they 
appear lo contain. 
Just as Kaufman seems lo think of Religious Propositionalism as semanti-
cally naive, he judges Theological Realism to be epistemologically naive. He, 
like Lindbeck, claims that recent developments in the socio logy of knowledge 
have indicated both the holistic character of human thought and the relativity of 
conceptual fram es, or frameworks. In light of this, he thinks that religions 
should be viewed i11stmme11tally, not cognitively as a ttempts to articulate and 
embrace tmths. Religion, from his perspective, functions rather " ... to present a 
framework from within which basic orientation and meaning for the whole of 
human life can be found."7 Kaufman thus accordingly believes that philosophi-
cal priority ought to be given to questions about the motivat ion of religious ut-
terances, their function and their practical consequences, not lo questions 
about their truth. 
But there are al least a couple of serious problems here. Quite apart from 
the philosophical sla t us o f the sociological accounts of knowledge, o r rather, of 
what is otherwise normally thought of as knowledge, there are two difficulties 
in Kaufman's diagnosis and recommendation which seem to me decisive. First, 
if we seek a map to o rient us and guide our movements, we surely want a map 
that is accurate. And a map of propositions, a framework for the orientation of 
hum an life, in order lo be accurate must be composed of truths. Thus, the re is 
no driving a wedge between function here and the concern for truth. 
It is true that, in order to determine what proposition a particular utter-
ance might be expressing, we have to understand something about the function 
of the utterance in its context, but it docs not follow from this a t all that phi-
losophers need to study the details of ritual and re lig ious activity before they 
can expect to have any proper philosophical objects for study. If we arc taking 
mainstream Christian faith at face value and no t trying to be ultra-sophisticated 
about it, it seems fairly straightforward, at least in broad outline, what Christi-
anity proclaims, and thus what Christians believe. And these objects of procla-
mation and belief are interesting and proper object s o f philosophical inquiry in 
their own right. Kaufman's insistence to the contrary is unpersuasive. 
The third framework assumption or basic presupposition of contemporary 
philosophy of religion that Kaufman rejects we can call "Conceptual Tradition-
alism." This is, roughly speaking, the assumption that major religious concepts, 
as they have developed over the centuries and have been handed down lo us, 
have a certain integrity and have at least a dcfeasible privileged status as lit ob-
40 Morris 
jects o f philosophical a ttention. Concerning what he refers to as " this symbol 
'God '," Kaufman says: 
We cannot take it for granted that this symbol has always meant the 
same thing; nor can we assume that the meaning it carried in earlier 
periods of history (whether biblical, o r the high Middle Ages, or the 
Reformation) is the meaning which it should (or can) carry for us 
today.8 
The intellectual development that Kaufman thinks has caused us to question 
this assumption is, he says, our awareness that many of the problems of the 
twentieth century, from the Holocaust lo our current ecological t roubles, arc 
somehow results of a mindset produced by traditional Christian theology and 
its many conceptions of God, man and nature forged in former centuries under 
very different cultural conditions. 
This is to me the most astonishing part of Kaufman's essay. The enormity 
of his accusations along with the utter paucity of his evidence for such connec-
tions is one thing. But the philosophical relevance of the a lleged connections is 
utterly mysterious. Even if one person or fifty million people are emotionally 
and attitudinally such that their handling of a concept o r a claim leads to disas-
trous consequences, that has absolutely nothing to do with whether the concept 
in itself is coherent or philosophically interesting and whether the claim is true. 
The psychological questions and sociological questions can be raised, but they 
serve in no way to undermine the properly philosophical questions of meaning, 
coherence and truth. To suggest otherwise without argument is utterly implau-
sible, quite apart from the merit o r demerit of the allegations about causal con-
nections between traditional theology and contemporary disaster. 
In Kaufman's essay, as in Lindbeck's book, we find the strong conviction 
that what contemporary philosophers of religion are up to is wrong-headed, 
out-moded, uninteresting and futile. What we do not find are any strong argu-
ments to back up this convict ion. We do, however, find the expression of a set 
of opinions all too common nowadays among o therwise astute and judicious 
scho lars in departments of thcolot,ry and divinity schools. IL is my hope that we 
contemporary philosophers o f religion can convince our dubious co lleagues to 
cease doing obeisance to Hume and Kant, to throw aside the needless self-im-
posed shackles of groundless materialism and self-defeating relativism, and to 
jo in us as companions in exploring the vast inte llectual riches which fill our tra-
dition. 
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The Meaning of Wesley's 
General Rules; 
An Interpretation 
HELMUT NAUSNER, translated by J. STEVEN O'MALLEY 
REFLECTIONS ON A METHODIST ECCLESIOLOGY AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CHRISTIAN LIFE 
John Wesley was interested in a "Christianity according to the Scriptures." 
To that end he produced the sermon "Scriptural Christianity."1 The question 
concerning the validity of a thought, an admonition or a teaching was always 
answered by Wesley in such a way that was authenticated according to the 
Scriptures. Scripture is the final court of appeal. 
In the introduction to his fifty-three doctrinal sermons, Wesley beautifully 
described the purpose of an exposition of Scripture: 
I have accordingly set down in the following sermons what I find in the 
Bible concerning the way to heaven with a view to distinguish this way 
of God from all those which are the inventions of men. I have 
endeavored to describe the true, the scriptural, experimental religion, 
so as to omit nothing which is a real part thereof, and to add nothing 
thereto which is not. And herein it is more especially my desire, first, 
to guard those who are just setting their faces toward heaven (and 
who, having litlle acquaintance with the things of God, are the more 
liable to be turned out of the way), from formality, from mere outside 
religion, which has almost driven heart-religion out of the world; and, 
secondly, so warn those who know the religion of the heart, the faith 
which worketh by love, lest at any time they make void the law through 
faith, and so fall back into the snare of the devil.2 
The Reverend Helmut Nausner is s11pe1intendent of The United Methodist 
Church in Austlia. This aiticle, 01iginally published in the Mitteilungen der 
Studicngcmcinschaft Hir Gcschichte dcr Evcngclisch-mcthodistischen Kirche 
(9th ed., 1988), was translated fivm Gemwn by J. Steven O'Mallcy, the 
Journal's book 1rview editor and p1vfessor of C/wrr:h hist01y and hist01ical 
theology at Asbwy. 
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In emphasizing conformity wilh Scriplure, he relied upon lhe doclrinal norm 
of his church which stands as Article V in the Articles of Religion. "Concern-
ing the Sufficiency of Holy Scripture for our Salvation," "Holy Scripture con-
tains all things necessary to salvation, so that whatever is not contained within it 
or cannot be proved by it should not be required of anyone as an arlicle of fai th 
or be considered necessary for salvation."3 What Wesley says in the context of 
his sermons is just as applicable for the concise, terse text of the General Rules. 
They are intended to help us stay on the road lo heaven, to learn to distinguish 
clearly the way of God from all human devices, especially from a merely exter-
nal religiosity. They are also intended that we might grasp wilh underslanding 
and with concrete experience that living faith which is active in love and is pre-
cisely the fulfillment of the law (Gal 5:6 and Rom 13:10). 
What assertions concerning the church are contained in lhe General Rules? 
We turn next to the definition of the church that is contained in Article 13 of 
the Articles of Religion, that has in its entirety been derived from Article 19 of 
the Articles of Religion of the Church of England. It reads as follows: "The 
visible Church of Christ is a congregation of failhful men, in which the pure 
Word of God is preached, and the sacraments be duly ministered according to 
Christ's ordinance." In lhis terse sentence lhe objective aspect of the being of 
the church is described. It lives because God creates il lhrough His living 
Word and His sacrament and it is preserved lhrough the very same in11uences. 
In the General Rules Wesley emphasizes the response of humans. ll can be 
stated concisely that the church is a fellowship of the responders. In lhe termi-
nology of the Arlicles, this aspect would be expressed as the "fellowship of lhe 
faithful." They answer in lhe doing of good, in lhe avoidance of evil and in lhe 
regular use of the means of grace. Wesley makes an interesling comment upon 
Acts 5:11 in his Explanatory Notes Upon the New Testament. This verse states, 
"And a great fear came upon the entire church [ekklesia, translated Gemeinde 
by Luther] and upon all who heard lhis." Wesley's notation states: 
The church--this is the first time it is mentioned. And here is a native 
specimen of a New Testament church; which is, a company of men, 
called by the gospel, grafted into Christ by baptism, animated by love, 
united by all kind of fellowship, and disciplined by the death of 
Ananias and Sapphira.4 
The ideas of fellowship (Gemeinschaft) and discipline that are expressed here 
are of major significance for the conception of the church. In both ideas the 
human response to God's actions is expressed in a distinct manner. 
First, the term "church" is understood in the General Rules as an open 
church . The church is clearly seen in such a way that it docs not understand 
itself as a fellowship of believers which has no place for seekers. A fullblown 
conversion is not expected as a condition for participation in the association, 
nor is required the consent to an explicit confession, to a specific form of wor-
ship or to a definite understanding of baptism. The determinative sentence 
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reads "There is only one condition previously required of those who desire ad-
mission into these societies--a desire lo flee from the wrath to come, to be 
saved from their sins." In the next place, this means that persons who are seek-
ing and are only able to attain a vague notion of faith are still welcome. The 
statement about desiring "to flee the wrath to come" is drawn from John the 
Baptist 's sermon on repentance (Matt 3:7), but here it is given a positive turn of 
meaning. What John the Baptist missed among the Pharisees is anticipated 
here--that is, not a religious security, but rather a seeking and a longing for the 
holiness of God. 
Second, through this concept of an open church, the church demonstrates 
that it is God sent. It seeks contact with persons, wherever they find themselves 
inwardly and outwardly. Therefore, the only condition for entrance into the fel-
lowship is called the longing for salvation. However, that is understood as a 
point of departure, and so it says " ... is expected at first.. .. " That means more 
must yet follow. However, that which would be learned should be learned in 
fellowship with believers. At the same time, a very important principle of 
Wesley's comes to expression in this formulation, and this is the rejection of 
every form of coercion and persuasion in matters of faith. In his enthusiastic 
letter to his former student J ames Hervey, against whom he vindicated his 
evangelistic activity in England outside the bounds of an appointed parish, 
there stands a famous statement: 
Suffer me to tell you my principles in this matter. I look upon all the 
world as my parish - thus far I mean, that in whatever part of it I am, I 
judge it meet, right and my bounden duty to declare unto all that are 
willing to hear me the glad tidings of salvation.5 
This statement is ordinarily cited as justification for the worldwide mandate for 
the proclamation of the gospel. I might call attention here to what Wesley con-
stantly expressed in many other contexts: that he was dependent upon the will-
ingness of persons to hear him in his proclamation. He expressed this idea in 
another way in his sermon on enthusiasm, where he admonished, 
Never dream of forcing men into the ways of God. Think yourself, and 
let think. Use no constraint in matters of religion. Even those who are 
farthest out of the way never compel to come in by any other means 
than reason, truth, and love.''6 
That is, each particular person is encountered where that person lives. The 
freedom to accept or reject the gospel is taken quite seriously. Moreover, the 
fact that this interaction takes place through the ongoing life of persons is also 
implicit in this statement. The meaning of law and gospel are rendered under-
standable and deepened not only by means of the sermon, but also in conversa-
tion that is sought out ever anew. Wesley gives a marvelous example of this 
process in his letter of 1751 to Ebenezer Blackwell. "Therefore, it is only in pri-
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vate conversation with a thoroughly convinced sinner that we should preach 
nothing but the gospel."7 
Jn this letter he sets forth how Jaw and gospel must be preached together. 
He concludes with the moving appeal that brings to expression the exemplary 
law and gospel: "God loves you, therefore love and obey Him. Christ died for 
you. Therefore die to sin. Christ is risen: therefore rise in the image of God. 
Christ liveth evermore: therefore live to God, till you live with Him in Glory."8 
Third, in the General Rules the church is understood further as a church i11 
expectatio11. A clear distinction should be made between that which we can do 
as humans, and thus that which we should do, and that which only God can do, 
but concerning which we are permitted to petition and expect. In the General 
Rules, persons who belong to the fellowship are described as those " having the 
form and seeking the power of godliness." This formulation is derived from the 
sentence in 2 Tim 3:5, which refers to, " .. .those holding the form of religion but 
denying the power of it." Wesley responds positively to the ideas under consid-
eration. In various points of his sermons he explains wherein the form of godli-
ness consists and how a person can gain it and thereby possess it. A person can 
learn to attend worship regularly, hear the Word of God, pray, investigate the 
Scripture for oneself, receive the Lord's Supper, fast and live in Christian fel-
lowship. Even if one does all that, the power of a godly life is still not conferred 
automatically, because God alone can give this. With this formulation, Wesley 
wants to make clear that it commences in this way, and that a person under-
takes the form of godliness not as a goal but rather as a way given to one by 
God, whereby one should learn to expect God. Above all, then, if one learns Lo 
do these things in the anticipation that God will grant power at a point in time 
which pleases Him, then the right tension comes into one's li fe. Only God can 
give power, but we arc allowed to seek it and thereby request it. 
Fourth, the church in the General Rules is described as an alive a11d com-
mitted fellows/zip. The foundational statement speaks of those persons who 
have united themselves in this fellowship as those who arc ready "to pray to-
gether, to receive the word of exhortation, and to watch over one another in 
love, that they may help one another to work out their salvation." 
Such a fellowship has a purpose for which it is to live. This is to attain the 
holiness without which no one will see the Lord (Heb 12:14). Above all, in such 
a committed fellowship the fundamental truths of Christianity arc not carried 
forward in a theoretical manner, but they are experienced and in the experience 
they are recognized as being true. Hence, holiness is certainly not the way of a 
pious eccentric or recluse; rather, it is a way pursued in fellowship. Holiness is 
experienced and attained in community, in the bearing of one another's bur-
dens and in watching in vigilance over one another in helpfulness. 
What assertions concerning the Clzristia11 life arc contained in the General 
Rules? For one thing, the notion of discipline docs not denote a military drill 
or other coercive pedagogical measures. Instead, it refers to a manner of obe-
dience. The English term is associated with its Latin root (discip11!11s, disciple) 
and means the manner of living that the student receives from his teacher. In 
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the Christian tradition, that means a disciple is not above his master. We live 
in discipleship to Jesus. Three aspects of this insight are to be noted. 
First, an earnest desire manifests itself through corresponding frnit. Wesley 
formulates his thought in the General Rules quite moderately: "But wherever 
this (the desire to flee the wrath to come and to be made free from sin) is really 
fixed in the soul, it will be known by its fruits." That is quite a liberating insight. 
We do not have to investigate people's hearts. Moreover, only God knows their 
actual condition. Hence, it is rightly said that He "will bring to light the things 
now hidden in darkness, and will disclose the purposes of the heart" (1 Cor 
4:5). However, we can see the mode of life (Wandel) of a person and discern 
whether it concurs with that which he confesses. As we have already indicated, 
there should therefore be a readiness to allow oneself to be admonished. In-
deed, it can be observed if a person turns from evil and does good, and uses the 
divine means of grace. To that end believers can inquire and they are permit-
ted to admonish one another. 
Second, an earnest Christian life distinguishes itself through consistency. At 
any rate, that was the conviction of Wesley. Consistency was another instance 
of Christian discipline. The longing for blessedness should co11ti11ual/y be 
brought lo expression. Wesley thereby emphasized that the important things of 
our life and faith need to be accomplished and exercised regularly, without 
looking back upon our states of feeling and circumstances. People continually 
say, " I will do this if I feel like it." It is precisely this kind of hesitation that 
needs to be attacked. Wesley referred to that as an "enthusiastic (schwaenner-
ische) doctrine" and he recommended that it be trampled under foot. 
Third, the General Rules shed light on the importance of mies. They are not 
understood as brazen law, but as aids to living. They appeal to conscience and 
may encourage deeds of love unto God. All of the rules that are compiled 
here, that have been set forth in a succession of formulations, have been in-
ferred from Scripture, and they seek to demonstrate what we mean when we 
speak of the Holy Scripture of the Old and New Testaments as the "guide given 
to us by God for faithful living." And they are only properly understood if we 
hear them not only as commands but also as promises and a privilege granted 
by God. 
THE MEANING O F THE GENERAL RULES: THE EVIL TO BE 
A VOIDED; THE GOOD TO BE DONE 
First, the evil to be avoided has much to do with the righteous fniit of repen-
tance (Matt 3:8). In his Notes 11po11 the New Testament, Wesley comments on 
verse 8 by saying, 
R epentance is of two sorts; that which is termed legal, and that which 
is styled evangelical repentance. The former, which is the same that is 
spoken of here, is a thorough conviction of sin. The latter is a change 
of heart (and consequently of li fe) from all sin to all holiness.9 
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In another connection, he offers a description of repentance that resembles 
his terminology in the General Rules. Jn his "Appeal to Men of Reason and 
Religion," Wesley wrote, 
By repentance I mean conviction of sin producing real desires and 
sincere resolutions of amendment; and by 'fruits meet for repentance' 
forgiving our brother, ceasing from evil, doing good, using the 
ordinances ·of God, and in general obeying Him according to the 
measure of grace which we have received.10 
The formulation of avoiding evil and doing good is not a discovery of John 
Wesley. The acknowledgment and emphasis upon this admonition indicates 
the extent to which Wesley thought and argued from the Scripture. His empha-
sis is supported by such significant passages as Job 28:28; Ps 34:15, 37:27; Prov 
3:7, 14:16, 16:6; Isa 1:16-17, 7:15; J er 4:22, 13:23; and 1Thess5:22. 
The biblically-grounded rule that Wesley erects here is conceived for that 
person who is selling out upon the way and who has the desire to be saved from 
the wrath to come. It also remains suitable for the one who has already entered 
into living fellowship with God. The difference lies in the fact that, at the be-
ginning of the way, the rule is held somewhat out of fear and uncertainty. 
Whenever fellowship with God is embraced, the rule is maintained out of 
thankfulness, joy and love. At this point Wesley distinguishes between the faith 
of a servant and the faith of a son. These ideas are drawn from his sermons. In 
his sermon, "The Almost Christian," and in the first four sermons from his se-
ries on the Sermon on the Mount, the concept of the good to be done and the 
evil to be avoided appears under different aspects.11 It appears to him that a 
person manifests an interest not only in an external obedience of this rule. 
Rather, one is not at peace until the power of godliness has been received. In 
discussion with his critics, Wesley holds firmly that God changes the life of 
people and that this transformation may be confidently expected. In one letter 
he bears testimony of such experiences: "The drunkard became sober and tem-
perate; the fornicator refrained from adultery and avoided fornication, the un-
righteous refrained from oppression and evil. He who was accustomed to curse 
and swear and did this for a decade, does no longer swear today. The idler 
began to work with his hands, in order that he might be able to eat his own 
bread."12 
Second, the admonition to do no evil, but to avoid every manner of evil, ap-
peals to the co11scie11ce of the individual and his or her competency to make judg-
ments. Behind this rule stands the expectation that a person who seeks God 
becomes competent to discern evil and to desist from it. The list of evils that 
Wesley then presents is clearly deliberate and it is also thereby relativized, so 
that he stresses such "sins that are most often committed," and certainly those 
that are most cited in his time. Therefore he clearly says that there are specific 
actions appropriate for each era that are evil, and that many things are evil that 
do not become known at all. 
Jlle Meaning of the General Rules 49 
Only two of the fifteen examples Wesley cites refer directly to the relation-
ship with God: the misuse of the name of God and the hallowing of the Sab-
bath. The remaining ones refer to social, socio-political (as in the treatment of 
slaves) and economic sins. This list is to some extent still topical, though the 
actual congregations in annual conferences arc challenged to use their own 
judgment as directed by the Holy Spirit. They are also challenged to candidly 
delineate ways of suppressing actions deemed evil and to encourage members 
to avoid them. In our day, few appear to be interested in the truth. The 
French poet George Bernanos states in one of his novels that " the crime was 
not detectable because no one was interested in the truth." This kind of reser-
vation is widespread and if there is no frank explanation in conformity with 
what is obviously evil, then that evil becomes tolerated and even comes to ac-
quire a right to existence. 
In Hebrews 3:12 there is the statement "Take care, brethren, lest there be in 
any of you an evil, unbelieving heart, leading you to fall away from the living 
God." Wesley comments on that in his Notes 11po11 the New Testament by saying 
"An evil heart of unbelief--Unbelief is the parent of all evil, and the very es-
sence of unbelief lies in departing from God, as the living God--the fountain of 
all our life, holiness, happiness." 13 This forsaking of God finds expression in 
various kinds of denials. One may refuse to be oneself and fl ee from one's 
identity. Jn an extreme case that can only lead to spiritual illness. To accept 
oneself means that I receive who I am from God's hand. Further, the denial is 
manifested in that a person does not accept a fellow human being as a " thou. " 
Then one's neighbor is not thankfully received as a brother or sister. Instead, 
that person is treated as an enemy or as an object that can be disposed of like a 
thing. 
Denial may also have lo do with the fact that the world is to be received as 
creation. Instead, it becomes a purveyor of raw materials that people misuse 
according to whim and convenience. The refusal to recognize God as Creator 
and Lord is without doubt the source of all evil deeds. The admonition to re-
frain from doing evil is not spoken in a vacuum. Wesley always has in mind 
those things that we have actually recognized as evil. We may certainly be able 
to expect that God will assist us in this endeavor. God has directly involved 
Himself as a partner with us in the struggle against evil, whose power is already 
broken. In his book entitled, W7zo Tmsts in God, Professor Albert Outler de-
fends the view that Christians ought not abandon the struggle for reasons of 
selfishness and anxiety. After all, the book was written in 1968 when a whole 
series of uprisings and demonstrations were breaking out. He was challenging 
Christians not to remain disengaged from the suffering and anxiety in the 
world, and he concludes with this significant sentence: "The unanimous 'an-
swer' by the saints and heroes of the faith to the problem of evil is disconcert-
ingly simple: evil is overcome by the intelligent, competent concern of people 
willing to pay the price of conflict."14 Precisely to that end, the General Rules 
impel us to take the Christian's existence seriously, to register a challenge to 
that which is evil and not to avoid conflict. 
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It may be expccled Lhal a person who seeks lo be relaled Lo God receives 
Lhe power of judg menl and discernmenl of evil, even where iL is disguised, and 
Lhereby is able to expose and avoid il. It is certainly Lo be expected that this per-
son does nol remain at the level of negalion. Instead, he makes evident Lha t, 
since he "does good," Lhe " no" to evil comes from a "yes" to life. The answer 
comes fro m Lhe love of God that has been received. Living faith was described 
by Wesley with the words of the apostle Paul as a faith that is "active in love" 
(Gal 5:6). And he always soughl Lhe balance bclween juslifying faiLh and good 
works. Failh and good works--this tensio n persists throughout life. An impor-
tant place where Wesley clearly te lls how he poises these emphases is in his 
comment upon the statement in James 2:22, "You sec that faith was active 
along with his works, and fai lh was completed by works." Aboul thal slalcment 
Wesley observes, 
... that faith wroughl together with his works--thcrefore faith has o ne 
energy and operat ion; works, another! And the energy and operat ion 
of faith are before works, and together with them. Works do not give 
life to fai th, but fai th begets works, and then is perfected by them. 
And by works was faith made perfcct....Faith hath not its being from 
wo rks, (for it is before them), but its perfectio n."15 
The question of law and gospel is naturally a t stake in this connectio n. As is 
evident from his explanation of James 2:22, Wesley distinguishes carefully be-
tween fa ith and good works and bears in mind that this distinctio n, as well as 
the inner connection, is to be seen and understood. Regarding the relatio n be-
tween law and gospel, he also emphasizes that there is to be no o ppositio n nor 
contradiction, but that the cla im of the law is to continue as the good and holy 
will of God, and the gospel points the way whereby this divine will is fullilled. 
In the fifth discourse o f his exposition of the Sermon on the Mo unt , Wesley 
argues that: 
There is no contrarily at all between the law and the gospel; that there 
is no need for the law to pass away, in order to Lhe establishing the 
gospel. Indeed neither o f them supcrccdes the other, but they agree 
perfectly well together. Yea, the very same words, considered in 
different respects, arc parts both of the law and of the gospel: if they 
are considered as commandments, Lhey arc part of the law; if as 
promises, of the gospel. Thus, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with 
a ll thy heart,' when considered as a commandment, is a branch o f the 
law; when regarded as a pro mise, is an essential part of the gospel--the 
gospel being no other than the commands o f the law, proposed by way 
of promise.16 
Sho uld it not thereby be concluded that " poverty o f spirit, purity o f heart, and 
whatever else is enjoined in the holy law of God, are no other, when viewed in a 
gospel light, than so many great and precious promises?"17 
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Finally, it becomes evident that the person who abandons himself to God in 
faith, becomes willing to live in complete obedience out of love for God. How-
ever, the purpose of faith is nothing other than that there be such love between 
God and human beings as corresponds to the will of God. "Love is the end of 
all commandments of God." 18 Therefore it is lit to incite people to do every-
thing that lies within their ability. 
Now then do all diligence to walk, in eve ry respect, according to the 
light you have received! Now be zealous to receive more light daily, 
more of the knowledge and love of God, more of the Spirit of Christ, 
more of His life, and of the power of His resurrection! Now use all the 
knowledge, and love, and life, and power you have already allained; so 
shall you continually go on from faith to faith ; so shall you daily 
increase in holy love, till faith is swallowed up in sight , and the law of 
love is established to all ctcrnity. 19 
In doing good we exercise ourselves i11 the rcalizatio11 of our tnie h11111011ity. 
Hence, the rule to lerates no rashly drawn limitat ions. The vocation of doing 
good is defined in terms of "each opportunity," allowing the good to reach "all 
persons, so far as our strength permits." Less cannot be said concerning the 
gospel that we have witnessed and the expectation of complete obedience 
through God. We have not received just some things or even several things 
from God. Rather, all things have come from Him and therefore we ought to 
serve Him with everything. 
The first place where doing good is lo be seen is the world, and not the con-
gregation. The words of the apost le make reference to th is with his statement 
to the church which says "especially to them that arc of the household of fai th." 
In the final analysis, the world remains the place of trial. Along with the refer-
ence from Gal 6:10, "So then, as we have opportunity, let us do good to all 
men .... " Wesley briefly commented, "Al whatever time or pl ace, and in what-
ever manner we can. The opportunity in general is our lifetime; but the re arc 
also many particular opportunities. Satan is quickened in doing hurt, by the 
shortness of the time, Rev 12:12. By the same consideration let us be quick-
ened in doing good."20 
In the second guiding principle concerning the doing of good, Wesley distin-
guished between two levels of the deed, with regard to the good of the body 
and of the soul. In the first case, he merely enumerates the works of mercy, as 
Jesus our Lord enumerates them in His parable concerning the judgment of the 
world (Matthew 25). This summation is known to us, yet it is important always 
to be reminded of it anew. In our modern world, in which the welfare stale has 
undertaken distinct duties, people have forgotten to sec these works of mercy 
as their duty. 
In Wesley's time, people were astonished to conceive of good deeds with re-
gard to the soul, and this is a reaction that is still encountered in our day. 
Wesley held firmly that it is good to instruct, to reprove and to exhort each per-
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son "with whom we have any intercourse." What stands behind this is not mor-
alistic arrogance, although it is wrongly passed over again and again for that 
reason. Instead, there is lhe insight, so deeply based in Scripture, thal I am in 
need of the continual help of my brethren in the faith in order to remain on the 
right path. However, that is a basic matter for every human relationship. In 
the Old Testament, it is reported, ''. .. reprove a wise man, and he will love you" 
and " ... he who rejects reproof goes astray" (Prov 9:8, 10:17). In the New Testa-
ment, it is reported, " I appeal to you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of 
God," (Rom 12:1), and " Brethren, if a man is overtaken in any trespass, you 
who are spiritual should restore him in a spirit of gentleness" (Gal 6:1), and 
"Teach and admonish one another in all wisdom" (Col 3:16). Throughout 
Scripture there are numerous places that support this interpretation, so that it 
is good lo do other good things through correction, reproof and admonition. 
Once again, it is exactly at this point where a moralistic misunderstanding 
has occurred. All three ideas are understood correctly only if they are viewed 
in light of their biblical context. Only someone who lives with the Bible and 
constantly seeks the face of God and walks in the light of God will be able to 
carry out this kind of doing good in a "gentle spirit." However, we can also ob-
serve here that this manner of doing good to one another has well-nigh disap-
peared, even in Christian congregations. It is appropriate and important to 
stress the importance of this renewed pastoral approach. Wesley certainly em-
phasized quite realistically and moderately the duty of Christians to support 
and encourage one another in their temporal affairs. 
The conclusion to his discussion of "doing good and avoiding evil" may be 
surprising to some, but it calls to mind a once significant mode of living. In 
Wesley's thought, anyone who lives with God and therefore avoids evil and 
does good, must reckon with s11fferi11g. Perhaps he has in the background such 
Old Testament passages as " He who corrects a scoffer gets himself abuse, and 
he who reproves a wicked man incurs injury" (Prov 9:7), and "blessed arc you 
when men revile you and persecute you and utter all kinds of evil against you 
falsely on my account" (Matt 5:11). The foregoing formulation particularly 
takes up the words of the apostle Paul. In a longer passage concerning the suf-
fering that he encounters as an apostle, he wr ites " ... we have become, and are 
now, as the refuse of the world, the offscoming of all things" (1 Cor 9:13 and 
the entire context). 
The encouragement to avoid evil and do good becomes realistic first of all in 
connection with the knowledge of the possibility of suffering. Whoever has first 
gone through the school of this suffering and still has not grown weary in doing 
good and avoiding evil in every form (1 Thess 5:22; Gal 6:9), has comprehended 
the mind of Christ. Such a person also knows that moral presumption has 
nothing at all to do with the disposition found in Jesus Christ. 
THE USE OF ALL THE MEANS OF GRACE ORDAINED OF GOD 
Our desire and longing for the " power of godliness" should come to expres-
sion without interruption. The desire for godliness should not only continually 
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come to expression through the avoidance of evil and the doing of good, but 
also in the fact that all the means of grace ordained of God are used. " For 
faith and love grow only through the existing contact with God. And only from 
faith can good be done and evil avoided."21 
The following beautiful passage stands in Wesley's second discourse on the 
exposition of the Sermon on the Mount: 
They who are truly meek can clearly discern what is evil ; and they can 
also suffer it. They are sensible of everything of this kind, but still, 
meekness holds the reins. They are exceeding zealous for the Lord of 
hosts; but their zeal is always guided by knowledge, and tempered in 
every thought, and word, and work, with the love of man, as well as the 
love of God. They do not desire to extinguish any of the passions 
which God has for wise ends implanted in their nature; but they have 
the mastery of all: they hold them in all subjection, and employ them 
only in subservience to those ends. And thus even the harsher and 
more unpleasing passions are applicable to the noblest purposes; even 
hatred, and anger, and fear, when engaged aga inst sin and regulated by 
faith and love are as walls and bulwarks to the soul, so that the wicked 
one cannot approach to hurt it.22 
Wesley has had to establish a boundary on three sides in his effort to pres-
ent effectively the correct and regular use of the means of grace. 
1. H e had to distinguish himself from those Anglican Christia ns who were 
at peace with the purely outward use and had no further expectation at all. 
2. He had to distinguish himself from the H errnhutcrs (Moravians) and 
those Christians like them who feared a false confidence in the means of grace 
and shunned their use as "works righteousness." 
3. He had to distinguish himself from those Christians within and without 
his own fellowship, who described the means of grace as a vimial magical op-
eration. 
Wesley allowed himself to be determined and influenced by none of these 
attitudes. Rather, he determined to commend the means of grace quite em-
phatically because he believed they were appointed by God. He regarded them 
as means of grace given by God, in wh ich God wants to meet persons. In the 
first part of his sermon on the means of grace,23 he said "By means of grace: 1 
understand outward signs, words, or actions, ordained of God, and appointed 
for this end, to be the ordinary channels whereby He might convey to men, pre-
venting, justifying, or sanctifying grace."24 
In this sermon, he amply expressed how he understood the reality of the 
means of grace. Over against recurring misunderstandings and erroneous inter-
pretations, he expressed four points at the end of this serm on. 
1. God is above all means. He has certainly instituted these means and H is 
promise rests upon them, but He is not bound to them. We as humans need to 
take care not to confine God in His freedom. H owever, we arc indeed permit-
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ted to accept these means with gratitude and, while we use them, to wait upon 
God's action. 
2. The means of grace have no power within themselves. Wi tho ut God they 
are poor, dead and empty, like a parched leaf or a shadow. No one who uses 
them earns merit o r a special advantage with Goel. Even that which God has 
instituted docs not mediate God's grace in itself, if the recipient docs not trust 
God alone. 
3. Whenever you use the means of grace, seek to find in them God alone. 
Reach o ut for the power of His Spirit and the merit o f His Son. No o ne and no 
thing can satisfy your soul as God alo ne can. Never forget that the means of 
grace are not means that arc inst ituted for our own sakes but rather they a re to 
renew your soul in righteousness and true holiness. 
4. Whenever you use them, take care how you regard yourself. Tf you a rc 
proud that you used them, you transform everything into po ison. Without God, 
everything is to no avail. Therefore, fall on your knees and praise Goel alone.25 
The rcOcctions concerning the use of the means of grace a re needed to be 
seen by Wesley in the context of his inte rpretation o f rational religion. H e val-
ues sobrie ty and reason quite positively and considers life realistica lly. Wesley 
was certa inly always again being reproached by his contemporaries as an enthu-
siast. H owever, in his inte rp retation o f the means o f grace and the ir use he 
made it clear in what enthusiasm consists. H e coined a sho rt formula: E nthusi-
asm is to desire the goal without using the means; that is, to desire the goal, 
without following the way. H e wrote a serm on on enthusiasm26 and there he 
described four fo rms. They each have to do with a broken re lationship with 
reality, and hence with self-deception. Jn brief, they are the foll owing: 
1. O ne form of enthusiasm consists in presuming that o ne has received 
g race wi thout it really be ing so. It often expresses itself either in fan aticism or 
in re ligious instability. 
2. A second form of enthusiasm consists in presuming that o ne has received 
gifts fro m God. Many lift up the presumption of having the g ift o f healing or 
having received dreams or visions. Enthusiasm and pride are o ft en tied to 
these. 
3. A third form consists in despising the means of grace. Fo r example, 
so me persons claim to understand the Bible even without reading it and with-
o ut having mC' ditatecl on biblical texts. 
4. The fourth for m consists in at tributing to divine providence matle rs of 
experience tha t ca nnot be so attributed. 
Trust not in visio ns or dreams; in sudden impressions, or strong 
im pulses o f any kind. Remember, it is not by these you are to know 
what is the will of G oel on any particular occasion; but by applying the 
pla in Scripture rule, with the help of experience and reason, and the 
o rdinary assistance of the Spirit of Gocl .... Bcware, lastly, o f imagining 
you sha ll obtain the end without using the means conducive to it. God 
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can give the end without any means at all; but you have no reason to 
think He will. Therefore constantly and carefully use all those means 
which He has appointed to be the ordinary channels of His grace. Use 
every means which either reason or Scripture recommends, as 
conducive (through the free love of God in Christ) either to the 
obtaining or increasing any of the gifts of God. Thus expect a daily 
growth in that pure and holy religion .... 27 
In using the means of grace it is possible to find a nearness to God, of which 
Wesley spoke in one sermon in terms (naturally to be viewed in a figurative 
sense) of a divine vision. In explaining the text from the Sermon on the Mount, 
"Blessed are the pure of heart , for they shall see God," Wesley wrote, 
But in a more especial manner they see God in His ordinances. 
Whether they appear in the great congregation, to 'pay Him the honor 
due unto His name' 'and worship Him in the beauty of holiness'; or 
'enter into their closets,' and there pour out their souls before their 
'Father which is in secret' ; whether they search the oracles of God, or 
hear the ambassadors of Christ proclaiming glad tidings of salvation: 
or, by eating of that bread, and drinking of that cup, 'show forth His 
death till He come' in the cloud of heaven, - in all these His appointed 
ways, they find such a near approach as cannot be expressed. They see 
Him, as it were, face to face, and 'talk with Him, as a man talketh with 
his friend,' a fit preparation for those mansions above, wherein they 
shall see Him as He is.28 
From these citations it becomes sufficiently clear that Wesley commended 
the regular use of the means of grace very soberly and rationally, yet still in the 
justified expectation that, because God promises it, His action is to be experi-
enced. 
THE MEANS OF GRACE ORDAINED BY GOD 
In the General Rules, Wesley names six means of grace: 
The public worship of God 
The ministry of the Word, either read or expounded 
The Supper of the Lord 
Family and private prayer 
Searching the Scripture 
Fasting or abstinence 
In certain other connections, he presents yet a seventh means of grace, the 
"Christian Conference," that is another term for the Methodist class. Let us 
consider here some observations and reOections concerning these particular 
means of grace. 
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771e Public Worship of God 
In the center o f the service of wo rship there is the meeting with God that 
docs not occur as an individual experience but rather in associa tion with other 
believers. The service is public; that is, every person who has the desire to 
meet God is welcome. The public aspect pushes back the private concerns. 
Yet, the personal concerns are certainly not wholly eliminated in a Christian 
service o f worship. They may be permitted to find expression in quiet prayer or 
a lso in a fe llowship of prayer. 
The meeting with G od sets the standard. A person docs not stand a t the 
center o f the event, but rather God H imself. T he book of Revelatio n offers 
helpful insight here. Right in the midst of all turbulent events o n earth, God is 
enthroned in silence. He speaks according to H is time. The worship here 
upon earth is united with the worship in heaven before the th rone o f God. 
W here the Christian church celebrates worship in truth and with great expecta-
t ion of God, it does more for the stabil ity of the world than is generally recog-
nized. We permit ourselves to gather each Sunday in the expectatio n that God 
speaks to us and meets us in some manner that He considers proper. 
The Mi11is1ry of the Word 
T he emphasis in this means of grace lies upon hearing. A nd the text clearly 
holds very firmly that the interpretation consists not o nly in the form of the ser-
mon or in a hymn o r exegetical medita tion. The readings in a service of wo r-
ship have their own particular form. By the hearing of the text of holy Scrip-
ture we arc permi tted to listen in the expectatio n that God speaks to us directly 
through the words of the Scripture. By listening patiently, the ear is instructed 
until there gradua lly happens what Jesus described by way of confirmatio n and 
promise: " My sheep hear my voice" (John 10:27). We are thereby permitted to 
reckon that there is an increase in the capacity of truly awakened Christ ians to 
hear clearly the voice of the good shepherd o ut of all the voices that are per-
ceived in this world. 
77ie Supper of /he Lord 
In the well-known lette r that John Wesley wrote in the year 1784 to "our 
brothers in America," stand the following sentences: 
I have prepared a liturgy lilllc di ffering fro m that o f the Church of 
England ... which I advise all the t raveling preachers to use o n the 
Lord's Day in all their congregations, reading the liturgy only o n 
Wednesdays and Fridays and praying extempo re o n a ll other clays. I 
also advise the elders lo administer the Supper of the Lo rd on every 
Lord's Day.29 
In his sermo n o n the means of grace, Wesley holds firmly to a view o f the 
Lord's Supper that all who earnestly desire the grace o f G od should part icipate, 
because God allows " ... a ll, therefore, who truly desi re the grace of God," to 
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participate in the Lord's Supper, and because God allows one to receive in this 
Supper "all that spiritual grace that righteousness and peace, and joy in the 
H oly Ghost"30 that has been won for us through the death of Jesus Christ. He 
also stressed, with the reprimand of 1 Cor 11:28, that participation in the Sup-
per is not merely allowed but commanded. An additional important aspect 
concerning the understanding of the Lord's Supper in the tradition of the 
church is that here our devotion to God is renewed. This is very beautifully 
expressed in the liturgy of worship for the "renewal of the covenant with God." 
There it says " From time to time we renew our vows of consecration, especially 
when we gather at the table of the Lord."31 
Family and Private Prayer 
Prayer is possible because the door is opened to the Father's heart in His 
Son Jesus Christ. It can be stated definitively, as our Lord J esus Christ said, 
" ... ask, and it will be given you; seek, and you will find; knock and it will be 
opened to you" (Matt 7:7). Here prayer is described as a means of grace as well 
as the means through which we receive His grace. Several of Jesus' parables 
illustrate the meaning of prayer. It is important to observe that prayer is first of 
all seen in the small context of the fa mily and then as conversation with God in 
the secrecy of the small chamber. Both belong together in all sobriety and 
openness before one another . We arc able to comprehend in depth the great 
privilege of childlike intimacy with God and grow into the form and mind of 
Jes us Christ. 
Searching the Scripture 
Pe rsonal intimacy with Scripture has another quality beside the hearing of 
the Word in the assembled congregation. I am with the Word alone and can 
leisurely and with concentration read, consult, check cross references and pur-
sue major themes through the various books of Scripture. What John Wesley 
considered to be very essential was that persons learn to read the entire Bible. 
He regarded that which stands in 2 Tim 3:16f. to be suitable for the entire 
Bible. "All Scripture is inspired of God and profitable for teaching, for re-
proof, for correction, and for t raining in righteousness, that the man of God 
may be complete, equipped for every good work." In the Large Minutes of the 
confere nces, the following entry stands under the heading "The Study of the 
Bible": 
1. To read: The Bible in an orderly way, constantly, at any time, 
every day, and continuously; attentively, with the help of 'annotations'; 
earnestly, with prayer before and after; productively, in that you 
immediately do what you have learned in it. 2. T o meditate: At the 
determined times. According to some rule."32 
The intimacy with the H oly Scripture in this manner is a lifelong business. The 
more one reads, the more one will grow into an extensive understanding of the 
biblical message, provided that the entire Scripture be read. 
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Fasting or Absti11e11ce 
John Wesley devoted an entire sermon to this means of grace. It is the sev-
enth discourse in his series of expositions of the Sermon on the Mount. H ere 
he enumerates the various reasons why people decide to fast. For him, fasting 
belongs together with prayer. Whenever there is fasting, it is always to take 
place in relation to prayer and works of mercy, with reference to Acts 10 and 
Isaiah 58. However, he maintains firmly that fasting is: 
... a means, in the hand of God, of confirming and increasing, not only 
virtue, not chastity only (as some have idly imagined, without any 
ground either from Scripture, reason o r experience), but also 
seriousness of spirit, earnestness, sensibility and tenderness of 
conscience, deadness to the world, and consequently the love of God, 
and every holy and heavenly affcction.33 
In his estimation of fasting, Wesley has remained very sensible, and he re-
peatedly notes that the exercise of fasting should be used within the limits of 
healthy possibilities. 
CONCLUSION 
In our day, in which it has increasingly become fashionable for Christians to 
"pick and choose" which of the means of grace they will observe--oftcn based 
on quite subjective and private considerations--Wesley's exhortation confronts 
us plainly: all the means of grace that have been treated here are lo be used. It 
is not possible to choose. They are not simply ways that have been contrived. 
Instead, they are rules, as it says in the General Rules, "all [o f] which we are 
taught of God to observe, even in His written word--the only rule, and the suffi-
cient rule, both of our faith and practice. And all these, we know, His Spirit 
writes on every truly awakened heart."34 
In his sermon on the means of grace, Wesley says quite simply, " I do expect 
that He will fulfil His word, that He will meet and bless me in this way."35 
That is exactly the way it happens. 
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How Cana 
Theological Understanding of 
Humanity Enrich 
Artificial Intelligence Work? 
CHRISTOPHER B. KAISER 
DEFINING THE THEOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF HUMANITY 
In order to answer the question posed by the title of this paper, we must 
first agree on what we mean by a "theological understanding of humanity." The 
most obvious sense of the phrase would be the understanding of human nature 
as defined by the councils and creeds of the Church. However, the creeds of the 
Church do not give us a statement of the nature of humanity sufficiently defini-
tive to allow us to draw any direct conclusions about efforts to develop Artifi-
cial Intelligence (hereafter Al). 
Creeds shared by Protestants, Roman Catholics and Orthodox Catholics 
tell us that we have been created (both physical body and rational soul) in the 
image of God, that we have somehow fallen from the grace of our original 
state, that our nature was assumed in its entirety (both physical body and ra-
tional soul) by the Son of God, that our bodies will be raised from the dead, 
and that we will be judged for things we have done in this life. 
Councils recognized by the Roman Catholic Church add the more techni-
cal points that humans have one and only one soul each (against Averroists and 
Manichaeans) and that the soul is the form of the body (an Aristotelian term)--
in other words, the soul gives each of us our distinct personality and character. 1 
Both Catholic and Reformed standards generally affirm that the soul is dis-
tinct from the body and continues to exist after the death of the body (the inter-
mediate state), but they say little about its exact relationship to the body in this 
life.2 
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These statements are not definitive for our purposes for two reasons. For 
one thing, the times in which these articles of faith were form ulated were ones 
in which the possibility of AI was not even being considered as a viable re-
search program. In fact, the theologians of the early Church regarded many 
questions of science as hopelessly speculative--not because they were opposed 
to science as such, but because there was at that time no prospect o f ever being 
able to develop the instruments needed lo decide the truth of such mallers. 
For example, Irenaeus regarded speculation about the migration of birds and 
the causes of meteorological phenomena like rain, thunder and lightening (all 
treated on speculative grounds in A ristotle's Mcteorologica) as e ntirely futilc.3 
Basil said the same concerning discussions about what supported the earth in 
space.4 Theophilus took it as granted that humans could never produce ma-
chines that would have the capacity for motion or sensation, let alone rcason.5 
We must keep in mind that the technologies that make modern scie nce 
possible arc only a few hundred years o ld, and they place us in a context of sci-
entific, political and moral possibilities quite d ifferent from that of the early, 
medieval and R eformation Church from which most of ou r confessional state-
ments come. So it would make no more sense to derive implicat ions concern-
ing AI from Christian doctrine in a st raight forward, logical man ner than it 
would to make judgments about the theory of evolution on the basis o f the 
book of Genesis. If we arc to derive any results al all, we shall have to do so by 
focusing on the underlying idea of the im age of God in humanity and by consid-
ering the implications that idea has had historically for the development of 
modern science. 
A second reason for saying that Church dogma is not definit ive by itself has 
to do with our understanding of hum anity. If we know anything about human 
nature, it is that it is highly malleable. In contrast to other social animals like 
ants and bees (less so to cetaceans and the higher primates), humans arc gov-
erned by their social and cultu ral conditions as much as by their genes. Our 
brains, for instance, are programmed by genetic material only in a very general 
way. As Jean-Pierre Changeux and others have pointed out , the nu mber of 
genes in the human genome, roughly HP (one hundred thousand), immense as 
it may be seem to us, is only a small fraction of the number of synaptic connec-
tions in the human brain, roughly 1015 (one quadrill ion) .6 The d ifference is a 
factor of 1010 (ten billion)! We do not know just how the inst ructions for the 
init ial formation of the brain are encoded in the human genome, but the struc-
ture of the mature brain is clearly underdetermined, genetically speaki ng. In 
other words, the format ion of the brain and mind is cont rolled by interpersonal 
and environmental factors as much as it is by the genotype. 
This malleabili ty of human nature means that humans arc largely what they 
make of themselves from one generation to the next: depending on our culture, 
we define ourselves through the structuring of our social relations, the degree 
of individual freedom in relation to group identity, the structures of our tech-
nology, moral values and religion. 
Technological structures arc a particularly important aspect of the cultural 
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formation of human nature. In the modern West, we recognize that thought 
and behavior of humans is rather different in a technological society than it is in 
a more traditional one.7 But the process of human self-definition has always 
been in a symbiotic relation to the development of human technology.8 We get 
hints of this as early as in the book of Genesis where the image of God is 
closely related to human dominion over nature--a dominion which is described 
in contemporary images of agriculture, the domestication of animals and metal-
lurgy (Gen 1:28-29; 2:15-20; 4:20-22). 
One of the most exciting, and sometimes frightening, aspects of the current 
computer revolution is the fact that we are asking questions about ourselves 
with renewed intensity. Are certain human traits potentialities within the laws 
that govern matter itself? Can we replicate ourselves through technology as 
well as we can through sexual reproduction? If not, which are the characteris-
tics that cannot be reproduced in machines and why? How does all this relate 
to our understanding of the "image of God" within us? Does it tell us some-
thing about the relation of matter and spirit? 
AI research is not just a narrow specialty that nonspecialists can ignore. 
While it is not as readily marketable, in the economic sense, as the "expert sys-
tems" that sometimes go by the name of Al, it confronts us anew with the cen-
tral questions of our own human existence. 
If and when the verdict is in on the viability of Al as a research program, 
we will all be in a belter position to define our own nature than we are at pres-
ent. Our "theological understanding of humanity" is grounded in the creeds of 
the Church, but it is not spelled out in explicit terms that would allow us to 
predetermine what can or will be. What ought to be is another question. 
THE IMAGE OF GOD AND HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 
So the theological understanding of humanity is not determinative in any 
straightforward sense: it docs not have a fixed, explicit meaning, and it is sub-
ject to reinterpretation in every age. Historically, however, the theological un-
derstanding of humanity has had important and influential meaning for the de-
velopment of Western culture. And, since the quest for Al is very much a prod-
uct of Western technology and philosophy,9 this particular expression of the 
theological tradition is relevant to our concerns. 
In fact, much of the confidence in human reason and human ingenuity that 
has made modern science possible was initially inspired by belief in one of the 
theological doctrines I mentioned earlier--belief in the creation of humans in 
the image of God. Traditionally this belief has had two correlates: that humans 
could know and understand the world God had created and that they could 
make moral judgments. Humans were believed to reflect the divine mind--the 
same mind that authored the laws of nature, and humans were believed to be 
accountable to the divine will--the same will that authored the moral law.10 
These two ideas are the epistemic and ethical correlates of belief in the crea-
tion of humanity in the image of God. Together they constitute the historic 
Western theological understanding of human intelligence. This is just one tradi-
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tion, but it is the tradition out of which the modern scientific quest was born. It 
is, therefore, the tradition to which we must refer back insofar as we want to 
know the meaning of the scientific enterprise as it has developed historically in 
the West. 
THE IMAGE OF GOD AND REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE 
(EPISTEMIC CORRELA TE) 
The idea that the divine mind is reflected in human intelligence--the epis-
temic correlate--goes back to the wisdom tradition of ancient Israel and to the 
Platonic tradition of classical Greece. Both Hebrew and Greek traditions were 
rooted in the mythology and cosmology of the ancient Near East. But the prin-
ciple vector for transmitting these ideas to Western Europe was the patristic 
tradition of the Church which blended biblical and Platonic ideas and stressed 
the importance of mathematics for an understanding of the structures of crea-
tion.11 Without such a belief there would have been no good reason to suppose 
that the principles of mathematics would have been applicable in any profound 
way to questions about nature. 
Belief in the reflection of God's mind in humans meant that the world was 
in principle comprehensible--that is, it was comprehensible insofar as it could 
be explored.12 Though space travel in the modern sense was unthinkable, apoca-
lyptic writers supposed that the mechanics of the heavens would be comprehen-
sible to someone like Enoch who was enabled by his ascent into heaven to ex-
amine them at close range.13 Against the skepticism of some Greek schools of 
philosophy, Tertullian and Augustine argued that sensory perception was basi-
cally reliable and that the world was comprehensible to the extent that our five 
senses allowed us to experience it.14 Even the inner recesses of the human mind 
were believed to be comprehensible, at least to Augustine, by virtue of God's 
image within it.15 
Faith in the comprehensibility of the world was an essential factor in the 
rise of modern science. This can be seen in the endeavors of early Western 
scientists like the Venerable Bede (early eighth century), A<lelard of Bath 
(twelfth century), Robert Grosseteste (thirteenth century), John Buridan (four-
teenth century), Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and Newton. Copernicus, Galileo, 
Kepler and Newton are generally recognized as the founders of modern sci-
ence. Even though there have been so-called revolutions in twentieth-century 
physics--the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics--mo<lern physics con-
tinues to be based on the method and findings of these early modern pioneers. 
It is diflicult to conceive of modern science developing as it has without 
founding figures like these, but it is just as difficult to imagine any of them 
working with the intensity needed to overcome the obstacles of early modern 
science without the kind of faith in the comprehensibility of the world that they 
had. 
The founders of modern science were doing what Thomas Kuhn has 
termed "revolutionary science": that is, they were seeking answers to problems 
for which they had no reason to suppose (on the basis of existing science) that 
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answers existed.16 In theological terms, they worked by faith more than by 
sight--a faith sustained by their theological understanding of human nature.17 I 
would argue, however, that the revolutionary nature of their work was some-
thing they shared with their early medieval predecessors. Though the para-
digms of modern science were not established until the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries, the attempt to reach out into the unknown, beyond what in-
ductively established paradigms would allow, was made by natural philosophers 
in every century of the M iddle Ages. 
Scientists that have succeeded Newton have often been able to follow their 
example without necessarily sharing their religious faith. But those like Albert 
Einstein, who have pioneered radically new paradigms in scientific thought, 
have often accepted the comprehensibility of the world as a tenet of the ir faith 
in God. There is probably no way to establish an exact correlation, but, histori-
cally, revolutionary episodes in science appear to be ones in which faith played 
a significant role. 
Now this epistemic correlate of belief in the image of God tells us two 
things about the understanding of humanity that might we ll enrich AI research. 
It tells us something about the character of the intelligence Al research may 
hope to reproduce, and it also tells us something about the capacity of A l re-
searchers themselves. In other words, we can take the founders of modern sci-
ence as models for the definition of what we mean by human intclligence--mak-
ing the goal of reproducing it seem almost im possible--aft cr all, Al workers 
have their hands full sim ply trying to replicate everyday common-sense be hav-
io r! Or we could take them as mode ls for what we may expect from A l work-
ers ( they, too, are created in the image of God!) and the legi timacy of their 
efforts to accomplish the seemingly impossible. 
SCIENTISTS SUCH AS COPERNIC US AS MODELS OF 
HUMAN INT E LLIGENCE 
The reason for taking the founders of modern science as models for our 
definition of the intelligence Al research aims to reproduce is that they form a 
bridge between classical Christian faith and modern Western science. In the 
lives and work of early modern scientists, the meaning of the theological under-
standing of human intelligence was worked out in such a way that it had impli-
cations for the scientific enterprise--im plications which could not be der ived in 
an unambiguous way from the creeds of the Chu rch themselves. Since this is 
just one way of defining intelligence, o r one part icular aspect of hum an intelli-
gence, I shall earmark it by referring to it as "Copernican intelligence," Cope r-
nicus being perhaps the most widely recognized historical expression of the 
revolutionary sort of intell igence I have in mind. 
If we learn anything about the character of the in telligence Al hopes to 
replicate from these historical exemplifications of theological understand ing, it 
seems to be this: a creature is int elligent (in the Copernican sense) only if it 
makes judgments concerning its own efforts to cope with reality when its very 
ability to cope is in doubt (and recognized to be so) and there arc no induc-
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lively-based paradigms for establishing the probability of success. 
The mere ability o f a machine to seek and to find solutions to problems--
whether by heuristic programs or by semantic information processing or by 
scripts or by stochaistic processes 18--is certainly a necessary condition for intel-
ligence, but not a sufficient one according to our defin ition. Why? Because the 
very possibility of arriving at a solution is never in doubt when the machine is 
programmed to keep trying or to quit according to some pre-determined rule--
a ru le based on the judgment of the Al worker who programmed the machine. 
In other words, problem-solving machines as we know them today can only be 
said to be " inte lligent" or even to "solve problems" in the metapho rical sense. 
For comparison, consider the way we speak of primitive prokaryotic (no n-
nuclcatcd) cells as having "solved the problem" of how to produce energy more 
efficiently or of having " learned the trick" of photo-synthesis. Orthodox sci-
ence today would readi ly admit that this is merely an anthropomorphism, a fig-
ure of speech. Prokaryotic cells arc o nly able to live and reproduce themselves 
(by sim ple subdivision). The fact that some o f them (the blue-green algae) 
evolved in such a way as to produce energy more efficiently was governed en-
tire ly by genetic mutations and environmental co nditions. If in telligence came 
into the picture at a ll , it was that of the Creator, not that of the creature, how-
ever remarkable its accomplishment may have been. 
At a so mewhat higher level, we speak o f mice "solving the problem" o f 
finding the correct way th rough a maze. Again this is a figure of speech. Why? 
Because the propensity of mice to keep searching is due entire ly to basic drives 
conditioned to a degree by past experience. The anticipations and skills they 
employ arc a mere projection based on past experiences of mazes much like 
the o ne at hand. There is no possibi lity of a mouse considering whether, in the 
case o f a radically new situation, there arc grounds for judging whether efforts 
towards a so lutio n arc worthwhile. 
The re is evidence that early hom inids like Hom o erecllls and early Honza 
sapiens ( the Neande rthals) also searched for new habitats and colonized much 
of no rthern E urope and eastern Asia. Perhaps this, too, was simply a matter o f 
basic drives conditioned by the need for survival. Or perhaps the possib ility of 
penetrating the unknown was weighed in relation to the obvious risks involved. 
We don' t know for sure . In any case, migra tion to new habi tats presumably 
took place in small steps, no ne o f which required a significantly greater risk 
that the one before it. Hence, past experience could serve as an indicator of 
the probabil ity of further success. 
A modern-day comparison would be the solution of crossword puzzles. 
D ifficult as these puzzles may be for some of us, their solu tion does no t require 
intell igence in the Copernican sense: we know in advance they were designed 
by human beings using basic patte rns and language that we share on the basis 
of a common culture. 
Or, to take a comparison closer to the to pic of Al, consider the decipher-
ment of enemy codes during World War II. Surely this was a job for " intelli-
gence," as the term is used in the business of espionage. In fact, some of the 
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earliesl steps in lhe development of computers were taken in the process of de-
ciphering codes (Turing et a l., late 1930s). But even this is not intelligence in 
the Copernican sense that we arc using lo illustrate the Western theological 
understanding of human nature. In military intelligence work, a cipher is 
always assumed to have a meaning. Anyone who tries to decipher it must have 
confidence in her or his individual ability. Bul the problem is known to be sol-
uble in advance, and its solution is generally thought lo be a matter of time . 
Jn comparison to these exam pies, early scientilic efforls by Copernicus, 
Kepler and Newlon to understand the kinematics and dynamics of the solar sys-
tem was distinctive in that there was neither compulsion nor guarantee of suc-
cess. The history of Western culture could very well have gone on without these 
breakthroughs in science. The effort was highly contingent: it exemplilied the 
way in which humans deline themselves and their abilities--defined, in this case, 
in terms of their faith in the ability of the human mind to understand what God 
had created. 
Perhaps the first indication in the fossil record of intelligence in this spe-
cial, "Copernican" sense is the evidence that Neanderthals provided grave 
goods in the burial of their dead, particularly in the case of children.19 Perhaps 
there was survival value for the group in practices like these, but individuals still 
had to reflect on the meaning and value of practices that could be varied in an 
indefinite number of ways without affecting the immediate material condition 
of the group. In other words, they were attempting to penetrate the unknown 
and questions of belief became a factor in the effort to solve problems for 
which neither environmental conditions nor past conditioning was dctcrmina-
tive.20 
TESTING A FULLY SOCIALIZED COMPUTER FOR 
COPERNICAN INTELLIGENCE 
Under what circumstances could computers exhibit Copernican intelli-
gence? This is still largely a matter for speculation. But a few suggestions may 
be offered if only to keep the ultimate goal in sight and to indicate the enormity 
of the task. 
As philosophers like Hubert Dreyfus have argued, the way in which hu-
mans know things can not be formalized in a way lhat is completely independ-
ent of context.21 Advocates of AI like John McCarthy have recognized the same 
problem.22 Computers that are programmed to exercise certain skills arc com-
pletely unable to cope with situations in which context may change unpredicta-
bly in such a way that the meaning of given stimuli is altered--yielding " ice 
cream," for example, instead of "I scream!"23 
Actually, we have a very simil ar difliculty with our children. We try to 
teach them "manners" for instance. ll is proper for them to use their fingers 
when eating some things, but not when eating others. They may run and jump 
in some contexts, but not in others. There may be no way in which to formalize 
all lhe rules involved, yet our children slowly learn lo make whal we are willing 
to accept as good choices. They become socialized. Of course, some critics 
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argue that children are simply being limited in the scope of their imagination. 
Their creativity may actually diminish as their cultural baggage increases! 
On the other hand, we know that children deprived of human contact in 
their formative years have great difficulty in behaving in socially acceptable 
ways. The same is true for other primates like chimpanzees.24 
So, even if we succeed in building computers with the hardware and built-
in programs that match the capacity of a newborn child--including something 
like a body with five senses and two hands in order to model human interaction 
with the world--we must suppose that a lengthy process of socialization would 
be required before the "intelligence" of the machine would be formed in a way 
that would allow it to function in real-life situations with any degree of suc-
cess.25 Such a machine would have to be able to "grow" as the human brain 
docs. Both its hardware and its software would have to develop as the machine 
learned of its identity and its capabilities through human contact.26 
Indeed, it could take many generations of humans and computers function-
ing together as a group for the human partners even to determine all of the 
hardware and programming requirements for the design of potentially intelli-
gent machines. Design and communal relations would have to evolve together 
phylogenetically before an individual machine would emerge that could achieve 
intelligence ontogenetically. I shall refer to such a hypothetical machine as a 
"fully socialized computer." And, for the sake of the argument, I shall assume 
that the development of such a machine is possible in principle. 
The question then is whether a fully socialized computer would be intelli-
gent. At what point in the co-evolution of design and communal relations 
would, or could, hum ans recognize their computers as equally intelligent? 
Insofar as the historic Western theological understanding of human nature 
is any guide, I would look for the day when computers began to pioneer in ar-
eas of revolutionary science.27 At this juncture their human mentors would no 
longer be infallible guides. Computers and humans would not only share a 
common stock of knowledge, but they would face a common unknown as po-
tentially equal partners. In other words, our relationship to potentially intelli-
gent computers would be something like our relation to our graduate students 
at the point that we recognize them as colleagues. This is not to say that a 
Ph.D. is a necessary condition for intelligence. But the capability of doing inde-
pendent research is assumed of any human with the necessary training as a con-
sequence of their being intell igent. Could a fully socialized computer exhibit 
Copernican intelligence? Could it decide, for instance, that it was wasting its 
time in pursuing a particular problem of revolutionary science--that is, in cases 
where there is insufficient precedent to allow judging on the basis of past expe-
rience? Could it decide that its efforts would better be spent on something 
else? In other words, could a computer articulate a belief system about the na-
ture of its own mind in relation to the real world (not the known world, but the 
real one)? 
On the other hand, could our fully socialized computer choose to go on 
with a research project when its human colleagues had given up--not just out of 
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necessity or a simple projection based on past experience, but on the basis of 
individual judgment? Could it recognize itself as participating in a transcendent 
order of ideas, for instance, or as created in the image of God?28 Could it ex-
hibit greater faith than its creators? 
SCIENTISTS SUCH AS COPERNICUS AS MODELS FOR AI WORKERS 
Considering the founders of modern science as paradigms of the historic 
Western theological understanding of human nature gives us some idea of the 
enormity of the task of reproducing Copernican intelligence in machines. 
However, we must weigh this enormity against that of the capacity of human 
beings to understand and to invent. For this, we must take the early modern 
scientists as models of what we may expect from the AI workers themselves. 
For example, if we consider Kepler in his own context (the early seven-
teenth century), we realize that he was pursuing a nearly impossible, and possi-
bly hopeless, task in trying to find mathematical laws that would describe the 
data of the orbit of Mars collected by Tycho Brahe. We do not always appreci-
ate this fact because we view the matter from the vantage point of the later 
Newtonian science that vindicated Kepler. We know that the orbits arc simple 
geometric figures--ellipscs with the sun at one focus. In retrospect, we can see 
that Kepler had a decent chance of finding a solution since the geometry of 
conic sections was reasonably well known.29 Similarly, the non-Euclidean ge-
ometries Einstein needed to work out his general theory of relativity were avail-
able, even if not so widely known. 
But neither Kepler nor Einstein, themselves, had any logical reason to sup-
pose (on the basis of existing science) that solutions to their respective prob-
lems were at hand. They spent large amounts of time and energy pursuing 
projects that could have been a colossal waste of time! In fact, both Kepler and 
Einstein knew the agony of defeat when cherished ideas turned out to be 
wrong. But they persisted because they believed that abstract geometrics could 
be applied to the real world even though most of their theorems were not de-
rived from everyday experience.30 As Kepler himself put the matter: 
Those laws are within the grasp of the human mind; God wanted us to 
recognize them by creating us after his own image so that we could 
share in his own thoughts .... Only fools fear that we make man godlike 
in doing so; for God's counsels arc impenetrable, but not his material 
creation. 31 
If Al workers today exhibit this same kind of faith, in a curious way they repro-
duce the faith of Kepler and Einstein. They too exhibit what I have called Cop-
ernican intelligence.32 
Whatever the potentialities of matter may be, the potentialities of the hu-
man mind in understanding them are a matter of personal faith. After all, the 
conditions under which our brains were form ed by natural selection millions of 
years ago were not ones in which the deep understanding of the laws of matter 
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were a signilicant facto r. On the basis of natural selection alone there is no 
reason at all to suppose that our minds could ever understand the workings of 
the human mind, or, for that matter, that they could have understood the dy-
namics of the solar system or the large-scale structure of the universe. Insofar 
as we share the fai th of Kepler and Einstein--and insofar as we share the theo-
logical understanding of human nature that lies behind it--wc may also share 
the faith of A l workers and o ther scientists who pursue the quest for under-
standing beyond what the previous history of science would give adequate rea-
son to suppose was likely to succeed. We may share their faith even if we have 
a greater sense of the enorm ity of their self-appointed task. 
Hubert Dreyfus has also drawn parallels between Al research and early 
modern scientists, but, instead of pointing to Kepler and Newton as I have 
done, he points to the alchemical research programs of the Middle Ages and 
Rcnaissance.33 This alternative is equally valid in my view, but it does not prove 
the futility of Al programs as Dreyfus implies. Historians generally recognize 
today that major developments of early modern chcmistry--not just the chemi-
cal apparatus, as Dreyfus suggests, but the theoretical concepts and experimen-
tal results o f early modern chcmistry--would not have been possible without the 
belief structure mediated by alchemical notions. For example, Yan Helm ont's 
thesis, that each clement had a distinctive "chaos" or " gas" that was given off 
when it was heated, was fund amental to all subsequent efforts Lo isolate and 
identify various gascs.34 Far from being a futile effort, alchemy played a posi-
tive, creative role in science at a time when there were no empirically-based 
paradigms to rely on. 
We can not say whether Al wi ll succeed in achieving the goals which it has 
set for itself, but, insofar as it excmplilies the human quest to understand the 
things God has created using the gifts God has given us, it is consistent with the 
theological understanding of humanity as understood historically in Western 
Christendom. 
THE IMAGE OF GOD AND MORAL JUDGMENTS 
(ETHICAL CORRELATE) 
For the sake of simplicity, we often differentiate between intellectual and 
moral questions, or between the faculties of cogni tive and ethical judgment. 
From a theological perspective, however, the two must be related. The re can 
be no real intell igence without consideration of justice. And, o f course, the ex-
ercise of moral judgment requires a cognitive understanding of the world in 
which such judgments arc to be made. Consequently, we must ask whether 
fully socialized computers would be concerned about the morality, as well as 
the feasibility, of their efforts. Or, in terms of the theological virtues, fully in-
telligent beings must exhibit love as well as faith. 
Like the belief in the capacity of hum an mind to understand the world, the 
Western belief in its accountability to a moral order is rooted in the concept of 
God as creator and lawgiver. Christians throughout history have rightly been 
critical o f science when it was pursued out o f self-interest o r even me re ly in the 
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national interest. Such, for instance, was the early Christians' critique of Greek 
science as they knew it.35 And such was the fundamental ethic that motivated 
the pursuit and publication of early modern science. 
For all the credit due Copernicus for his restructuring of our understanding 
of the solar system, it should be remembered that he originally planned to pub-
lish only some astronomical tables and rules of calculation for "common 
mathematicians" and was reluctant to publish the underlying theory and proof 
of his results. This was not out of fear of the Church, by the way, but due to a 
Pythagorean principle of reserving advanced forms of knowledge for personal 
associates and students. The fact that Copernicus did publish the full theory 
was largely due to the insistence of Tiedemann G iese, the bishop of Kulm. 
Against Copernicus, Bishop Giese argued that the Pythagorean practice of se-
crecy had no place in mathematical science and that the latter should be de-
voted to Christ and a gift to the world (for which Christ also gave his li fe ).36 
The fact that the Church later placed Copernicus's work on the Index should 
not be allowed to obscure our indebtedness to Giese and other church officials 
for their positive role in science. 
SCIENTISTS SUCH AS BACON AS MODELS OF INTELLIGENCE 
From a theological perspective, then, true intelligence entails the consid-
eration of how one may conform to the moral law, or in the specifically Chris-
tian sense, how one may follow the example of J esus Christ. In order to paral-
lel our earlier discussion of "Copernican int elligence," I shall refer to this as-
pect of human nature as " Baconian intelligence." It was Francis Bacon, whose 
insistence that science be pursued not for personal gain but for the benefit of 
humanity, who provided the basis for a socially-supported program of scientific 
research in seventeenth-century E ngland. 
As Bacon put it in OJ the Advance111e11t of Leami11g, science should no t be a 
shop for profit or sale, but a storehouse for the glory of the Creator and the 
relief of the human estate.37 Accordingly, the citizens of the New Atlantis, the 
Christian utopia that Bacon set forth as the model of the scientific community, 
daily prayed to God "for the illumination of [their] labors and turning them 
into good and holy uses."38 Baconian intelligence in this sense is the ethical cor-
relate of the theological understanding of human nature as created in the im age 
of God. 
Like the epistemic correlate, the ethical tells us two things that may enrich 
Al research. It tells us something about the character of the intelligence AI 
workers may hope to reproduce, and it tells us something about what we should 
expect from AI workers themselves. 
TESTING A FULLY SOCIALIZED COMPUTER FOR 
BACONIAN INTELLIGENCE 
Under what circumstances, then, could fully socialized computers (assum-
ing again that such machines can be developed) exhibit intelligence in the Ba-
conian sense? I would look for situations in which the need for moral judgment 
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characteristically arises--situations in which various alternative futures would be 
recognized as possibilities, and in which priorities and criteria would have lo be 
developed to deal with the varying costs and benefits to others as well as Lo 
oneself and one's own group. Could a fully socialized computer protest against 
a policy that was advocated by its human associates? 
Could a computer contemplate risking its own well-being in o rder to avoid 
harm or to promote the well-being of a human or of another computer--not 
just because it was programmed to (as Isaac Asimov has imagined in his "First 
Law of Robotics")39 but as a matter of reasoned moral judgment? In other 
words, could a computer recognize itself and others as participating in a moral 
order? Could it conceivably exhibit even greater concern for morality than its 
creators? 
The answer to these questions may depend on the degree to which the Al 
workers themselves exhibit ethical concerns in their work. After all, it is they 
who would function as the "parents" in relation to these new members of the 
community of intelligent beings. Like faith, morality is something that is 
learned from situations and examples. It can not be schematized o r pro-
grammed. T o what extent, then, will AI research be motivated by the desire to 
enhance the environment or alleviate human suffering? T o what degree will Al 
workers address the issues of the social impact of the results of their work? 
The viabil ity of the long-range goals of AI research may well depend on the 
faith and love of the Al community as much as it does on the possibilities al-
lowed by the electronic properties of matter. And, even if Al research fails ulti-
mately to reproduce true intelligence, it may at least force us to develop ne-
glected aspects of our own. That is what a theological understanding of human 
nature can contribute to the enterprise. 
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Sin, Self and Society: 
John Wesley's Hamartiology 
Reconsidered 
JOHN R. TYSON 
The arrival of the "Bicentennial Edition" of John Wesley's 108 Sennons on 
Several Occasions, in Albert Outler's *Works of 10'111 Wesley ,1 seemed reason 
enough to take a fresh walk down those familiar roads; but the sheer size of 
those three volumes led me into the temptation of procrastination. When I fi-
nally took up the task I was amazed to see how much my perception of our 
Methodist patriarch changed as I tried to view all 108 sermons as a doctrinal 
and practical whole. 
This rereading of Wesley was so revolutionary for me that I urge others to 
undertake a similar pilgrimage. Not only did I find myself refreshed by encoun-
tering our forefather in such a sustained fashion, but I was also impressed by 
the theological unity and development found across his homiletical corpus. We 
have been too apologetic about Wesley the "unsystematic theologian." While it 
is certain that no one will mistake the SOSO for a literary offering from Calvin 
or Barth, it is clear that the collection does have a systematic principle at work 
in it. It is framed on the essential themes of practical divinity (orthodoxy wed 
to orthopraxis), and, like concentric circles of instruction, those foundational 
truths ripple into broader parameters of application all across the homiletical 
corpus. 
*Hereafter cited in the text as Sennons, with the appropriate volume and page number 
indicated. When the Sennons on Several Occasions are referred to in a general fashion, 
as with respect to their order or context, they will be cited as SOSO. When a specific 
quotation is made, it will be cited from Outler's edition of the Sennons, which includes 
the SOSO and additional material. 
John R. Tyson, Ph.D., is associate p1vfessor of theology at Houghton College, 
Houghton, New York. His second book, Charles Wesley: A Reader was 
published by Oxford in 1989. This a11ic/e is pmt of a paper read at the Eighth 
Oxford Institute 011 Methodist Theological Studies (sponsored by the World 
Methodist Council) held at So111men1il/e College, Oxford, in July 1987. 
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John Wesley's treatment of the doctrine of sin is a good example of the way 
he approached the formation of doctrine in his SOSO. An examination of his 
hamartiology is all the more necessary because of popular misconceptions 
about Wesley's doctrine of sin. 
The first misconception was that he had, as Colin Williams termed it, "a 
defective conception of sin."2 This criticism is based in Wesley's willingness to 
consider sin, "properly so-called," as "a voluntary transgression of the law of 
God; ... acknowledged to be such at the time it is transgressed." (Sem w11s, I, p. 
436). Wesley's recognition that willful ("voluntary") and cognitive ("acknowl-
edged" ) factors lay at the heart of human sin caused him to occasionally depart 
from the more absolute definition, which, in the words of the Westminster Di-
vines, described sin as "any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the 
law of God" (Shorler Catechism, Q. 14).3 In some respects Wesley's hamartiol-
ogy stands closer to the A11glica11 Articles of Religio11 which view sin as a loss of 
paradisiacal perfection and distinguish between voluntary and involuntary sins.4 
A closer reading suggested that it was precisely the "defective" (or voluntarist) 
element of Wesley's doctrine of sin that made it an importan t basis for 
Wesleyan soteriology, ethics and practical piety. 
A second misconception about Wesley's hamartiology is that his doctrine 
of sin, while being connected to "social holiness" (through issues like slavery, 
the "scarcity of provisions" and the "reformation of manners"), was primarily 
concerned with personal sin and therefore it generally functioned in the context 
of his evangelism. This apparent difficulty seems all the more serious when 
Wesley is read from the perspective of theo logies of liberation, since a privat-
ized gospel has sometimes been a silent accomplice of systemic injustice. But a 
closer reading suggested that Wesley's doctrine of sin functioned in at least two 
contexts beyond the personal: it embraced and simultaneously corrected the 
Enlightenment's optimism about the importance of human moral agency; and it 
drew such a direct line of connection between "personal sins" and societal evil 
that it seems unwise for Wesley's descendants to distinguish sharply between 
personal and social sins, between personal and social holiness. 
THE FOUNDATION 
Few of Wesley's doctrinal constructs show the impact of his theological 
context more than his treatment of original sin. He built this construct through 
his recurring attention to biblical phrases like " in Adam all died" (which 
pointed to the extent "all" and the dire situation caused by it--spiritual death), 
" lost the life and the image of God," "dead in trespasses and sins, without 
hope, without God in the world, and therefore children of His wrath," and so 
on.5 Anchored in his direct affirmation of the Christian tradition (Semw11s, I, 
p. 317), Wesley's hamartiology was also, as he said, "confirmed by daily experi-
ence" (Semw11s, II, p. 176). 
Wesley's SOSO affirmed a doctrine of human depravity at the time when 
enlightened folk viewed it as a "superstitious error" that had debilitating effects 
upon human moral agency and action. While his sermons did not mount a di-
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rect attack on the Deistic or Enlightenment anthropology (there are occasional 
asides), his Appeals are another matter. They are direct assaults upon ideas 
like " innate moral virtue" and the essential goodness of (unspoiled) primitive 
human consciousness.6 In both cases, depravity was the presupposition of 
Wesley's gospel of gracious restoration in an age that abounded with optimism 
regarding human nature and destiny. In a deft stroke, Wesley issued a chal-
lenge to the age's optimism about unaided humanity and the appropriate bases 
for moral action, and yet also co-opted its interest in human dignity, moral ac-
tion, and ultimate perfectibility.7 It seemed typical of Wesley to restore with 
one hand what he took away with the other. 
Seeking to curtail the Enlightenment's estimate of "natural man," Wesley 
pointed to human "sickness," or "sleepiness" which caused " the whole imagi-
nations of the thoughts of [their] heart to be ONLY evil, ... continually."8 Thus, 
" ... we may learn one grand, fundamental difference between Christianity, con-
sidered as a system of doctrines, and the most refined heathenism .. .they knew 
not that men were empty of all good, and filled with all manner of evil" (Ser-
mons, II, p. 182-183). The fall of humanity, which was occasioned by an abuse 
of human liberty (in contradistinction to contemporary religious naturalistic de-
terminists), made everyone (in their natural state) liable to judgment and cor-
rupt in their dispositions.9 It also turned them into active atheists or practical 
idolaters who traded the love of God for the love of the world since they affixed 
to creation the loyalties they justly owed to the Creator. 10 In SOSO, Wesley's 
"The Imperfection of Human Knowledge" (#69) and "The Case of Reason 
Impartially Considered" ( #70) assailed the epistemology of "this enlightened 
age, wherein it is taken for granted, the world is wiser than ever it was from the 
beginning of the world" (Sen11011s, II, p. 483). Sermons like "On Eternity" 
(#54), "On Predestination" (#58), "The Mystery of Iniquity" (#61), "On Di-
vine Providence" ( #67) and "The Wisdom of God's Counsels" ( #68) chal-
lenged and interacted with current cosmologies. 
Wesley also emphasized a reconstituted human dignity that shared the as-
pirations of his age with regard to the nature11 and destiny of humanity.U His 
sermons provide both the ideological and practical underpinnings for effective 
human moral actions13; they seem both classically traditional and strangely cur-
rent with his emphasis upon the sanctifying effects of spiritual formation and 
religious education.14 
John Wesley's understanding of salvation as "healing of souls" (171erapeia 
psuchas) presupposes universal sin as the fatal disease that afflicts humanity 
(Sen11011s, II, p. 171f.). It is a leveler of all human schemes of self-salvation and 
the presupposition (preparatio eva11gelica) for his creation-wide conception of 
salvation (justification and sanctification) by faith. Taken in its therapeutic 
context, Wesley could even see tremendous benefits in the doctrine of original 
sin: "See then you, upon the whole, how little reason we have to repine at the 
fall of our first parent, since herefrom we may derive such unspeakable advan-
tages both in time and in eternity" (Sen_no11s, IT, p. 434). 
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The second important connection for the doctrine, an obvious outgrowth of 
the first, was its structural role. The fall of the first Adam provides the pattern 
for redemption through the second Adam (Christ) . Albert Outler described it 
as Wesley's " dramatic theology of history" (Sen11011s, II, p. 451); it was founda-
tional to the soteriology of both Wesley brothers.15 Church fathers as ancient 
as Irenaeus ( d. 198?) looked to the Pauline pairing of the first and second 
Adams to find a paradigm for speaking of humanity's long trek from being ex-
iles of Eden to having the Imago Dei restored within them through the love of 
the Son of God. This pattern pervaded the SOSO, and gave Wesley's theology 
the sort of symmetry (his word was " proportion") that he described as the 
"analogy of faith." 16 It set his soteriology against the background of the larger 
plight of all humanity, and made his theology of redemption less individualistic 
than the way we have been accustomed to reading it. It gave him a theology of 
history, in which the "Mystery of Iniquity" and the "Mystery of Godliness" are 
worked out on the broad stage of human events (Sem 1011s, II, p. 452). And for 
all his criticism of the Enlightenment's anthropology, Wesley also embraced the 
substance of its optimism about the perfectibility of humanity (by grace) and 
thereby set his doctrine of original sin in a thoroughly constructive context.17 
While coming "lo the very edge of Calvinism," Wesley's soteriological opt i-
mism emphatically distinguished him from its narrow reading of the parameters 
of redemptive grace.18 Hence, on two separate occasions, he drew a direct line 
from the fall of Adam to the incarnation of Christ, setting both events in the 
context of divine, therapeutic grace. Wesley wrote: " If Adam had not fallen, 
Christ had not died" (Sem zo11s, II , p. 411 , 433). 
VARI E D CONTEXTS 
The emphasis Wesley gave his doctrine of sin is especially significant as 
one tries to assess its adequacy. A few of his early sermons, especially those 
written sermons which stand on the shoulders of his popular evangelism, do not 
offer Wesley's famous distinction between sin " properly" and " improperly so-
called." The early SOSO sermons link inner and outer sins, urging repentance 
and liberation from both bondages.19 In fact, SOSO # 9, "Spirit of Bondage 
and Adoption," seems to go out of its way to argue that the issue of intentional-
ity does not enter into the assessment of one's guilt: " If thou dost [commit sin], 
is it willingly or unwillingly? In either case God hath told thee whose thou art--
'He that committeth sin is of the devil."' (Sen11011s, I, p. 264). In these in-
stances Wesley used the broadest conception of sin; his early evangelism fol-
lowed the so/a fides tradition in emphasizing a hamartiology that undercuts all 
human attempts at self-justification. 
With that foundation soundly in place, Wesley turned his attention to the 
residual effects of sin which remain in believers. In "The First-fruits of the 
Spirit" ( # 8) , and "On Sin in Believers" (#13), he sought to clarify the connec-
tion between residual sin in believers and his conception of sanctification. In 
the former (sect. III.5-6) he makes a distinction between willful transgression 
and "sins of infirmity" --including " involuntary failings" and "sins of surprise" --
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since "they that are in Christ and walk after lhe Spiril are nol condemned ... for 
anything whatever which lhey are not able to help ... " (Sermons, I, p. 246-247). 
In the latter section he sought to reconcile his sotcriology wilh his hamartiology 
and other current expressions, especially crilicizing the Moravian notion that a 
person could be pure in heart but not in lheir "flesh" or physical life. Wesley 
was willing to affirm a believer's "sinlessness" wilh respect lo oulward sin, but 
he could not affirm that a believer, as soon as he or she is justified, is "freed 
from all sin" (Sen11011s, I, p. 321f.). "Hence," Wesley concluded, "although 
even babes in Christ are sanctified, yet it is only in parl .... Accordingly, believers 
are continually exhorted to watch against the flesh, as well as the world and the 
devil" (Sennons, I, p. 332-333; cf. #14, "The Repentance of Believers"). 
This line of development reached its apex in #19, "The Great Privilege of 
those that are Born of God." H ere "sin" was understood "according to the 
plain, common acceptation of the word: an actual, voluntary 'transgression of 
the law'; of the revealed, written law of God; of any commandment of God ac-
knowledged to be such at the time it is t ransgressed" (SOSO, #19, p. 436). 
This emphasis upon volu11tary tra11sgressio11 laid some of the basis for Wesley's 
perfectionism that both looked to a complete renovat ion of the human will 
(which was considered sinlessness in the Wesleyan, special sense of lhe word), 
and yet which was also fraught with qualifiers in order to take into account the 
extent of human frailty. 
John Wesley's SOSO moved toward the doctrine of sanctificalion with "a 
singleness of eye." But the chronological dislocation of several of his most im-
portant sermons on this topic suggests that Wesley ordered this collection of 
sermons with a theological agenda in mind. The earliest extant sermon on 
sanctification, "The Circumcision of the H eart" (1733), was pushed back to po-
sition #17 in the SOSO, signaling, I think, the author's recognition of the diffi-
culties associated with what he considered to be Methodism's most distinctive 
doctrine. More standard topics like justification, sanctification, religious affec-
tions and the nature of the new birth were treated before broaching the topic of 
Christian perfection. Outler is certainly correct to point out that the location of 
the sermon rings true "in the right order of Christian experience" (Semzo11s, I 
p. 400). The position of "The Circumcision of the Heart" is also didactically 
sound, since one must have the preceding doctrines well in hand in order to 
understand Wesley's distinctive views on sanctification as Christian perfection. 
The next major presentation of Christian perfection was found in sermon 
#40, "Christian Perfection" (1741). The topic had been opened in several 
inlervening sermons, but now it received fuller treatment. One might conclude 
that its position, after fourteen sermons on the Kingdom of God and eight ser-
mons about religious affections, has something to do with Wesley's desire to 
ground his teaching about perfection in practical theology and Christian experi-
ence. But the immediate context of "Christ ian Perfection" is even more inter-
esting since the sermon is set amidst six apologetical pieces; furthermore, an 
apologetic tone is registered by lhe sermon's insistence (like the larger tract by 
the same Lille) on clarifying exactly what this sort of perfection is NOT . While 
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the theological thrust is consonant with the earlier sermon, the apologetic tone 
suggests that Wesley's conception of Christian perfection had begun to cause 
misconceptions which needed to be put to rest. 
"The Scripture Way of Salvation" (#43, 1765) maintains the standard 
Wesleyan themes ("sanctified, saved from sin and perfected in love"), but also 
indicates that two important questions had come to the forefront: whether 
Christian perfection was to be expected " now," "at any moment," or on the 
threshold between life and death; and, whether God works " this great work in 
the soul gradually or instantaneously'' (Sen11011s, II, p. 168). Ending the ser-
mons on a note of evangelistic urgency, John registered his preference for an 
instantaneous work that is to be expected " now." 
In 1784 Wesley issued two significant treatments of Christian perfection. 
The one, "On Perfection" ( #76), was a latter day attempt to explain the doc-
trine along the lines marked out in "The Circumcision of the Heart." Wesley's 
tone was, as Outler describes it, "irenic." His approach was to reduce the doc-
trine to its essential core: Christian perfection defined in terms of the love of 
God and neighbor, and sin understood from the standpoint of voluntary trans-
gression ("sin properly so-called"). The more controversial issues which had 
emerged in "The Scripture Way of Salvation" were jettisoned for the moment, 
as Wesley chose, instead, lo "expostulate a little with the opposers of this per-
fection." 
The second sermon from 1784, "On Patience" ( #83), seems to have been 
born in the midst of controversy. Outler suggests that the sermon's setting--
amidst still another controversy with the Calvinists--explains its rejection of " fi-
nal preservance" (eternal security). But this context also explains the connec-
tion which Wesley drew between patience and Christian perfection. Pointing 
out the immaturity of the opposition, Wesley urged the Methodists to have pa-
tience in the midst of the sort of trials which reline one's faith, since trials lead 
lo Christian perfection (Sem1011s, III, p. 173). In the closing paragraphs of "On 
Patience," he returned to the more controversial issues surrounding Christian 
perfection; he urged " the universal change which turned holiness that was 
" mixed" into that which was "entire," and claimed that this change " is com-
monly, if not always, an instantaneous work" (Sem1011s, 111, p. 176-179). Those 
closing paragraphs of "On Patience" offer Wesley's most unqualified state-
ments about Christian perfection found in the SOSO. 
Interestingly enough, in other later sermons where Wesley sought to re-
form the attitudes and morals of the populace at large (i.e., " Reform ation of 
Manners" [#52], "On Riches" [#108] or " National Sins and Miseries" [#111]), 
he returned readily to the broader, evangelistic description of sin ("not properly 
so-called"). Thus, when reading Wesley on hamartiology one must ask whether 
he understands himself as fun ctioning as an evangelist/ reformer or as a spiri-
tual supervisor addressing those already striving to " run the race set before 
them." And in his willingness to link those two sides of the theological task we 
find that sense of balance which makes Wesleyan hamartiology worth reconsid-
ering. 
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SOCIETAL SIN 
Wesley looked lo the human will for the root of sin (in contradistinction to 
social or contextual causes).20 He responded to the rhetorical question, "Why 
is there pain in the world?" by pointing to human sin (Sermons, II, p. 400-401). 
In a similar fashion, "the origin of evil" can be traced to the Edenic Fall, which 
"God permitted in order to a fuller manifestation f sic.] of his wisdom, justice, 
and mercy, by bestowing upon all who would receive it an infinitely greater 
happiness than they could possibly have attained, if Adam had not fallen" (Ser-
mons, II, p. 434). But Wesley's emphasis upon the pe rsonal character of sin 
was not so pervasive that he was blind to systemic injustice and societal evil. 
Wesley's sermons offer us two important test cases for looking al his ap-
proach to human sin in the collective or societal sense. The first issue is easily 
identified by the title of one of his later sermons, "National Sins and Miseries" 
( #111). It traces the impact of human sin beyond the individual into society. 
The "mystery of iniquity" has corrupted all facets of human history including 
the church (Sen11011s, II, p. 309). His sermon on "The Reformation of Man-
ners" ( #52), delivered before a reformatory society by the same name, offered 
a direct and admittedly s implistic solution to the problem: "So far 
as ... righteousness in any branch is promoted, so far is the national interest ad-
vanced. So far as sin, especially open sin, is restrained, the curse and reproach 
are removed from us" (Scmwns, II, p. 309). Wesley's approach to the evil in 
human society began with the Word of God and personal piety, and it also ex-
tended beyond what others considered his appropriate field of influence to his 
urging legislation for the promotion of righteousness and restraint of evil. Per-
haps we will not feel the full force of the scandal Wesley felt in matters like 
"buying and selling on the Lord's Day." Perhaps issues like global hunger or 
apartheid touch us more acutely. But it is clear that a pattern emerges in these 
sermons that shows a deep awareness of the way in which the selfish attitudes 
or immoral actions of a few can abridge justice and threaten the well-being of 
the many. 
Wesley was even willing to sec some of the faults of British colonialism. As 
he wrote: "We have carried our laurels into Africa, into Asia, into the burning 
and frozen climes of America. And what have we brought thence? All the ele-
gance of vice which either the eastern or western world could afford" (Sennons, 
II, p. 574). But such sentiments were quickly silenced when dealing with the 
practical dilemma of the American Revolution (cf. "The Late Work of God in 
America" [ #113]). In Wesley's mind the conflict was the result of the colonists' 
spirit of arrogance, afnuence and self-indulgence; it was based in a fal se under-
standing of " liberty" (Sermons, 111, p. 607). The colonists confused "liberty" 
with the "spirit of independency." Quoting the poet, Alexander Pope, Wesley 
described this false liberty as "The glorious fault of angels and God" which is 
"overruled by the justice and mercy of God, first to punish those crying sins, 
and afterwards to heal them" (Sen11011s, lll, p. 607). After they have been pun-
ished for their waywardness and they arc "brought again to 'seek the kingdom 
of God and his righteousness,' there can be no doubt but 'all other things,' all 
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temporal blessings, 'will be added unto them' " (Sen11011s , III, p. 607) . These 
blessings will not include " independency (which would be no blessing, but a 
heavy curse ... ) but liberty--real liberty, which is an unspeakable blessing ... " (Ser-
mons, III , p. 607) . While Wesley did not believe that the North American 
claims of political explo itation were valid, his vision for God's resto ration of the 
land showed the familiar interconnection of spiritual and civil liberty: God 
"will superadd to Christian liberty, liberty from sin, true civil liberty; a liberty 
from oppression of every kind; from illegal violence; a liberty to enjoy their 
lives, their persons and their property--in a word, a liberty to be governed in all 
things by the laws of their country ... " (Sem wns, Ill, p. 607). 
In a second test case, if Wesley's view of " national sins" seemed to become 
more skewed as a result of his own poli tical identifications, his approach to 
riches became increasingly prophetic down through the years. His practical 
bent took Wesleyan evangelism from the doctrine of sin to the use of money 
with surprising rapidity.21 Wesley's exposition of the Serm on on the Mount (pt. 
111), connected gospel "meekness" with both self-sufficiency and gene rosity 
(Semwns, l, p. 528) . His most fa mous treatment of finances appeared in "The 
Use of Money" ( #50). Once again Wesley sought to steer a middle course be-
tween sloth and extravagance. He sought to raise the Methodists from poverty 
and yet save them from the temptations of surplus accumulation; hence his 
threefold dictum, " Gain all you can, Save all you can, Give all you can," marked 
out the way of careful stewardship. The acquisitionist portion of the program 
was tempered by suitable considerat ion for love of self and neighbor (sec. 1.3-
8) . Saving money is a portion of one's stewardship, and should be without self-
ish orientation: "Expend no part of it merely to gratify the desire of the flesh, 
the desire of the eye, or the pride of life" (p. 274). The first two rules found 
their motivation in the third: " Having first gained all you can, and secondly 
saved all you can, then give all you can" (p. 277). 
Where "The Use of Money" had been addressed to the populace, Wesley's 
sermon "The Good Steward" ( # 51) considered the responsibili ties of those to 
whom God has entrusted many talents--people of the upper class and financial 
substance. The tone and content of the sermon fi ts well its occasion, Wesley's 
"somewhat unlikely appointment as 'Chaplain to the Countess Dowager of 
Buchan' " (Sermons, 11, p. 281). More typical of Wesley was his st rong influ-
ence upon "Self Denial" ( # 48) as a central feature of gospel piety and spiritual 
power. 
By the tim e he was preaching and publishing "The Wisdom of God's Coun-
sels" ( #68), perhaps as much as forty years after "The Use of Money," Wesley 
had become much more skeptical about the: 
... deceitfulness of riches ... .A thousand melancholy proofs of which I 
have seen with in these last fifty years .... For who will believe they do 
him the least harm? And yet I have not known threescore rich 
persons, perhaps not half that number, during the threescore years, 
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who, as I can judge, were not less holy than they would have been had 
they been poor (Sen11011s, II, p. 560). 
Nor was Wesley now addressing people of substance, as he had in "The Good 
Steward" (#51); a "rich person" is now defined as one "who has food and rai-
ment for himself and family without running into debt and something over" 
(Semwns, II, p. 560). The Methodists seem to be among those who are not 
"giving aJI they can": "without which they must needs grow more and more 
earthly minded. Their affections will cleave to the dust more and more, and 
they will have less communion with God .... That must follow unless you give all 
you can, as well as gain and save all you can. There is no other way under 
heaven to prevent your money from sinking you lower than the grave ... " (Ser-
mons, II, p. 561). 
By 1781 and the inclusion of "The Danger of Riches" in SOSO (as #87), 
Wesley had become increasingly concerned about the issue of wealth. He con-
tinued to describe "riches" in a very minimal way: "Whoever has sufficient food 
to eat and raiment to put on, with a place where to lay his head, and something 
over, is riclz" (Sen11011s, III, p. 230). The danger of riches is that, "either de-
sired or possessed," they lead lo "foolish and hurtful desires." Wesley noted "a 
near connection between riches [and) ... anger, bitterness, envy, malice, revenge-
fulness, to an headstrong, unadvisablc, unreprovablc spirit--indeed to every 
temper that is earthly, sensual or devilish ... " (Semzo11s, III, p. 236). In Wesley's 
view, riches had become more and more the locus of sinful attitudes and behav-
ior. The sermon ends with a fa miliar saying: " It is easier for a camel to go 
through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man lo enter into the kingdom of 
heaven," but he leaves the door open Gust a crack): " ... yet the things impossible 
with men are possible with God. Lord, speak! And even the rich men that 
hear these words shall enter Thy kingdom!" (Sermons, Ill, p. 246). 
The third main sermon in this progression was "On Riches" (#108, 1788). 
Outler correctly notes striking parallels between this sermon and "The Use of 
Money'' (Semw11s, 111, p. 518). But the tone has changed markedly, and the 
mood of the later sermon is easily traced to the changing status of the Method-
ists: " How many rich men are there among the Methodists (observe, there was 
not one when they were first jo ined together!) who actually deny the mselves 
and take up their cross daily? ... See one reason among many why so few in-
crease in goods without decreasing in grace--because they no longer deny 
themselves and pick up their daily cross" (Semzo11s , m, p. 527-528). 
Because of the way in which riches "lead naturally" to " devilish" affections, 
and turn one's attention from God, Wesley came very close to considering 
wealth to be idolatrous and sinful. His definition of what constitutes " riches" 
and his repeated insistence upon Christians having the at titude of a beggar 
("meek" and " humble") provides a foundation for constructing a theology for 
the poor. But his "Gain, Save, Give" formula will not work for those who live 
their lives in abject poverty, or who are deprived of economic opportunity. Nor 
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will his primarily spiritual approach to problems like poverty and injustice sat-
isfy the just claims of the oppressed.22 In a similar fashion, Wesley's sermons 
on " national miseries" drew a direct connection between sin, society and civil 
law, and thereby provided a basis for speaking about the redress of systemic 
injustice. Yet when it came to particulars, like the North American Revolution, 
Wesley believed that the grievances of the colonists were primarily problems of 
piety and were not politically valid. 
It would seem appropriate to suggest that just as Wesley drew a direct con-
nection between personal and national sins an<l the downfall o f the nation, so 
also should virtues like " meekness" an<l "self-denial" have been extended from 
the personal to a national or international model. Some of this sort of a ttitude 
emerged in Wesley's evaluation of colonialism as a system, but in the final 
analysis he could not attribute the American Revolutionary War to anything 
other than the colon ists' sinful understanding of freedom. The raw materials 
for a societal theology that encom passes both individual and corporate sins are 
present in Wesley's SOSO, but the final construction must be one of our own 
making. 
CONCLUSION 
In his whimsical theological word book, Wishful Thi11ki11g, Frederick 
Buechner writes that "The power of sin is centrifugal. When at work in human 
life, it tends to push everything out toward the periphery. Bits and pieces go 
flying off until only the core is left. Eventually bits and pieces of the core itself 
go flying off until in the en<l nothing is left."23 This is certainly the way J ohn 
Wesley viewed sin; it attacked the very core of what it means to be a human 
being (our created Godlikeness and will) . In this respect Wesley's conception 
of sin is surprisingly current, because he drew an unabashedly direct line from 
personal sin to societal evil and injustice. Against a background of almost un-
bridled optimism about hum an capacity, he pointed to the graphic record of 
humanity's inhumanity, and yet Wesley's bedrock optimism about God's grace 
made his theological thrust a therapeutically restorative one. While not a ll of 
his modern heirs will agree with Wesley's penchant for starting the reformatory 
task with personal sin, we do see imbedded in his model the recognition that a ll 
sin has a personal quality; it is based in the will and conscience (or lack thereof) 
of individuals and their collectives. Nor docs Wesley see sin as a private matter 
between the individual and God-- individual sin quickly has catastrophic ramifi-
cations. 
While Wesley's treatment o f matters like poverty and discrimination (racial 
and gender) does not seem adequate by modern standards, his acknowledge-
ment of the pervasiveness of human sin and his vision of the interrelatedness 
and gracious perfectibility of all human life mark out the road we must travel if 
we would follow Wesley. It seems possible to think of Wesley's theology as 
being foundational for contemporary Wesleyan ethics, while also acknowledg-
ing that John Wesley himself may not be an adequate e thical "model" for mod-
ern Wesleyans--if by that we mean that our ethical concerns and actions must 
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specifically imitate or be limited by his own. Rather, it is appropriate to suggest 
that Wesley's hamartiology is determinative for the way in which his modern 
heirs understand themselves and their world, while arguing that (following 
Wesley's own pattern) our tradition must continue to expand in ever-increasing 
ripples of recognition of the dimensions of human sin and altcmpls to remedy 
the pain and injustice caused by it. 
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Groves, Joseph W. Actualization and Interpretation in the Old Testament. Soci-
ety of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series 86. Atlanta: Scholars Press 
1987. vii, 223 pp. Bibliography. No Indices. ISBN 0-89130-966-7. 
No modern scholar has equaled the influence of Gerhard Von Rad on the 
study of Old Testament theology. Central to Von Rad's impact was his discov-
ery of powerful hermeneutical and theological forces at work in the growth of 
the Old Testament tradition. Joseph W. Groves provides a competent analysis 
of the centerpiece of Von Rad's exegesis: the concept of "actualization," which 
denotes the process by which the Old Testament writers made the past acts of 
God, and the ancient traditions about those acts, live afresh for the recipients of 
a later time. After a brief introduction outlining the modern preoccupation with 
bridging the gulf between historical-critical description of the Bible as an his-
torical "artifact" and Christian theology's approach to the Bible as a normative 
rule of faith, the first chapter sketches the essential character, roots and unfold-
ing of Von Rad's understanding of actualization. Groves finds the roots of Von 
Rad's conception in Herder, Gunkel and Mowinckel. Herder understood the 
interpreter of a text to be one who made the past live again, cont em porizing 
material otherwise locked into its own historical context. Gunkel's pioneering 
form-critical work presented a portrait of the biblical literature's steady, or-
ganic development, thus disclosing concerns for contemporaneity within the 
material itself. Mowinckel's anthropological understanding of the cult as a ve-
hicle for uniting the present worshiper to the primal time of God's activity lo-
cated actualization at the heart of Israel's worship. Groves then traces the evo-
lution of Von Rad's approach culminating in Old Testament Theology, relating 
actualization to the other major elements of Von Rad's theological approach: 
promise-fulfillment, typology and the creative word of God in history. 
The second chapter follows the development and extension of Von Rad's 
approach in the work of Martin Noth, Claus Westermann, Hans Walter Wolff, 
D. R. Jones, P. R. Ackroyd, Brevard S. Childs, Norman Porteous, James Sand-
ers and Odil Hannes Steck. This chapter overwhelmingly documents the perva-
sive impact of Von Rad's theological method on the best in modern theological 
interpretation. In particular, Groves demonstrates the close relationship among 
actualization, redaction criticism and canonical interpretation. Incidentally, 
Groves's correct linkage of Brevard Childs's emphasis on canon as the context 
for exegesis with Von Rad's theological understanding of tradition development 
provides a welcome correction of the misconstrual of Childs's proposal as an 
ahistorical, purely synchronic " literary" approach somehow related to "new 
criticism" or structuralism (for example: John Barton, Reading the Old Testa-
ment [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984], pp. 140-179). 
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The third chapter presents an extensive analysis of the nature of actualiza-
tion as Yon Rad presented it. Groves distinguishes three types of actualization 
in Von Rad's work. In literary actualization a text simply revivifies an old image 
or tradition. Cullie actualization derives from Israel's worship and is only indi-
rectly related to the Old Testament text, although the core concept of cultic ac-
tualization is typically invoked for elucidating the tc>..1s. Chronological act ualiza-
tion focuses on the organic development of the biblical tradition with its inner 
hermeneutical and theological character. The latlcr is most distinctive of Yon 
Rad's exegesis. Groves's exposition is sympathetic, but his criticisms arc equally 
trenchant. He argues that actualization is not unique to the Bible, discussing in 
turn the connection between cultic and chronological actualization, Israel 's 
sense of history and Israel's sense of time. He then argues that actualization, as 
Von Rad described it, is not central to inner-biblical exegesis, though clearly 
some kind of reuse of ancient tradition is the theological engine driving the Old 
Testament forward. Finally, Groves argues the actualization does not, as Yon 
Rad and others thought, provide a suitable bridge between historical-cri tical 
analysis and the religious concerns of contemporary readers of the Bible. 
In his final chapter, Groves offers a reformulation of the concept of actuali-
zation growing out of his own exegesis of some critical passages for developing 
the concept: Dcut 5:1-3, Amos 9:11-15 and Isaiah 36-39. In these discussions he 
points out that the reuse of tradition is usually discernible not by reconst ructing 
the growth of the material, but by analyzing the present literary contc>..1s of the 
passages. His redefini tion of actualization, therefore, emphasizes how the new 
literary context of a passage affects its meaning. Sometimes actualization in-
volves a shift in the semantic level of a text. Other times actualization involves 
literary interrelationships indicated explicitly by vocabulary resonances. Other 
times actualization involves rethinking an entire biblical book. For Groves, the 
Bible's reuse of ancient tradition is best understood by careful scrutiny of the 
text's present shape. The final chapter summarizes the argument and sets out 
the parameters within which further development of the concept must move. 
This book is thorough, well argued and insightful. Groves makes frequent 
recourse to the original Germ an, when most use the English translation, and he 
often traces Yon Rad's thought through successive German editions of Old 
Testament 77zcology (cf. p. 43). The volume is helpful particularly in the context 
of the present discussions of " inner biblical exegesis" and the debate surround-
ing the role of the canon for theology. Herc, however, its primary weakness be-
comes apparent. This volume, though appearing with a 1987 publication date, is 
the author's 1979 Yale dissertation. Nowhere is the reader informed of the time 
lag between the writing and publication, nor docs the author note whether or 
not the original work has been revised. The publisher must bear responsibility 
for omitting this information. The book takes no cognizance of developments 
since 1979, such as Michael Fishbancs's Biblical lnterpretatio11 i11 A11cie11t Israel 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) . Groves also seems to consider redaction criticism a 
dead-end and fails to develop fully the implications of his own discussion for 
reformulating redaction criticism. It is no accident that the early New Testa-
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ment redaction critics, who generated great theological excitement and stimu-
lated renewed interest in the evangelists, drew their inspiration from Von Rad. 
Indeed, Graves's arguments, in the light of present discussions, offer important 
clues for assisting historical-critical interpreters to recover a holistic vision of 
their theological task. 
LAWSON G. STONE 
Assistant Professor of Old Testament 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Molina, Luis de. On Divi11e Foreknowledge: Part IV of 171e Concordia . 
Trans., Introduction and Notes, Alfred J. Fred<loso. llhaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1988. xii + 286 pp. $34.95, Cloth. ISBN 0-8014-2131-4. 
It is increasingly common for philosophers, especially those who are con-
cerned with theological topics, to take medieval philosophy as their point of de-
parture when they want to explore "the literature" on some issue. And on 
many topics, the most thorough and rigorous discussion to be found is by a me-
dieval philosopher. Indeed, contemporary philosophers often discover that 
moves they have made and distinctions they have employed were worked out in 
great detail by their medieval predecessors. Unfortunately, however, much of 
the interesting medieval philosophy remains untranslated, and thus inaccessible 
to those who do not read Latin. 
In this volume, Alfred J. Frcddoso, who teaches philosophy at Notre 
Dame, has made widely accessible a text which has attracted considerable 
interest in the past few years. The author, Molina, was a sixteenth Century Jes-
uit who was one of the main figures in a rather intense controversy concerning 
the relationship between divine sovereignty and hum an freedom. Freddoso's 
translation covers only one part of Molina's main work, 171e Concordia, the full 
title of which is 171e Compatibility of Free Choice with the Gifts of Grace, Dh•ine 
Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination a11d Reprobation. As the title indi-
cates, Molina was concerned to maintain genuine human freedom--which phi-
losophers usually call libertarian freedom--without in any way weakening the 
claim that God has absolute foreknowledge and is fully provident. 
All of these issues converge in Molina's treatment of divine foreknowledge. 
What is most distinctive about Molina's views in this regard is his idea of 
"middle knowledge," which he characterizes as that knowledge 
by which, in virtue of th e most profound and in scrutable 
comprehension of each faculty of free choice, He saw in His own 
essence what each such faculty would do with its innate freedom were 
it to be placed in this or in that or, indeed, in infinitely many orders of 
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things even though it would really be able, if it so willed, lo do the 
opposite ... (p. 168). 
To oversimplify, God's middle knowledge is his knowledge of what all possible 
free persons would do in all possible circumstances or situations. Since these 
persons are free, they could do otherwise, but God knows what they would in 
fact do if He created them in such and such circumstances. 
God providentially orders the world in light of His middle knowledge, ac-
cording to Molina. So God's foreknowledge of what will actually happen de-
pends logically on both His middle knowledge and His knowledge of which per-
sons and circumstances He has chosen to create. 
The idea of middle knowledge is a very fruitful one which has been applied 
to a number of current discussions in philosophy of religion. Probably the best-
known recent application of the notion is that of Alvin Plantinga in his various 
formulations of the " Free Will Defense" as a response to the problem of evi l. 
(It is noteworthy, however, that Plantinga was not aware of Molina's work when 
he initially devised his free will defense and he admits he did not know whether 
it was commendation or condemnation when he was first called a Molinist!) In 
our day, as in Molina's, his views have become the subject of considerable con-
troversy. 
Freddoso has enhanced the value of his translation by including a lengthy 
(81 page) Introduction which is a substantial work of philosophy in its own 
right. Much of this is given to explicating the modal, metaphysical and logical 
distinctions which are important for understanding Molina's argument. Fred-
doso also takes pains to set the discussion of divine foreknowledge in its larger 
theological context, particularly stressing its connection with the orthodox doc-
trine of providence. In the last section of the Introduction, he defends Molin-
ism against a number of objections. 
Although his case for Molinism is impressive overall, his response to one 
objection is particularly disappointing. He argues, contrary to some critics, that 
there is no reason for a Molinist to deny the " principle of predilection," accord-
ing to which God distributes the favors of His grace unequally (pp. 65-66). This 
principle, of course, is readily embraced by those who hold that God bestows or 
withholds His grace as He will. It does not, however, fit as easily into a Molin-
ist framework, especially since one of Molina's aims was to construe the doc-
trine of predestination in a way which does justice to the claim that God desires 
to save all persons. If the principle of predilection is accepted, Molinism does 
not seem to represent much of an improvement over the views Molina op-
posed. 
This volume is of obvious interest to those in the Wesleyan tradition since 
the issues Molina debated with his opponents parallel those in Protestant theol-
ogy which separate Calvinists on one hand, and Arminians and Wesleyans on 
the other. I suspect many Wesleyans will find in Molina a powerful ally on 
matters of foreknowledge, providence and predestination. 
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This is not, I should add, a book for the casual reader or the half-inter-
ested. But those who still recognize the value of hard thinking on classical 
theological questions will find it to be very stimulating and helpful for their con-
cerns. 
JERRY L. WALLS 
Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Religion 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Webber, Robert E. Celebrating Our Faith: Evangelism 171rougll Worship. San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1986. 118 pp. $11.95. ISBN 0-
06069-286-3. 
The hype of the American church today is numerical growth and congrega-
tional planting. The market is inundated in one way or another with "how to" 
books on the subject of harvest. There is mass, personal, para-church and life-
style evangelism ... name it, it is for sale. So one might think that Webber's litur-
gical evangelism is just another new gimmick or fad technique. Not so! 
Webber's approach is as old as the third century. His generative idea comes 
from Hippolytus's 171e Apostolic Tradition. The idea is developed by a Protes-
tantization of the modern Catholic version of this ancient evangelism called the 
"rite of Christian initiation of adults" (RCIA). The approach is grounded in a 
sound Christology, a strong theology of the Church, a structure of ritual and 
stages of faith development. 
From Hippolytus, via Piaget, Erikson and Fowler (and I would add John 
Wesley), Webber constructs three rites of passage in a person's conversion. 
Within these rites there is a period of inquiry, times of instruction and disci-
pleship, a period of purification and enlightenment, the moment of initiation 
into Christ and His Church, and a final period of integration into the life of the 
Church. Webber adequately demonstrates these stages of conversion chapter 
by chapter, presenting for each a biblical background, experiences of the early 
church and a modern application of the tradition. 
Webber's own disjunctures in faith have already given us such helpful 
books as Worship Old and New, Worship Is A Verb, and Evangelicals 011 the 
Canterbury Trail. He is well acquainted with the sources, giving excellent Notes, 
Bibliography and an Epilogue which cites helps for making the liturgical model 
a cutting edge in local congregations today. 
The book stresses only first-generation Christians--the conversion of 
adults. I would like to see a book by Webber covering second-generation 
Christians--the faith development of infants and young children. Such a book 
might clear up some of the vestiges of his Baptist theological heritage which 
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appear here and there in his sacramental theology (e.g., chapter 7) . One re-
joices, however, in his ecclesiology, especially in regard to the process o f con-
version and continual renewal of the church. This book is a must for the season 
of Lent! 
DONALD C. BOYD 
Professor of Preaching and Worship 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Davies, W. D., and Allison, Dale C., Jr. A Critical a11d fa:cgetical Co111111e11tary 
011 the Gospel accordi11g to Sai11t Mat/hew. Vol. I: Introduction and Com-
mentary on Matthew I-VII. The International Critical Commentary. Ed-
inburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988. 731 pp. $55.16. ISBN 0-56709-481-2. 
It is remarkable that the Gospel of Matthew, which has exerted primary 
influence upon Christian life and thought from the very beginning of the 
Church, has received so little a ttention by English-speaking commentators dur-
ing the past seventy-five years. The last of the great English commentaries on 
the First Gospel appeared in the dawning years of this century; and in spite o f 
the immense learning and acute critical insights contained in them, these works 
are now clearly outdated. The most significant recent commentaries have been 
written in German or French, and left untranslated into English (one thinks of 
Lohmeyer, Gaechtcr, Grundmann, Gnilka, Luz and Sabourin). The English-
language commentaries which have emerged in the last several years have ei-
ther been limited by the space restrictions of the series in which they appeared 
(as with the otherwise fine volume by David Hill in the New Century Bible 
Commentary), o r have suffered from idiosyncratic biases (as with the commen-
tary by R obert Gundry). 
The time is ripe, then, for an up-to-date, thorough, learned and perspica-
cious commentary on Matthew. And there is no better place to look for such a 
work than in the new series of the International Critical Commentary. The 
New Testament scholarly community desperately needs a great commentary, 
written from within the English-speaking world, on the First Gospel. Is it to be 
found in this massive work by Davies and Allison? 
One approaches this commentary with great expectations. Both authors 
are mature scholars who have written widely in New Testament studies, with 
particular attention to the Gospel of Matthew. W. D . Davies, especially, has 
earned a wide and well-deserved reputation as a fair, informed and profound 
interpreter of the New Testament. Moreover, this commentary is of immense 
size. The volume under review, itself over 700 pages long, covers only the In-
troduction and chaps. 1-7; two subsequent volumes are planned. 
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Jn the face of such high expectations, the commentary generally disap-
points. One senses difficulties already in the first pages of the Introduction, 
which deal with method. Here the authors (seem to) opt for a wholistic ap-
proach, one that takes seriously the traditional historical-critical analysis, while 
at the same time employing insights from literary criticism and canonical criti-
cism. Such an integrative approach is to be commended; but th is kind of inte-
gration requires thorough understanding, reflection and a high degree of her-
meneutical sophistication. These authors arc unable to pull it off. For one 
thing, they do not fully understand the literary and canonical methods, as they 
themselves admit. Further, although they state that literary criticism and the 
more traditional approaches arc complementary, they actually cannot believe 
this; for they (wrongly) identify the notion of semantic autonomy, as espoused 
by the New Critics, with literary criticism in general. It is obvious that semantic 
autonomy leaves no room for historical interpretation of the text. The upshot 
is that, despite asseverations to the contrary, Davies and Allison react against 
the literary and canonical criticisms. Indeed, they have produced a commentary 
that interprets the text almost ent irely on the basis of historical (mostly Jewish) 
parallels and to some extent the evangelist's editorial changes vis-a-vis Mark 
and Q, but gives no significant attention to evidence from the narrative itself. 
In fact, this commentary is less concerned with the logic of the narrative for 
interpretation than were the older com mentaries by Plummer, McNcile and 
Schlatter. 
This methodological confusion not only concerns the Introduction, but has 
implications for Davies and Allison's interpretation of the book as a whole, as 
well as individual passages within the book. For example, because Davies and 
Allison cannot find perfect historical parallels lo the form of our canonical 
Gospels, they conclude that our Gospels have no overall genre at all; they arc 
simply hybrid works that contain within them various kinds of genre. This view 
not only represents a problematic return to Dibelius's notion of Klei11/iterat11r, it 
also tends toward a rejection of real literary (an<l theological) integrity and co-
herence in the Gospel. 
Moreover, Davies and Allison frequently interpret individual passages only 
on the basis of historical parallels, with no allention given to the immediate or 
broader contexts, and with relatively little aucnt ion given even to Mallhew's re-
dactional aims. This tendency sometimes results in interpretations that actually 
contradict the context, as when they maintain that the infancy and baptism nar-
ratives emphasize the theme of new creation (a notion certainly absent in Mat-
thew's Gospel), or when they suggest that the devil's act of showing Jesus the 
kingdoms of the world (4:8-9) causes Jesus to possess them ("the act of show-
ing the kingdoms of the world seems lo be a legal one--lo see is lo possess"). 
In spite of these methodological short comings, this commentary contains a 
wealth of background information, exhaustive citations of rabbinic and other 
Jewish parallels, and clear presentations of the history of interpretation on vari-
ous passages. One should add, however, that the authors are stronger in listing 
historical data than they are in drawing persuasive conclusions from them. In 
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addition, the authors frequently discuss grammatical points in the text, but they 
usually fail to make theological applicatio n from their grammatical observa-
tions, even when such applications could certainly be made with justification. 
We conclude, then, that Davies and Allison have provided a sometimes 
he lpful commentary, but not a great commenta ry. The New T estament schol-
a rly community s till awaits a commenta ry on Matthew that matches, for ex-
ample, the magnificent work by Joseph Fitzmyer on the Gospel of Luke. 
DA vm R. BAUER 
Associate Professor of English Bible 
A sbury Theological Seminary 
Lohse, Eduard. 171e First Christians: Their Beginnings, Writings and Beliefs, 
trans. M. Eugene Boring. Philadelphia: Fo rtress, 1983. 126 pp. ISBN 0-
8006-1646-4. 
Bishop E duard Lohse of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, H anover, West 
Germany, formerly taught New Testament at the University of G ottingen. In 
addition to his scholarly contributions to the mission of the C hurch, such as his 
commentary on Colossians and Philemon in the acclaimed H ermeneia series, 
he is g ifted at writing for the informed lay pe rson. His 171e New Testament En-
vironment (Nashville: Abingdon, 1976) is a satisfactory undergraduate text, and 
17ze First Christians would be useful as a basic reading for an adult class in the 
church. 
The book amounts to a thematic int roductio n to the New Testament with 
attention to the co mmunities of fa ith in which its d ocuments arose. It is divided 
into five chapters: the person of Jesus, His words and deeds, the beginnings of 
the C hurch, the distinctives of the early Christ ian community and the distinc-
tives of the New Testament. The author's thesis is thoroughly evangelical and 
tho roughly Luthe ran: "The New T estament is a collection o f writings tha t show 
wha t the first Christians believed and preached ... , the gospel of God's grace, 
which in C hrist is extended to all people of the world. It is this news, this gos-
pel, that is the heart and cente r of Scripture, giving unity to a ll its parts" (p. 7). 
By the use of a ple thora of insights into the culture prevailing at the time of 
the New Testament, and the tools of New Testament research and criticism, 
Lohse demonstrates this unity by inte racting with the diversity he discovers 
within scripture. The pa rticular circumstances tha t called forth the va rious 
books of the New T estament and the unique perspective of each author or 
community o f faith gave rise to contrasting reports within the New T estament 
which cannot be reconciled or harmonized . For example, Lohse believes that 
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the reasoning by which J ames refut es those who were attempting lo separate 
faith and works would not have been acceptable to Paul (p. 86). 
Lohse does not attempt to harmonize these contradictions. Rather, he 
takes the differences of the various witnesses seriously and celebrates their 
common testimony to the distinctive and common fai th of the first Christians. 
For example, the synoptic gospels cast Jesus' words at the Last Supper in the 
context of a farewell Passover meal. The fourth gospel, in contrast, portrays the 
Last Supper as a farewell , but not a Passover meal. It is important for John that 
Jesus dies at the very time the Passover lambs were being sacrificed in the 
Temple . Lohse concludes that since the time of the farewell supper cannot be 
determined precisely, its meaning must not be derived from its cultic setting as 
a Passover meal, but from the words of J esus that are preserved in several of 
the traditions. Lohse points out that many religious groups in late antiquity 
gathered for cultic meals in o rder to be e mpowered by the deity or to become 
deified themselves. But a distinctive feature of the fa ith of the first Christians 
was that no cultic meal or ritual activity could mediate divine power. Rather "at 
the celebration of the Lord's Supper the death of the Lord is proclaimed, the 
one who died and was raised 'for us"' (p. 75) . 
Lohse agrees with Luther that books like James, Hebrews and the Revela-
tion arc of less value than the other books of the New Testament (p. 120) . And 
the resul t is a tende ncy to read the unity of the New Testame nt witness in 
Pauline terms. Nevertheless, in tension with his Lut heran tradition, Lohse re-
jects reading the Sermon on the Mount as a mirror reflecting the believer's in-
adequacy and, thus, revealing the necessity of divine grace. While the focus 
upon grace is good theology, the Scripture itself calls for another in terpretation 
(p. 56). 
This little book is well written, easily understood and includes suggestions 
for fu rther reading for anyone who wants a short and manageable treatment of 
the New Testame nt in its environment. It would be a valuable tex1book for 
adult classes or small disciple groups in the church. While the chapters are de-
scriptive and no t hort atory, they challenge readers to enter into the faith of the 
first Christians and live it out in their own cultural contexts. In churches where 
participants are un fa miliar with New Testament criticism or arc un prepared to 
deal with a plurality of viewpoints within Scripture, the book will need to be 
taught by a person prepared to deal with these matters. 
T he thrust of The First Cluistians is thoroughly constructive and positive, 
for Bishop Lohse insists that the books of the New Testament " unanimously 
testify to the Gospel of God's grace, which in Christ is extended to all the 
people of the world" (p. 120). 
A.H. MATHlAS ZAHNISE R 
Associate Professor of World Religions 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
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Kikawada, Isaac M. and Arthur Q uinn. Before Abraham Was: 17ie Unity of 
Genesis 1- 11. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1985. 144 pp. $10.95, paper. 
ISBN 0-687-02602-4. 
Isaac M. Kikawada teaches ancient Near-Eastern studies at Berkeley, and 
Arthur Quinn is a professor of rhe toric at the University of California at 
Berkeley. Their book contributes much to biblical scholarship. Altho ugh the 
book's main thesis, that Genesis is the work of o ne skillful autho r (although he 
may have used sources) , may not be persuasive, the book will serve well as an 
introductory text for some lite rary courses. Interested lay people and college 
and seminary students encounteri ng biblical criticism for the first time will find 
this book helpful. The authors describe some of the intricacies of biblical criti-
cism, but a lso demonstrate the aesthe tic beauty of the bibl ical text. 
The authors maintain that classical studies do ne over the past one hundred 
years support their claims for the authorial unity o f G enesis. In 1938, W. 
Schadewal t (also Cedric Whitman in 1958, in Homer and the Heroic Tradition 
[Cambridge: Harvard U niversity Press]), reversed the scholarly opinio n about 
the nature o f Ho mer's Iliad. Previo us to his study, lliasst11die11, classical schol-
ars had assigned the Iliad to the death of a thousand indeterminate sources. 
Current Homeric studies (outside of G erm any at least) no lo nger employ a 
documentary, but rather a unitary approach to the Iliad. A similar reversal has 
not, however, taken place in biblical studies, especia lly in the study of the Pen-
tateuch. 
Kikawada and Quinn maintain that the documentary hypothesis " remains 
an hypothesis" (p. 13). Their thesis is that the unity of Genesis is probably 
more subtle than the unity of the Iliad. It has escaped our best powe rs o f ob-
servation until now. They are not polemical, nor are they championing the 
evangelicals. Their hope is to perform an objective test for the possible unity of 
Genesis 1-11 which is picked, of course, because this is a section that the docu-
mentary hypothesis has t raditio nally used to establish its leading arguments for 
the sources JE P. 
In three chapters of lite rary analysis on Genesis 1-11, the writers conclude 
that they have "found an author with such complete mastery over his materials 
(whatever their source) that it makes no lite rary sense to speak o f him as an 
edito r" (p. 83). Chapter four, "One Noah. One Flood: The Coherence o f the 
Genesis Version" (pp. 83-106) summarizes the evidence for the unity o f Gene-
sis 1-11. In additio n to their appeal to the "unitary hypothesis" in Homeric 
studies, they cite a number of biblical scholars in support o f this conclusion o f 
unity. Bernhard Anderson, Francis l. Anderson, G . J. Wenham and, in a nega-
tive vein, Jeffrey H. Tigay. Kikawada and Quinn argue that Tigay has shown 
how much it would take to establish the documentary hypothesis o f Genesis 1-
11 (Tigay, 771e Evol111io11 of the Gilgamesh Epic, [Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1982]). 
In chapters live and six, Kikawada and Quinn branch out and suggest the 
application o f the unity of Genesis 1-11 as a paradigm for finding biblical unity 
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in other biblical texts (e.g., historical books). They do not develop a convincing 
case for their further proposals in these last pages. 
Kikawada and Quinn remain irenic throughout their study and are not "re-
belling against a century of Old Testament scholarship," as the publisher's 
blurb suggests. They rather build upon the insights gained by past research, 
even when they disagree with it. It appears to me that Kikawada and Quinn 
have demonstrated a great amount of unity in Genesis. But more problem pas-
sages remain to be treated, and the 11at11re of the 1111ity of Genesis does not nec-
essarily demand the conclusion they suggest. 
EUGENE E. CARPENTER 
Director of Graduate Studies 
Professor of Old Testament/Hebrew 
Bethel College, Mishawaka, IN 
Craigie, Peter C. 171e Old Testament. Its Background, Growth, and Content. 
Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1986. 351 pages. $18.95, cloth. ISBN 0-687-
28751-0. 
The name of Peter Craigie is well known in conservative circles of Bible 
scholars. Craigie, before his death in 1986, was for several years the dean of the 
faculty of humanities at the University of Calgary. Other useful works of his 
include 771e Book of Deuteronomy (1976), 77ie Problem of War i11 the Old Testa-
m ent (1978) and Ugarit and the Old Testament (1983) (all from Eerdmans). The 
last-mentioned title indicates Craigie's intense interest in the language and lit-
erature of the West Semitic world. He brings this extra-biblical knowledge to 
the fore in the present work as well. This is all to the good of the reader. As a 
United Methodist, the reviewer is grateful to Abingdon for taking on such a 
necessary publishing project with so capable a scholar. 
One thing that strikes the reader almost from the first is that Peter Craigie 
attempts throughout his work to present both what modern mainline historical 
critical scholarship and what traditional and conservative scholars think about 
the Old Testament. Thus, one will find here positions with which one will not 
always agree (Craigie himself frequently docs not) . But one will find a fair de-
scription of "how the other halP' thinks--and this from a scholar who is highly 
conversant with such positions. The key word for describing his references to 
historical critical and other issues is "balance." Unlike many conservative stu-
dents, he is able to see the value in certain liberal positions with which he may 
not always agree. He is open to any logical, defensible positions which will help 
to explain the present form of the Old Testament books. And Craigie fre-
quently offers a level-headed critique of entrenched positions on both the lib-
eral and conservative sides of scholarship. 
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The work is divided into five parts. Part I introduces the book and deals 
with "The Phenomenon of the Old Testament." Here are contained brief but 
informative discussions of the nature of the Old Testament, the titles of the 
separate books which compose it, canon and formation of the entire Hebrew 
Bible, its languages, chronological perspectives, the preservation of its texts, its 
place in contemporary religions and its relationship to the humanities. In the 
latter two sections Craigie illustrates the pervasiveness of the Old Testament's 
influence in modern secular society and thus demonstrates our need to under-
stand it. 
Part II is labeled, "Background of the Old Testament Period." Here is 
where Craigie really excels. In this sixty-page section he describes the im portant 
civilizations of the ancient Near East which contribute to an understanding of 
ancient Israel's own culture and literature. In the first half of Part 11, Craigie 
places the summarized Old Testament story in the context of historical devel-
opments of the great civil izations of Mesopotam ia and Egypt. In a second sub-
division he discusses the value and admitted limits of archeology in enhancing 
our understanding of the Old Testament. Here he discusses several im portant 
sites such as Tell Mardikh (Ebia) and Qum ran. The value of physical and liter-
ary archeological remains are assessed. There is much in the Old Testament 
which archeological discoveries have not explained; nor can one expect them to. 
Part III, the longest portion of the book at 150 pages, may be considered 
the "meat" of the book since it deals with the individual Old Testament books. 
Here, in conformity with his opening remarks on canonization, Craigie deals 
with the literature in its Hebrew canonical order: the Law, the Prophets and the 
Writings. This portion of the work orients the reader to the sacred literature so 
that one is exposed in canonical sequence to the historical prophetic books fol-
lowed by the major and minor prophets. Likewise, Craigie treats the Writings 
in two digestible sections (Psalms with Wisdom Literature and other books of 
the ketlmbim ). 
Craigie describes the "Content of the Old Testament" in a fourth part of 
his book under the respective chapter headings, "The History of Israel" and 
"The Religion and Faith of Israel." Here the reader is confronted wi th prob-
lems and perspectives in the study of Israel's history. Craigie recognizes that 
the historical narratives are written from a theological perspective using (from 
the modern historian's point of view) incomplete sources. Even given the differ-
ences in scholarly opinion on matters of authorship and dale, Craigie strives to 
offer the modern scholarly consensus on Israelite history. This is composed of 
the so-called " pre-historic" and " historic" periods. Genesis through Judges rep-
resents for most liberal scholars those Old Testament narrative works which re-
fer to the former period. Craigie admits, with the consensus, that the history of 
Israel as contained in the books falling into the second category is less conten-
tious. 
Having laid this foundation Craigie then moves through a discussion of 
each of the main historical periods which gave rise either directly or indirectly 
to the content of the Hebrew canon: the patriarchs, Exodus and Sinai, settle-
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ment of Canaan, the united and divided monarchies, and the exile and restora-
tion. Here Craigie's position is conservative and well-informed about the Near-
Eastern history into which the biblical periods lit. This section includes several 
helpful charts which contain dates for figures associated with the historical, pro-
phetic and "writings" literature. 
In the second chapter of Part IV ("The R eligion and Faith of Israel") the 
author acquaints the reader with the components of ancient Israelite cult, com-
mon religious beliefs and ideas, the prophetic contribution to the faith of an-
cient Israel, and the place of the Wisdom traditions. One will come away from 
this section feeling less estranged from the peculiar idioms of, say, the classical 
prophetic books and the Psalter. 
The "E pilogue" comprises the final brief section of the book. H ere Craigie 
orients the reader toward the modern study of the Old Testament: what schol-
ars are interested in pursuing at present. The final segment of Part V consists 
of the useful annotated bibliography of books for the study of Old Testament 
literature, history and culture. Besides the Scripture index there is a general in-
dex keyed to biblical names and topics of study. Due to the nature of his con-
cise discussions, the former index often directs one to crucial passages for un-
derstanding each book. 
An example of Craigie's balanced approach may be seen in his treatment 
of the composition of Isaiah. He recognizes that there were reasonable grounds 
which gave rise to the formation of a hypothesis of mulliple authorship for this 
book such as differences in historical perspective and literary style (pp. 153-
154). Conservative scholarship, in attempting to maintain the unity of the book 
regarding authorship, represents "a minority position within biblical scholarship 
as a whole" (p. 155). On the other hand, he also recognizes that the author or 
editor has done nothing to confirm the modern notion of multiple authorship. 
R ather " .. .it is essential to recognize that the book of Isaiah in its present form 
is presented, apparently deliberately, as a single and unified work" (p. 155). 
This fact suggests that it is to be read and com prehended in its entirety. 
Likewise, in grappling with the date of the book of Daniel, Craigie presents 
both the older traditional view of a late sixth-century authorship alongside that 
held by many modern scholars: circa 167-164 13.C. He then opts for a moderate 
position admitting that "a firm dating of the book remains debatable and diffi-
cult" (p. 247). Nevertheless, the book is not intended as "a prophetic timetable 
of either the ancient world or the twenty-first centuries." Craigie recognizes 
that the most important issue at hand is lo understand the visionary message of 
Daniel, a task which is all too easily clouded "by lighting the battles of histori-
cal criticism ... " (p. 248). Daniel must be understood from the standpoint of its 
place in the genre(s) of apocalyptic literature. 
The reader of this review will have rightly discerned that Craigie has 
packed a tremendous amount of useful inform ation for the beginning and ad-
vanced reader in a relatively small space. Craigie has once more demonstrated 
his mastery at digesting much information into brief, readable sections. 
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The Old Testament is helpfully illustrated throughout with maps, c;hrono-
logical charts, script figures and museum photos. This is especially helpful in 
orienting the reader toward the ancient Near Eastern setting of the Old Testa-
ment (Parts II and IV). 
The book is intended primarily for undergraduates, and this reviewer be-
lieves it achieves the goal of condensing an enormous subject into a readable, 
accurate, introductory package. However, 77ze Old Testament will prove useful 
to seminary students and pastors as well. This reviewer has already found it 
helpful as a quick reference source lo the historical background for Old Testa-
ment books. No doubt it will serve this function for busy pastors. In fact, 
Craigie's work should make the Old Testament far more accessible and less in-
timidating to a wide audience of pastors and educated laity. And this is well in 
keeping with the lifetime goals of Dr. Craigie, who was himself a com milled 
churchman. 
PAUL DEAN DUERKSEN 
Pastor, The United Methodist Church 
Iraan, Texas 

